Should Latin America Worry about President Trump?
Photo by Gage Skidmore / CC BY-SA 3.0
This article originally appeared in Portuguese in Estadão.
Four months ago, a BBC reporter proclaimed that, in Mexico, Donald Trump was “public enemy number one.” In identifying Trump’s fulminations against Mexico and Mexicans with the rhetoric and style of Hitler and Mussolini, Mexican president Enrique Pena Nieto may have been exaggerating, but no other US political figure in recent memory has generated more anger and resentment in Mexico. Although Trump has not yet directly targeted any other Latin American nation, his campaign rhetoric and belligerence have generated unease throughout the region.
Like the rest of the world, Latin Americans have watched in disbelief as Trump emerged as a viable presidential contender, then quickly turned into the Republican front runner, and has now virtually clinched the party’s nomination. The polls today predict that he will be defeated by Hillary Clinton in the general election. But Trump’s chances should not be underestimated. He has demonstrated an exceptional talent for political campaigning and has already built a large, enthusiastic, and growing base of support. Many articles point out how Trump, although hardly a perfect candidate, could come out on top. Clinton continues to reveal critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities in her campaign. No one expected the difficulty she has had beating back the challenge of Bernie Sanders for the Democratic nomination. Although improbable, Trump’s candidacy is serious. He could be elected the 45th president of the United States. Better than any of his rivals, he has skillfully exploited the anger and resentment of American politics today.
In his only foreign policy speech so far in the campaign, Trump ignored Latin America, but that is hardly unusual. Few presidential contenders in recent years have demonstrated much interest in the region. Since he declared himself a candidate last summer, however, Trump has focused a great deal of his attention on Mexico, which is deeply entangled with the two high profile domestic issues, immigration and foreign trade, that catapulted him to a dominant position in the campaign.
Unlike most Republicans, Trump abhors free trade agreements. His venom has focused mostly on NAFTA, the US-Mexico-Canada treaty signed in 1993. He claims Mexico has unfairly monopolized the benefits generated by the NAFTA treaty, while the US has paid the cost in lost jobs, declining industries, and rising trade deficits. Trump insists that NAFTA is the “worst trade agreement in the world” and must be completely renegotiated or simply “ripped up.”
Trump has pledged to honor treaties with US allies, but he has not specified whether Mexico qualifies as an ally or not. He has made clear, however, that he does not view Mexico as a close friend. He claims that, whenever it can, this neighboring country is ready to take advantage of the US and deliberately sends rapists, murders and drug dealers northward. Trump also seems to overlook the fact, or perhaps just doesn’t care, that NAFTA is an arrangement involving Canada as well as Mexico—and that the two countries are America’s first and third leading trade partners and together account for about 40 percent of US global commerce. Mexico alone is responsible for some 60 percent of all US trade with Latin America. His campaign has revealed a strong nativist, anti-globalization strain in the US.
It is unlikely that Trump’s election would end in a drastic overhaul of US policy or Washington’s relations in the region. Aside from Mexico, he has shown no interest in hemispheric affairs.
Mexicans and other Latin Americans have been even more alienated by Trump’s stand on US immigration policy, where he has been more personally insulting. Although polls show a majority of Americans favor a pragmatic and humane reform of the US’s immigration laws, Trump’s blatant anti-immigrant tirades have whipped up support in certain sectors. His immigration agenda is callous and offensive—and probably unworkable. It includes mass deportations, stiff taxes on migrant remittances, and the construction of an impassable wall on the US border, which he says he will force Mexico to pay for. Moreover, Trump has promoted this agenda with an aggressive, derogatory, and openly confrontational rhetoric. He conveys a deep disdain and antipathy toward Mexico and Mexicans—which sounds racist to many and is contemptuous of other Latin Americans and US Hispanics.
But whether or not Trump is able to impose his strategy, his invective has already soured the US-Mexican relationship, and raised concerns in much of the rest of Latin America . Trump has been bitterly berated by President Pena Nieto and other Mexican leaders, and is widely resented by ordinary Mexicans and Mexican-Americans—despite his assertions that he “loves Mexicans.” The enthusiasm in some quarters for Trump’s immigration message, which has been too often left unanswered, has left the impression, correct or not, that Americans hold far more negative views of Mexicans and other Latin Americans than had been believed.
Most Latin Americans are understandably troubled by the prospect of a Trump presidency and the damage it could cause their countries—resulting, first, from uninformed and wrong-headed policies toward the region, and second, from potential economic and institutional setbacks in the US. Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa expressed a minority view when he cynically welcomed a Trump victory as “good for Latin America because its bad for the US.” Still, it is unlikely that Trump’s election would end in a drastic overhaul of US policy or Washington’s relations in the region. Aside from Mexico, he has shown no interest in hemispheric affairs.
Alone among Republican presidential candidates, he was unbothered by Obama’s dramatic reshaping of US policy toward Cuba. When asked about Obama’s new approach, he said that “normalization is fine....50 years is enough.” Although he is unlikely to turn the clock back on Cuba policy, it is uncertain whether he will press ahead with the loosening of US restrictions or place new demands on Cuba for a “better deal.” However he proceeds, the Cuban government—and most Cubans—are likely to be considerably more cautious and distrustful of a Trump administration than they have been of the Obama White House.
Possibly, a Trump administration would be less tolerant of anti-US diatribes from Venezuela or any other country and more inclined to respond in some way, but so might Hillary Clinton. However, the practical consequences in either case would probably not be very significant. Regardless of the Trump’s bravado it is hard to identify circumstances today that would propel the US to intervene unilaterally in any Latin American country. In Central America, whoever occupies the White House, is likely to continue the enhanced aid programs launched by President Obama, which are designed to discourage emigration from the region.
A Trump administration is apt to be more sympathetic to former President Alvaro Uribe’s objections to the peace agreement being hammered out by the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas. Still, the most probable course is sustained bilateral support from Washington for a negotiated settlement of the armed conflict and continuing aid to help make the peace work. China’s expanding presence in Latin America may generate more attention, and perhaps concerns about Iranian and Russian influence may be pursued more vigorously, but there is not much of consequence the US government will be able to do. But no one should be surprised by more grandstanding on these fronts.
The fact is that Trump, if elected, will likely enter the Oval Office without much of an agenda for Latin America or, for that matter, for most of the rest of the world. He has not said even a single word about Brazil. He has barely mentioned Cuba or any other Latin American country aside from Mexico. Yes, a President Trump, by pursuing his anti-NAFTA, anti-immigration instincts, could cause Mexico real problems and possibly provoke a crisis in US-Mexican relations. But, when the costs are added up and it is clear no one benefits, even Trump might be dissuaded from breaking up NAFTA and walling out Mexico. Or he might just jettison these positions, and adopt others, as he has on so many issues.