Julio Borges, head of the Justice First party and president of the now disempowered National Assembly, said Monday his party will boycott local elections scheduled for next month.

Venezuelan opposition leader and former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles on Oct. 24 withdrew from the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable, or MUD, highlighting a rift in the coalition. His move came after four out of the five opposition governors elected on Oct. 15 agreed to be sworn in by the country’s pro-government Constituent Assembly after President Nicolás Maduro threatened to re-hold elections in the five states that elected opposition governors. What does Capriles’ decision mean for the coalition’s leadership, and what should be the MUD’s strategy looking forward? How will the decision by the four opposition governors to be sworn in by the Constituent Assembly affect their relationship with the powerful body? Will the coalition mend fissures among its members or will a new opposition dynamic replace it?

John F. Maisto, member of the Advisor board and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela and the Organization of American States: "The opposition’s situation and options remain unchanged following 1) the election and launching of the National Constituent Assembly, widely considered in Venezuela and abroad to be illegal and unconstitutional, and 2) the stacked, manipulated gubernatorial elections held under that fatally flawed body and the regime-loyal electoral tribunal. The next moves to be made by the opposition MUD (or a new coalition) and member political parties are now being plotted. Divisions continue, and once again, opposition leaders face tough political decisions ahead of the municipal elections in December and a presidential election next year. Their options remain: unite in the face of an authoritarian regime that will use its power to undermine the opposition’s chances and not permit a level playing field, divide and participate, or boycott. Division most likely results in a regime victory; a boycott guarantees it. However, economic realities and the internal pressures they will produce, including from within Chavismo and the military, combined with unrelenting external pressures, missed debt payments, corruption revelations and further isolation, could change the political picture in ways no one can predict. And though a foreign mediation role is not out of the question, the one sure thing about the ongoing Venezuelan tragedy is that only the Venezuelans themselves can work something out, by mustering the political will in their time and in their way, in order to begin to get themselves out of this mess. Or not."

Gustavo Roosen, member of the Advisor board and president of IESA in Caracas: "The Venezuelan democratic tradition from 1958 to 1998 translates into a high level of citizen participation in electoral processes. Venezuelans have had to vote under dictatorship in recent times. In the midst of an environment that is not conducive to voting, a high level of citizen participation has continued, even during the manipulated results of the important recall referendum of 2004. An important warning signal for the civil-military regime of Nicolás Maduro were the results of the elections for the deputies of the National Assembly in December 2015, in which the opposition won control of the absolute majority of the chamber. Again, this result was snatched from the opposition through a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice, aligned with the executive branch. From that historic day, the government and its institutions have been politically disabling and imprisoning their opponents. They have also politicized control over the masses, affected by inflation and shortages, using instruments of submission such as the ‘fatherland identity card.’ The MUD is a union of many opposition parties, organized only for electoral purposes. It has been fully aware that the uneven playing field, which for years has clearly favored the government, has become much more complex. What happened in the election of the members of the Constituent Assembly on July 30, and in the election for governors on Oct. 15, places the opposition in front of a fence almost impossible to overcome. According to all available polls, 85 percent of Venezuelans want change, and only 6 percent report they intend to vote for President Maduro. However, in the face of the electoral political scenario, the only valid option is to allow the social and economic deterioration to erode military support for the regime and promote a transitional government with a broad mandate of unity. This could restore the rule of law and respect for human rights and reorganize the economy. The support of the international community is essential to achieve this purpose."

David Smilde, Charles A. and Leo M. Favrot Professor of Human Relations at Tulane University and senior fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America: "The four governors’ swearing in before Venezuela’s Constituent Assembly was as big of a setback to the opposition as the electoral losses themselves. The biggest obstacle to the consolidation of Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian project is that the supposedly all-powerful Constituent Assembly is considered illegitimate by most Venezuelans and most countries in the region. Having recently elected opposition leaders swear in before it is the first step in the government’s efforts to create an ‘official opposition’ like Vladimir Putin has in the Russian Duma. Clear vote-count fraud in the assembly elections in July and the governor’s election in Bolívar State would now make it almost impossible for opposition leaders to convince their base to turn out. This, in addition to the Kafkaesque conditions the National Electoral Council has imposed on opposition candidates and voters in recent elections, virtually guarantees that the opposition would lose big in municipal elections, as it did on Oct. 15. Thus, it is not surprising that they have declined to participate as a way of demanding better electoral conditions. But here again, without some sort of unified strategic plan and communications effort, it will be difficult for the opposition to pressure the government or benefit from concerted international support. It is likely that some local opposition leaders will participate in and win elections despite the MUD’s refusal. This will further strain the coalition, as these elected mayors will either become part of the government’s ‘official opposition’ or develop dissenting leaderships that challenge MUD leaders. The Maduro government will likely seek to up the ante on the MUD’s new abstentionist strategy by moving up the 2018 presidential elections."

Eva Golinger, attorney, author and former advisor to late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez: "One of the biggest mistakes the Venezuelan opposition has made over the years has been uniting behind the sole goal of regime change. The opposition is not a homogenous group. It’s comprised of more than a dozen different political parties from a range of ideological perspectives. Some of the parties have traditional roots in the Venezuelan political system, such as Acción Democratica, whose members have held powerful positions at all levels of government for more than 50 years and are a deeply entrenched part of Venezuelan identity. Other parties are newer, like Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, and while trendy at specific moments during the past decade, have largely failed to build their own meaningful and sustained presence in Venezuelan society. Consecutive political losses and tactical disagreements have left the opposition coalition profoundly fractured and without a collective platform. The government has capitalized on the opposition’s weakened appearance, which has successfully portrayed it as opportunistic and blundering, offering no real alternative to the Venezuelan people even in the face of a desire for change. Now, by betraying the anti-government coalition’s position and recognizing the all-powerful Constituent Assembly, the four new opposition governors, members of Acción Democratica, have shown their party’s thirst for power exceeds its commitment to achieving real change. Maybe if those who consider themselves ‘opposition’, which today may also include many discontented chavistas, accept that they are not a united coalition with a unified agenda, they could rebuild their own parties and develop genuine, pragmatic solutions to the country’s difficulties. Sometimes a true political alternative comes from within a party in crisis and builds on experience and insight to offer a real venue for change."

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