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The U.S. Treasury on Sept. 12 sanctioned 16 people affiliated with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro after the country’s disputed elections on July 28. The sanctioned individuals included leaders of Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and the National Assembly. What is the impact of such sanctions by the United States? How likely are the United States and European countries to impose further economic sanctions on Venezuela following the disputed election and the exile of opposition candidate Edmundo González? Should tougher sanctions be imposed on Venezuela?

Francisco Rodriguez, Rice Family Professor of the Practice of International and Public Affairs at the University of Denver: “The United States imposes two types of sanctions on Venezuela: targeted sanctions aimed at Venezuelan leaders, and economic sanctions aimed at key sectors of the economy. While many countries have imposed targeted sanctions on Venezuelan officials, the United States is alone in pursuing sanctions that directly target the country’s economy. There is considerable evidence that U.S. economic sanctions have exacerbated Venezuela’s crisis, hurting vulnerable Venezuelans. In my empirical work, I estimate that approximately half of Venezuela’s economic contraction since 2012—the largest ever documented outside of wartime—can be attributed to economic sanctions and other U.S. foreign policy decisions that affected the Venezuelan economy. There is thus a very strong case for lifting U.S. sanctions on the country’s oil industry, as Venezuelans should not be made to pay the cost for Nicolás Maduro’s atrocities. At the same time, there is also a strong case for maintaining targeted sanctions aimed at regime officials. Yet we should understand that more sanctions are unlikely to alter Venezuela’s current political equilibrium. Most key regime figures have already been sanctioned, and those who haven’t are likely to have moved their assets outside of the United States long ago. Extensive literature finds that sanctions are particularly ineffective at generating regime change. The reality is that the arsenal of tools that the international community has to stop a country from sliding into authoritarianism is limited. Recognizing that these limits exist is an important first step in designing a realistic foreign policy.”

Juanita Goebertus Estrada, director of the Americas Division at Human Rights Watch: “Maduro is able to stay in power by ensuring the loyalty of key members of the military through a combination of ‘carrots,’ particularly through grand corruption schemes, and ‘sticks,’ including arbitrary prosecution, detention and torture. To effectively promote a democratic transition in Venezuela, foreign governments should create counterincentives to encourage the military and others to side with democratic actors, stop repression and respect the true will of the people expressed in the polls on July 28. Targeted sanctions, particularly the freezing of assets, can play a role in what needs to be a much broader effort to incentivize officials to defect. Such sanctions should be implemented in a coordinated manner between the United States, the European Union and ideally Latin American governments. They should target strategic actors in the military and other key institutions, and should be explicitly and meaningfully conditioned to ending these people’s role in repression and the manipulation of electoral results. The sanctions should also make sure that relatives of those involved in corruption and human rights violations—including those living abroad—are not allowed to profit from illicit gains of corruption or abuse.”

Alejandro Velasco, associate professor at New York University: “If the aim of sanctions is to get those who are targeted to break from Maduro, then they are unlikely to succeed. The election confirmed that government officials, from the military to the courts to electoral authorities, are united in one goal: to remain in power. They have forsaken even the most minimal pretense of legitimacy and have calculated that they can withstand any pressure that comes their way. Sadly, they may not be wrong. Under Trump, the United States launched a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy to oust Maduro through crushing oil industry sanctions and unprecedented diplomatic isolation. Not only did that effort fail; it wrought untold harm upon a population already battered by the government’s ruinous economic policy, repression and corruption. For Maduro and those around him, the takeaway was that with some strategic support from abroad (Russia, China, Turkey and others), they can survive. That geopolitical landscape remains unchanged. If anything, it may be even more favorable to Maduro. That leaves the United States, Europe and Latin America with no good options when it comes to helping Venezuelans reclaim democracy. But some options are surely worse than others. Punishing everyday Venezuelans for their leaders’ actions should be a non-starter, not only as bad policy but as fundamentally immoral. Instead, the United States and Europe can take a backseat to Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, nations whose leftist governments have been highly critical of Maduro but have more sway with Caracas than does Washington. Of course that strategy may also fail. But with stakes so high, let’s strive to make new mistakes, not repeat old ones.”

Maria Puerta Riera, adjunct professor of political science and international politics at Valencia College: “The impact is likely to be limited given that these are individual sanctions. This will not to represent a threat to the sanctioned individuals’ hold on power. If anything, it will reduce the places they can travel to and where to safely hide their assets. However, there is a more concerning aspect regarding these measures, especially when there is a weak reinforcement mechanism. Individual sanctions need support from the international financial system. If these individuals are being punished for their role in human rights violations, it is critical that the consequences are the same around the world, specifically when it comes to its implementation, otherwise the punishment is worthless. The United States has made clear there will be consequences and has moved immediately with this first batch of individual sanctions, accumulating close to 2,000 visa restrictions imposed on government officials involved in undermining democracy, significant corruption and human rights violations. However, the European Union has a more complicated scenario regarding sanctions. The recent attempt to recognize Edmundo González Urrutia as Venezuela’s president-elect brought some divisions among the European Parliament, with further calls for reinstating sanctions against members of the National Electoral Council, as well as issuing targeted sanctions against Nicolás Maduro and his inner circle, based on the E.U. Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. The lack of initial agreement indicates this will need further negotiations among the different European coalitions. Rather than tougher sanctions that hurt the most vulnerable Venezuelans, individual sanctions need to be more effective. There is no use in having sanctions imposed on Venezuelan officials who are unlikely to leave the country for fear of arrest, when their family members are living abroad, enjoying the freedom and privileges obtained through their ties to the Maduro regime. There needs to be more surveillance and reinforcement.”

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