Nicaraguans have taken to the streets in recent days to demand the resignation of President Daniel Ortega.

Spurred by public anger over a planned social security reform, Nicaragua has been wracked by some of its biggest protests since the country’s civil war ended in 1990. President Daniel Ortega has backed off the reform, but protesters have continued taking to the streets to demand his resignation. Why has there been so much violence and carnage now in Nicaragua, which had enjoyed decades of relative calm? Will the Ortega family dynasty fall, and will authorities be held accountable for the deaths and repressive tactics that they are accused of by human rights activists? What will it take to appease protesters? Why has Nicaragua’s state-run pension system run out of money?

Mario Arana, director of the Nicaraguan Foundation for Social and Economic Development and a former Nicaraguan minister of finance and central bank president: "Ortega’s administration until recently had extraordinarily positive economic circumstances in large part due to a generous stream of cash from oil loans given by Hugo Chávez, which allowed the government to invest in public goods, social spending and giveaways, including the enrichment of a small cadre of trusted allies, which in turn helped Ortega to accumulate unusually high amounts of power. A number of other economic conditions helped as well. The debt overhang was finally over, and CAFTA, as expected, produced trade and investment benefits. Economic growth rates were around 5 percent for the last five years. The model combined liberal economic policies with power centralized in the hands of the president and vice president. The executive branch controlled all major state institutions. That economic environment ended as export prices stagnated, Venezuelan trade and cash flow disappeared, fiscal gaps began to increase and it became clear that more challenging decisions and tradeoffs were to come. The question was how the regime would handle those choices under harsher economic constraints. The social security system was to run out of cash this year as decisions were postponed, questionable investments were made and expenditures increased as the population aged and the number of pensioners grew. Unfortunately, instead of building consensus around difficult choices, the regime sought to impose costs on the business sector and pensioners. College students saw their future employment prospects compromised as the business sector forcefully opposed the reforms. The regime’s thugs attacked a small demonstration of university students, and then protesting retirees were attacked in León the next day. Both incidents went viral, and students from other universities began to spontaneously organize through the Internet. The university student-led revolt only gained strength as students were violently repressed and the lives lost began to accumulate. As the massacre became evident, leading sectors began to issue statements of protest and support and on April 23, massive demonstrations took place on the streets of Managua and major cities in the country."

Christine Wade, associate professor of political science and international studies at Washington College in Chestertown, Md.: "Though Nicaragua has generally received good marks from international creditors in fiscal management, there have been allegations that the Ortega administration was using pension funds to benefit programs and supporters. The reforms Ortega implemented were significantly milder than those proposed by the IMF and COSEP, Nicaragua’s private business association which initially called for protests, but many are wary about paying into a system rife with abuse. Anger surrounding the protests quickly escalated in response to repression by police and Sandinista Youth mobs. This very quickly became an anti-government protest. Based on the massive turnout for Saturday’s protests, the scale of which appears to be growing, not diminishing. Protestors have made numerous demands, ranging from accountability for the violence to the resignations of Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo. In recent days, the government has announced that it will install a truth commission to investigate the violence. It’s imperative that this commission be independent and represent a broad cross section of Nicaraguan society. Aminta Granera, the once-popular police chief, has resigned. The demand that Ortega resign is unrealistic. There’s no clear political alternative to Ortega at this moment, and he still enjoys popular support across a variety of sectors. A destabilized Nicaragua serves no one’s interests. With general elections in 2021, there’s a window for reforms that could lead to more democratic conditions. In addition to institutional reforms, Nicaragua needs new leadership across all political parties. It would help the current crisis if Ortega and Murillo would commit to not running in 2021."

Fulton Armstrong, senior fellow at American University’s Center for Latin America Studies and former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for Latin America: “President Daniel Ortega seemed to have found an effective governing model in recent years that, although eerily resembling that of the Somozas, served him well. Spreading the wealth from generous oil deals with Venezuela, he’d bought peace with some of his oldest political foes, including the country’s two biggest business organizations—COSEP and AmCham. The economy was doing well, social indicators were edging upward, the streets were among the safest in Central America, and the drug trade largely stayed out. He is now learning that the margin of error for a revolutionary in his mid-30s backed by a nine-member National Directorate in the 1980s is much greater than it is for a lonely 72-year-old authoritarian and his ambitious wife. He may be able to hold on for a while, but his image of invincibility has been irreversibly pierced. Even in Nicaragua, as insensitive gringos might say, corruption and manipulation have their limits, and the political model of Ortega and Rosario Murillo—his wife and vice president—is passé. The slogans and images that have enabled Ortega to govern with mediocrity for 20 of the past 38 years don’t resonate with a population whose median age is 25.7 years. What they see is Murillo furiously building an economic and political power base for herself and their children to succeed Daniel. Ortega has reversed himself on social security reform, but his government seems to be running on empty. Murillo has used up the reserves. Nicaraguans want better governance. The next question is whether Ortega’s political opponents, long hindered by venality and deep divisions, can provide it."

Editor’s note: The Advisor requested a comment on this topic from Nicaragua’s embassy in Washington but did not receive a response.

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