In September 2024, Mexico embarked on one of the most radical judicial transformations undertaken by a contemporary democracy. Promoted by outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and backed by his successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, a constitutional reform established the direct popular election of Supreme Court justices, federal judges, electoral magistrates, and members of a newly created Judicial Discipline Tribunal. It also dismantled key components of the traditional judicial career system and restructured federal judicial administration and oversight.
More than a selection mechanism, the reform was the culmination of a broader political struggle over the role of the judiciary as a constraint on executive power. While López Obrador portrayed the courts as an insulated and privileged elite safeguarding special interests, critics viewed them as an indispensable check against single-party dominance. Although the pre-2024 judiciary suffered from opacity, nepotism, and unequal access to justice, the reform overlooked a crucial fact: chronic impunity in Mexico stems primarily from earlier stages of the justice chain—such as weak police investigations, underfunded prosecutors, and dysfunctional local institutions—deficiencies that electing federal judges does not directly solve.
Following Morena and its allies’ decisive electoral victory in June 2024, Congress enacted the reform, which took effect on September 16, 2024. Two years later, after the first judicial elections, the debate is no longer theoretical.
What the Reform Changed
Before 2024, Mexico’s federal judiciary combined nomination mechanisms for top courts with a professional civil service career for lower courts. Supreme Court justices were nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. At the same time, district judges and circuit magistrates entered and advanced through a competitive judicial career (carrera judicial) based on examinations, experience, and internal evaluations.
Under the new framework:
- Direct Popular Elections: Federal district judges, circuit magistrates, and Supreme Court justices are now elected directly by voters. The Supreme Court was reduced from eleven members to nine.
- New Administrative Architecture: The Federal Judicial Council was abolished; its functions were split between a new Judicial Administration Body and an elected Judicial Discipline Tribunal.
- Political Screening: Evaluation committees linked to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches screen candidates before they appear on the ballot. Thus, popular election does not mean unrestricted nomination—political institutions retain significant control over candidate eligibility.
- Phased Implementation: The first election took place on June 1, 2025, with the remaining federal judicial positions scheduled for election in 2028.
The First Judicial Election: What Happened?
In the initial exercise, voters were tasked with filling 881 federal judicial positions—including all nine Supreme Court seats, five Discipline Tribunal posts, electoral magistracies, 464 circuit magistracies, and 386 district judgeships—drawn from a pool of over 3,300 candidates. The complexity was unprecedented: individual voters faced as many as thirty-nine separate choices on their ballots.
The inaugural election revealed critical institutional challenges:
- Low Voter Turnout: Only 12.9 percent of registered voters participated, weakening claims that direct popular elections would automatically confer a stronger democratic mandate on the judiciary.
- Widespread Use of Voting Guides (Acordeones): Organized lists instructed voters on specific candidates across complex ballots. The National Electoral Institute (INE) found that winning national candidates appeared on an average of 80 percent of documented voting guides (85 percent for regional electoral court races). In 23 percent of polling stations (19,336 locations), all nine winning Supreme Court candidates matched the top reported guide exactly. In 62 percent of polling stations, six to nine candidates promoted by that guide received the most votes.
- Influence of Political Machinery: The INE concluded that only well-resourced political organizations with extensive territorial reach could orchestrate an operation of this scale, linking the guides to federal executive interests and local state political networks.
- Information Deficits and Distorted Incentives: Voters possessed minimal information about candidates’ technical qualifications. More fundamentally, judicial elections expose a deep paradox of democratic accountability: unlike elected executives or legislators who represent majorities and make policy, a judge’s constitutional role requires applying the law impartially, even when doing so conflicts with government policy or popular majorities. When voters lack information, access to political networks—rather than professional credentials—becomes the primary currency for reaching judicial office.
Economic Consequences and Legal Predictability
For businesses and international investors, the primary concern is not abstract constitutional theory, but legal predictability. Mexico’s federal courts adjudicate complex disputes in taxation, telecommunications, energy, infrastructure, antitrust, labor relations, intellectual property, and regulatory compliance.
- Practical Risk for Foreign Capital: For a U.S. manufacturer challenging a tax assessment, an energy company contesting a regulatory ruling, or an infrastructure investor seeking contract enforcement, court independence directly affects asset valuation and operational risk.
- Administrative Friction and Delays: Replacing experienced career judges creates steep learning curves, procedural backlogs, and inconsistent interpretations.
- Restrictions on Amparo Injunctions: The reform curtailed amparo rulings’ ability to temporarily suspend general laws during constitutional challenges, making it significantly harder for private entities to seek immediate court protection against government regulations.
- North American Economic Integration: Implementation coincides with the 2026 review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Contract enforcement, property rights, and nearshoring investments rely heavily on judicial certainty. U.S. authorities and investors will closely assess whether the new judicial architecture provides reliable adjudication in disputes against government actions or private counterparties.
Four Indicators for Washington to Watch
U.S. policymakers and business leaders should monitor four key metrics to determine whether the new system stabilizes or weakens the rule of law in Mexico:
- Judicial Independence in High-Stakes Cases: Observing whether courts demonstrate genuine autonomy when ruling on major government initiatives, regulatory controversies, or politically connected actors.
- Commercial Adjudication Quality: Tracking litigation delays, consistency in contract enforcement, and the technical caliber of commercial rulings.
- Operations of the Judicial Discipline Tribunal: Monitoring whether the new tribunal enforces professional accountability or acts as a political mechanism to pressure independent judges.
- The 2028 Electoral Round: Congress’s decision to postpone the second round from 2027 to 2028—and redesign portions of the process—implicitly acknowledges the severe logistical challenges of 2025. The next cycle will reveal whether adjustments can improve participation, voter information, and candidate evaluation.
Mexico’s judicial overhaul is an ongoing institutional experiment rather than a settled outcome. The central issue is not whether the previous judicial system required reform—few dispute its flaws—but whether this specific model can deliver what any effective judiciary must: impartial dispute resolution, constitutional rights protection, professional competence, and independence from political pressure.
For Mexico, the outcome will define the quality of its democracy. For the United States, it will shape the reliability of one of its most vital economic and strategic partners.
