

GENDER QUOTA LAWS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

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Gender Quota Laws in Global Perspective

Women form more than half the population, but constitute only a small minority of all political representatives. According to the most recent figures, they occupy 17% of all seats in national parliaments around the world (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007b). However, attention to global averages masks important variations. States like Rwanda, Sweden, and Costa Rica have nearly equal numbers of male and female parliamentarians, while countries like Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have no women in their parliaments at all. Further, it does not acknowledge the important increases made over the last several years in a number of countries around the world. In Latin America, the two most notable cases are Argentina, where the percentage of female deputies grew from 5% in 1991 to 35% in 2006, and Costa Rica, where the proportion increased from 5% in 1993 to 39% in 2006 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007a). In this and other regions of the world, a crucial impetus for change has been the adoption of quota policies to facilitate the selection of female candidates to political office. However, not all quotas are equally successful in increasing women's political representation: some countries experience dramatic increases following the adoption of new quota regulations, while others see more modest changes or even setbacks in the proportion of women elected to national assemblies.

Gender Quota Policies

Gender quota policies fall into three broad categories: reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas. They vary in terms of their basic characteristics, the countries in which they appear, and the timing of their adoption (see Table 1). Nonetheless, they share striking similarities in terms of the timing of their introduction. In the fifty years between 1930 and 1980, only ten states established quotas, followed by twelve additional countries in the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, quotas appeared in more than fifty states, which have been joined by nearly forty more countries since the year 2000 (Krook 2006b, 312-313). As a result, more than one hundred countries now have some sort of quota policy, with more than seventy-five percent of these measures being passed during the last fifteen years. Quotas thus appear to reflect a growing international norm regarding the need to promote women's political representation (Krook 2006a; Towns 2004).

Reserved seats are policies that literally set aside places for women in political assemblies. In this way, they guarantee women's presence by revising the mechanisms of election to mandate a minimum number of female representatives. This proportion is often very low, as some reserved seats policies mandate as little as one or two percent of all seats. However, there are important exceptions, like the thirty percent policy that was adopted in Tanzania. These measures first appeared in the 1930s, but have been adopted as recently as 2005, and have become an increasingly prominent solution in countries with very low levels of female parliamentary representation. They are concentrated geographically in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In some states, there are no quotas at the national level, but quotas are used very effectively at the local level, as in India and Namibia.

Party quotas are measures adopted voluntarily by political parties to require a certain proportion of women among their parties' candidates. Given their origins with political parties, these quotas differ from reserved seats in that they concern slates of candidates,

rather than the final proportion of women elected. Further, they generally mandate a much higher proportion of women, usually between twenty-five and fifty percent of all candidates. They were first adopted in the early 1970s by various left-wing parties in Western Europe. Today they are the most common type of gender quota, appearing in parties across the political spectrum and in all regions of the world. They continue to be the most prevalent measure employed in Western Europe. However, they also frequently coexist with legislative quotas in Africa and Latin America, where party quotas predate or accompany the adoption of more encompassing quota laws.

Legislative quotas, finally, are measures passed by national parliaments that require all parties to nominate a certain proportion of female candidates. Similar to party quotas, they address selection processes, rather than the number of women actually elected. Unlike party quotas, however, they are mandatory provisions that apply to all political groupings, rather than simply those who choose to adopt quotas. Legislative quotas typically call for women to constitute between twenty-five and fifty percent of all candidates. They are the newest type of gender quota, appearing first in the early 1990s, but have become increasingly common as more and more countries adopt quota policies. With some notable exceptions, these measures tend to be found in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, and/or in post-conflict societies, primarily in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeastern Europe. In many countries, they coexist with – or supersede – provisions for party quotas.

Gender Quota Adoption

The rapid diffusion of gender quota policies raises the question: how and why these measures have been adopted in diverse countries around the world? Cases around the world suggest four possible explanations (Krook 2006b; Krook 2007). The first is that *women mobilize for quotas to increase women's representation*. This usually occurs when women's groups realize that quotas are an effective – and maybe the only – means for increasing women's political representation. These women may include women's organizations inside political parties, women's movements in civil society, women's groups in other countries, and even individual women close to powerful men. In all of these instances, women's groups pursue quotas for both normative and pragmatic reasons. They believe that there should be more women in politics in order to promote justice, interests, and resources (Phillips 1995). In the absence any 'natural' trend towards change, however, they recognize that this is likely to be achieved only through specific, targeted actions to promote female candidates.

The second explanation is that *political elites adopt quotas for strategic reasons*, generally related to competition with other parties. Various case studies suggest, for example, that party elites often adopt quotas when one of their rivals adopts them (Caul 2001; Meier 2004). This concern may be heightened if the party seeks to overcome a long period in opposition or a dramatic decrease in popularity. In other contexts, elites view quotas as a way to demonstrate some sort of commitment to women without really intending to alter existing patterns of inequality, or alternatively, as a means to promote other political ends, like maintaining control over political rivals within or outside the party. If these motives are correct, the adoption of quotas may be less about empowering women in politics and more about how quotas fit in – perhaps serendipitously – with various other struggles among political elites.

The third is that *quotas are adopted when they mesh with existing or emerging notions of equality and representation*. Evidence indicates that gender quotas are compatible in distinct ways with a number of normative frameworks. Some scholars view quota adoption as consistent with ideas about equality and fair access. They point out that left-wing parties are generally more open to measures such as quotas because these match with their more general goals of social equality. Others interpret quotas as a method to recognize difference and the need for proportional representation. Quotas for women are thus a logical extension of guarantees given to other groups based on linguistic, religious, racial, and other cleavages. A final observation is that quotas tend to emerge during periods of democratic innovation. In these countries, quotas may be seen as a way to establish the legitimacy of the new political system during democratic transition or the creation of new democratic institutions. Taken together, these arguments analyze quotas in relation to their 'fit' with features of the political context: they do not reflect principled concerns to empower women or pragmatic strategies to win or maintain power.

The fourth explanation is that *quotas are supported by international norms and spread through transnational sharing*. Over the last ten years, a variety of international organizations – including the United Nations, the Socialist International, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Commonwealth, the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, and the Organization of American States – have issued declarations recommending that all member-states aim for thirty percent women in all political bodies. These norms shape national quota debates in at least four ways (Krook 2006b). International imposition occurs in cases where international actors are directly involved in quota adoption, either by deciding to apply quotas themselves or by compelling national leaders to do so themselves. Transnational emulation takes place in cases where local women's movements and transnational non-governmental organizations share information on quota strategies across national borders. International tipping appears in cases where international events provide new sources of leverage in national debates, shifting the balance in favor of local and transnational actors pressing for quota adoption. International blockage, finally, happens in cases where international actors seek to prevent the adoption of gender quotas, despite mobilization by local women's groups and transnational NGOs in favor of these policies.

Gender Quota Implementation

Quota measures are diverse, and thus differences in their impact are to be expected. However, pinpointing why some quotas are more effective than others is a complicated task: in addition to features of specific quota policies, which affect their likelihood of being implemented, quotas are introduced when variations already exist in the percentage of women in national parliaments. Cross-national variations are thus the combined result of quotas – where they are present – and other political, social, and economic factors that were often at work before quotas were established (see Table 2). As a result, quotas do not simply lead to gains proportional to the quota policy, but also interact, both positively and negatively, with various features of the broader political context.

Three broad explanations have been offered to untangle these effects. The first links variations in quota implementation to *details of quota measures themselves*. Some scholars connect

quota impact to the type of measure involved. Although most studies agree that reserved seats generally produce small changes in women's representation (Chowdhury 2002), some claim that party quotas are more effective than other types of quotas because they are voluntary measures, adopted from concerns about electoral advantage (Leijenaar 1997). Others insist that legislative quotas are more effective because they bind all political parties, rather than merely those who choose to adopt quotas, and are enforced by state bureaucracies and the courts, rather than simply party leaders (Jones 1998).

More recent work delves deeper into variations within and across types, seeking to understand why specific quota measures are more or less effective in achieving changes in women's representation. These scholars argue that the impact of gender quotas stems from the wording of the quota, whether the language used in the policy strengthens the quota requirement or reduces ambiguity or vagueness regarding the process of implementation; the requirements of the quota, whether the policy specifies where female candidates should be placed and to which elections the policy applies; the sanctions of the quota, whether the policy establishes organs for reviewing and enforcing quota requirements and procedures for punishing or rectifying non-compliance; and the perceived legitimacy of the quota, whether the policy is viewed as legal or constitutional from the point of view of national and international law.

A second explanation relates the impact of quotas to *the 'fit' between quota measures and existing institutional frameworks*. Most studies in this vein focus on characteristics of the electoral system, examining how electoral rules facilitate or hinder the potentially positive effect of quotas on women's representation. They observe that quotas have the greatest impact in proportional representation electoral systems with closed lists and high district magnitudes (Caul 1999; Htun and Jones 2002), although they also identify idiosyncratic features of particular electoral systems that negatively affect quota implementation, including the possibility for parties to run more than one list in each district (Costa Benavides 2003), the existence of distinct electoral systems for different types of elections (Jones 1998), and the chance for parties to nominate more candidates than the number of seats available (Htun 2002).

Other scholars consider features of the political party system, as well as the characteristics of parties themselves, to discern partisan dynamics that aid or subvert quota implementation. They argue that quotas are more likely to have an impact in party systems where several parties co-exist and larger parties respond to policy innovations initiated by smaller parties (Kolinsky 1991; Stykárssdóttir 1986), as well as in parties with left-wing ideologies where the party leadership is able to enforce party or national regulations (Caul 1999; Davidson-Schmich 2006). Still others observe higher rates of implementation across all parties in countries where the political culture emphasizes sexual difference and group representation (Meier 2004), and lower rates of compliance in countries where the political culture stresses sexual equality and individual representation (Inheteen 1999).

A third explanation outlines the *actors who support and oppose quotas and their respective roles in guaranteeing or undermining quota implementation*. Much of this literature focuses on political party elites as the group most directly responsible for variations in the impact of quotas, since the effective application of quotas largely hinges around elites' willingness to recruit female candidates. Most accounts expose the ways that elites seek to mitigate quota

impact through passive refusal to enforce quotas to more active measures to subvert their intended effect (Araújo 2003; Costa Benavides 2003), to the point of even committing large-scale electoral fraud and widespread intimidation of female candidates (Delgadillo 2000; Human Rights Watch 2004).

Many also mention other actors who play a direct or indirect role in enforcing quota provisions, including women's organizations both inside and outside the political parties who pressure elites to comply with quota provisions, distribute information on quota regulations both to elites and the general public, and train female candidates to negotiate better positions on their respective party lists (Camacho Granados et al 1997; Durrieu 1999); national and international courts who provide an arena to challenge non-compliance and require parties to redo lists that do not comply with the law (Jones 2004; Villanueva Flores 2003); and ordinary citizens who engage in public scrutiny of parties' selection practices through reports and reprimands that lead elites to honor and even exceed quota commitments (Baldez 2004; Kolinsky 1991).

Gender Quota Policies in Latin America and Beyond

Evidence from around the world suggests that these three sets of factors work together to shape the effects of gender quota policies. Crucially, multiple combinations appear to be successful in improving the numbers of women elected to political office: strict quota policies combined with proportional representation electoral systems and strong elite support often produce gains in women's representation, but similar results have been observed in other countries with vague quota measures, majoritarian electoral systems, and weak elite but strong civil society support. The main recipe for success is simultaneous attention to all three of these dimensions, possibilities which become evident when we compare cases where quotas have succeeded and where quotas have failed to increase women's representation. Because reserved seats are unlikely to be proposed, experiences with party quotas and legislative quotas offer the most insights for designing more effective quota policies in Latin America. *Party quotas* take a variety of different forms across countries. Their impact on the overall numbers of women elected depends largely on (1) the number and size of the parties that adopt gender quotas and (2) the percentage of women provided for by the quota policy. In addition, many of the most successful policies 'frame' quotas in ways that resonate in clever ways with local contexts.

The most effective party quotas are those that operate in *Sweden*, where women's representation in parliament is currently 47.3% (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007a). Since the 1920s, women have mobilized inside and outside the political parties to pressure elites to select more female candidates. Their efforts resulted in a gradual strengthening of party measures to promote women: from the inclusion of at least one woman per list in the 1950s and 1960s, to recommendations and targets of "at least 40% women" in the 1970s and 1980s, to stricter 50% party quotas in the 1990s and 2000s. Importantly, the final push for equal representation came after women's representation decreased in 1991 for the first time since 1928. Women from all the parties threatened to leave to form their own women's party if the established parties did not take steps to recruit more female candidates. In response, most parties agreed to alternate between men and women on their party lists. Interestingly, many insisted that this was not a 'quota' but rather the principle of *varannan damernas* ('every other one for the ladies'), which referred to a tradition in Swedish countryside dances where

men asked women to dance for one song and then women asked men to dance for the next song. (In many towns, this was also known as the practice of 'democratic dancing'). Similar policies are known as the 'zipper principle' in Western and Eastern Europe and the 'zebra principle' in Southern Africa. Quotas have been particularly effective in Sweden because they have been adopted by all the political parties, they aim for 50% female representation, and – given the context of their adoption – parties believe that they would lose female voters if they do not fully implement these policies. The effects of these policies are heightened by the fact that Sweden has a proportional representation electoral system that employs closed lists, which enables parties to ensure that approximately 50% women will be elected (for more details, see Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Freidenvall 2005; Krook 2005).

Party quotas have been less successful in increasing women's representation in other countries. In some cases, this is because the parties that adopt quotas are very few and very small, for example the many women's parties across Eastern Europe (Ishiyama 2003). This indicates that party quotas are unlikely to increase women's representation to a significant degree unless they are also adopted by one or more of the major political parties. Sincere party commitments are also important: some parties adopt quotas but then do not fully implement them, as in France in the 1970s and 1980s (Opello 2006). In still other cases, parties adopt quotas but then are forced to abandon them due to legal challenges. For example, in the *United Kingdom*, the Labour Party instituted a policy in 1993 that pledged to consider only female candidates in 50% of all the districts that the party expected to win in the 1997 elections. However, this policy was soon challenged by two male party members who were overlooked as possible candidates, because their districts were among those that had been designated for all-women shortlists. The quota was eventually overturned by the courts in 1996 on the grounds that it violated the terms of the Sex Discrimination Act, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex in applications for employment. The party did not challenge the ruling, but did not de-select those female candidates that had already been chosen through the quota. As a result, women's representation doubled from 9% to 18% in 1997, due exclusively to the Labour Party policy. Following a modest decrease in the number of women elected to parliament in 2002, the Sex Discrimination Act was subsequently reformed to allow positive action in candidate selection, but women's representation has since stagnated at 20%. Concerns about the legitimacy of the quota, combined with the difficulties in making dramatic increases in a majoritarian electoral system, have made further dramatic increases hard to achieve (for more information, see Childs 2003; Krook 2005; Russell 2005).

Legislative quotas, which are the most common type of quota policy in Latin America, are similarly diverse. Their impact on the overall numbers of women elected stems mainly from (1) the percentage of women provided for by the quota law, (2) degree to which the policy constrains the behavior of political parties, and (3) the extent to which women's groups remain vigilant over the implementation of the quota policy. In Latin America, the two countries with the most successful legislative quotas are Argentina and Costa Rica, for very similar reasons. In *Argentina*, both houses of parliament passed a law in 1991 that specified that parties were to nominate at least 30% women in list positions where they were likely to be elected. The idea for the quota emerged through meetings of women from all the major political parties (Bonder and Nari 1995). They had learned about experiments with quotas at the UN Third World Conference on Women, as well as through contacts with women in the Spanish Socialist Party, where quotas had been adopted in 1988 (Valiente

2005), and women's groups in Costa Rica, where a bill proposing quotas was under consideration also in 1988 (Lubertino Beltrán 1992). Confusion over what constituted an 'electable' position, however, led to a series of constitutional and legal debates, as well as a number of presidential decrees, over the course of the 1990s that clarified the precise requirements of the quota law, including the placement of women and the procedures for rectifying non-compliance (Chama 2001; Durrieu 1999). As these stricter interpretations took effect, the proportion of women in the lower house of parliament increased from 6% in 1991 to 14% in 1993, 22% in 1995, 28% in 1997, 27% in 1999, 30% in 2001, and 35% in 2005. When these provisions applied to the Senate for the first time, women's representation jumped directly from 3% in 1999 to 35% in 2001, increasing to 43% in 2005 (Krook 2005; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007a).

In *Costa Rica*, a quota law was discussed as early as 1988 as part of the proposed Bill on Real Equality between Women and Men, but the final version passed in 1990 simply recommended that parties adopt their own measures to ensure women's representation (Camacho Granados et al 1997). Supporters continued to lobby for revisions to the electoral code, however, and parliament eventually adopted a 40% quota law in 1996 (García Quesada 2003). Because the law required all parties to reform their internal rules governing candidate selection, but made no formal requirements regarding women's placement on party lists, advocates appealed to the highest electoral court to pass a judgment on the 'spirit' of the law. While the court rejected placement mandates in 1997, it espoused them in 1999, arguing that in order to conform to the law, parties must include 40% women in 'electable positions,' defined by the court as the number of seats won in the previous election. As a consequence, the proportion of women in parliament increased only from 14% in 1994 to 19% in 1998, but jumped to 35% in 2002 and 39% in 2006 (Jones 2004; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007a). In both Argentina and Costa Rica, therefore, the quotas were increasingly more successful over time because while they initially mandated a high proportion of women, women's groups continued to watch over the implementation of the quota law, calling on political leaders and national courts to make adjustments and clarifications each time the policy was not followed to its fullest extent.

Legislative quotas have been less effective in other countries, leading to stagnation and even decreases in the numbers of women elected. In *France*, both houses of parliament amended the constitution in 1999 and the electoral law in 2000 to mandate that parties nominate 50% female candidates for all elections. The new law set out distinct requirements for different sorts of elections, however, according to the type of electoral system used. For local elections held under proportional representation, the law obliged parties to achieve parity per group of six candidates, with three men and three women in any order, with rejection of the list being the penalty for non-compliance. For elections to the lower house of parliament governed by two-round majoritarian voting, the law required parties to present equal numbers of male and female candidates across all electoral districts, with no specification as to which districts female candidates should be placed, with a financial penalty for non-compliance. While all parties complied at the local level, regulations at the national level created distinct incentives for smaller versus larger parties: smaller parties generally respected parity, because they were under pressure to maximize the amount of state subsidy that they could claim, while larger parties did not, because they could absorb losses in state funding by recouping money later through winning more seats (Bird 2003; Murray 2004). As a consequence, the proportion of women in local councils jumped from

26% to 48% in 2001, while women's representation in the lower house of parliament barely rose from 11% to 12% in 2002 (Krook 2005).

In *Brazil*, quotas were first debated inside the political parties as early as 1986, but proposals for national quotas appeared only in 1995, when both houses of parliament approved a 20% quota for local elections, along with a reform allowing parties to nominate 20% more candidates than seats available. Following the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women, women's groups stepped up their lobbying and no less than eight proposals for various types of quota laws were presented between 1995 and 1997 (Araújo 2003). In 1996, both houses of parliament established a 20% quota for state and federal elections that was raised to 25% in 1998 and 30% in 2000. At the same time, however, members of parliament passed another regulation allowing parties to present 50% more candidates than seats available. Combined, these provisions introduced a crucial escape clause regarding the process of implementation: since parties were simply required to 'reserve' 30% of slots for women, the possibility to nominate 150% meant that they could in practice propose a candidate list consisting entirely of men (Htun 2002). As a result, the number of women in the lower house of parliament actually decreased following adoption of the quota law, dropping from 6% in 1994 to 5% in 1998, although this figure eventually increased to 8% in 2002 and 9% in 2006 (Araújo 2003; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007a). In France and Brazil, therefore, quota laws have largely failed to increase women's political representation. In both cases, the policies themselves permitted parties various means for circumventing the quota requirements which, combined with the lack of mobilization by women's groups, have produced disappointing results.

In addition, quotas remain very controversial in many countries, despite a growing international norm in favor of gender quotas (Krook 2006a). This has limited their effects in some cases; in others, quota policies have been subject to legal challenges and subsequently overturned, as in Colombia and Venezuela. While in some cases such developments have taken quotas off of the political agenda, it is worth noting that such setbacks have been successfully overcome in a number of countries outside Latin America. As mentioned above, party quotas were made legal again in the *United Kingdom*, following reform of the Sex Discrimination Act in 2002. The new Act now allows – but does not require – parties to apply gender quotas when selecting their candidates to parliament. The Labour Party quickly resumed its former quota policy in the run-up to elections in 2005, and recent changes inside the Conservative Party indicate that it too may take special steps over the next few years to select more female candidates (Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski 2006). In *France* and *Italy*, quotas were declared unconstitutional in 1982 (France) and 1995 (Italy). In both cases, women's groups transformed this legal setback into a strategy for change, focused on reforming the constitutional articles on equality that had been used to overturn the earlier quotas. While difficult, these changes were achieved in France in 1999 and in Italy in 2003 after extensive mobilization (Guadagnini 2005; Krook 2005). Reforms to the French electoral law soon followed in 2000. However, despite various proposals, similar changes have not occurred yet in Italy, because although various quota reforms have been approved by the Chamber of Deputies, they have never yet reached the floor of the Senate. These cases suggest that legal obstacles surrounding quotas can be resolved in ways that allow new quota policies to be passed, although such changes generally require sustained mobilization by women's groups to ensure that new policies are approved.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This overview of gender quota policies around the world reveals that a wide range of actors are engaged in quota campaigns, and that the issue of women's representation has now reached the political agenda in countries around the world. Viewed together, patterns of adoption and implementation suggest that political action plays a crucial role in shaping women's access to political office. Most obviously, the spread of quotas challenges the idea that increases in the number of women in politics occur 'naturally.' However, while quota adoption appears to be a major reason for these recent shifts in representation in recent years, it is important to recognize that not all quotas have their intended effects. Many produce increases, but others result in stagnation and even decreases, in the numbers of women elected to political office. These variations suggest that quotas are not a panacea, but constitute a crucial step forward for women's political empowerment worldwide.

Designing more effective gender quotas requires attention to three features: the design of quota policies, the 'fit' between quotas and broader political structures, and the relative balance between actors who support and oppose quota policies. These three features may fit together in a number of different ways. Nonetheless, it is possible to pinpoint some general characteristics of successful quota policies. Party quotas generally have a greater impact on the numbers of women elected to political office when (1) many parties, especially several larger parties, adopt these policies; (2) the quotas adopted call for a relatively high proportion of women to be nominated as party candidates; and (3) the quotas are framed in ways that link them to well-understood and widely accepted cultural practices and traditions. Legislative quotas tend to result in increases in women's representation when (1) these laws require a relatively high proportion of female candidates to be nominated by the political parties; (2) these laws strictly bind the behavior of political parties or, alternatively, create positive incentives for parties to nominate more women; and (3) women's groups continue to monitor compliance with these policies, through legal and political means if necessary, to ensure that parties implement quotas to their fullest degree.

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Appendix: The Adoption and Impact of Gender Quota Policies Worldwide

Table 1: Gender Quota Policies by Date of Adoption, Region, and Quota Type

<i>Decade</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Reserved Seats</i>	<i>Party Quotas</i>	<i>Legislative Quotas</i>
1930s	Asia	India		
1940s	Asia	Taiwan		
1950s	Asia	Pakistan	China	
1960s	Africa	Ghana		
1970s	Asia Africa Middle East Western Europe	Bangladesh Tanzania*** Egypt* Sudan***	Israel Netherlands Norway	
1980s	Africa Latin America North America Western Europe	Uganda	Senegal Brazil Chile Uruguay Canada Austria Belgium Denmark* Germany Iceland Sweden United Kingdom	
1990s	Africa Asia Eastern Europe	Kenya Sudan*** Tanzania*** Nepal Philippines**	Cape Verde Cameroon Mozambique Namibia** Senegal South Africa India*** North Korea Philippines** South Korea*** Taiwan*** Armenia** Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Kyrgyzstan Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia	Namibia** Armenia**

	Latin America		Bolivia** Dominican Republic** El Salvador Haiti Mexico*** Nicaragua Venezuela**	Argentina Bolivia** Brazil Colombia* Costa Rica Dominican Republic** Ecuador Guyana Mexico*** Panama Peru Venezuela*, **
	Middle East Pacific		Turkey Australia Fiji Cyprus France** Greece Ireland Italy** Luxembourg Portugal	Belgium France** Italy*, **
2000s	Africa	Burkina Faso Djibouti Eritrea Rwanda** Somalia Tanzania***	Angola Botswana Cameroon Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Ivory Coast Kenya Malawi Mali Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Thailand	Burundi Djibouti Liberia Mauritania Niger Rwanda**
	Asia		Bosnia-Herzegovina** Croatia Macedonia** Moldova	Indonesia South Korea*** Bosnia-Herzegovina** Macedonia** Romania Serbia and Montenegro Uzbekistan Honduras Mexico***
	Eastern Europe			
	Latin America			

	Middle East	Bahrain Jordan Morocco**	Algeria Morocco** Tunisia Yemen Malta Portugal	Afghanistan Iraq Palestinian Territory, Occupied
	Western Europe			

Source: Krook 2006b, 312-313, updated.

*Measure later repealed. **Two quota measures adopted in the same decade. ***Two quota measures adopted in different decades.

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Table 2: The Implementation of Gender Quota Laws

<i>Region and Country</i>	<i>Quota Law, Single/Lower House</i>	<i>Year Adopted</i>	<i>% Women Before Quota</i>	<i>% Women After Quota</i>	<i>Impact of Quota, Points</i>
<i>Latin America</i>					
Argentina	30%	1991	8.7% (1989)	35.0%(2005)	+26.3
Bolivia	30%	1997	6.9% (1993)	16.9%(2005)	+10.0
Brazil	25%	1997	6.6% (1994)	8.6% (2002)*	+2.0
Colombia**	30%	1999	11.8% (1998)	12.0%(2002)*	+0.2
Costa Rica	40%	1996	15.8% (1994)	38.6%(2006)	+22.8
Dominican Republic	25%, 33%	1997, 2000	11.7% (1994)	19.7%(2006)	+8.0
Ecuador	20%, 30%	1997, 2000	Unknown(96)	16.0%(2002)*	--
Guyana	33%	Unknown	Unknown	29.0%(2006)	--
Honduras	30%	2000	9.4% (1997)	23.4%(2005)	+14.0
Mexico	30%, 30%	1996, 2002	14.2% (1994)	22.6%(2003)*	+8.4
Panama	30%	1997	9.7% (1994)	16.7% (2004)	+7.0
Paraguay	20%	1996	2.5% (1993)	10.0% (2003)	+7.5
Peru	25%, 30%	1997, 2001	10.8% (1995)	29.2% (2006)	+18.4
Venezuela***	30%	1998, 2003	5.9% (1993)	18.0% (2005)	+12.1
<i>Eastern Europe</i>					
Armenia	5%	1999	6.3% (1995)	5.3% (2003)	-1.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	33%	2001	7.1% (2000)	16.7%(2002)*	+9.6
Macedonia	30%	2002	6.7% (1998)	28.3% (2006)	+21.6
Serbia & Montenegro	30%	2002	N/A	12.0% (2003)	--
<i>Asia</i>					
China	Increasing	1955	12.0% (1954)	20.3% (2003)	+8.3
Indonesia	30%	2003	8.0% (1999)	11.3% (2004)	+3.3
Nepal	3%	1990	6.1% (1988)	5.9% (1999)	-0.2
North Korea	20%	1998	20.1% (1990)	20.1% (2003)	+0
Philippines	W. incl.	1986	10.7% (1992)	15.7% (2004)	+5.0
South Korea	30%	2000	3.7% (1996)	13.4% (2004)	+9.7
<i>Western Europe</i>					
Belgium	33%	1994	9.4% (1991)	34.7% (2003)	+25.3
France	50%	1999-2000	10.9% (1997)	12.2% (2002)	+1.1
Portugal	33.3%	2006	21.3% (2005)	Unknown	--
<i>Middle East</i>					
Afghanistan	25%	2004	N/A	27.3% (2005)	+27.3
Iraq	25%	2004	7.6% (2000)	25.5% (2005)	+17.9
Palestinian	20%	2005	N/A	Unknown	--

Territory, Occ.					
<i>Africa</i>					
Burundi	30%	2005	18.4% (1993)	30.5% (2005)	+12.1
Djibouti	10%	2002	0.0% (2003)	10.8% (2003)	+10.8
Liberia	30%	2005	5.3% (2003)	12.5% (2005)	+7.2
Mauritania	20%	2006	Unknown	Unknown	--
Niger	10%, 25%	2001, 2004	1.2%	12.4% (2004)	+11.2
Rwanda	30%	2003	25.7% (1994)	48.8% (2003)	+23.1

Sources: Own data; Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007a.

*Most recent election results (2006) unknown. **Quotas repealed. ***Quotas repealed and then reinstated.

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