The convening of the Organization of American States (OAS) meeting of foreign ministers set for September 2026 represents a step forward for hemispheric relations. Twenty-nine member states have agreed that Nicaragua’s rejection of universal suffrage runs counter to the region’s political principles and must be addressed.

The challenge now lies in determining the diplomatic and coercive measures that countries can adopt in a multilateral setting that proportionally respond to Nicaragua’s belligerent and transgressive practices.

KEY ISSUES AT STAKE WITHIN THE OAS 

Since 2018, most OAS member states have criticized the Nicaraguan government’s conduct and political nature, invoking its obligation to guarantee universal suffrage and non-aggression.

This obligation falls within the scope of three main treaties: the Charter of the Organization of American States, in particular Articles 2, 3, and 20; the Human Rights Covenant under the Pact of San José, Article 23; and the Rio Treaty (Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), Article 3. Although the Democratic Charter is an integral instrument of the Inter-American Human Rights System, it is not legally binding.

The situation in Nicaragua has therefore been addressed from two core angles within the ideological framework of the Inter-American System: security and human rights (with an emphasis on the latter).

States have been cautious about treating Nicaragua as a “regional security” problem because of the term’s sensitive nature and implications. Moreover, some countries like Brazil openly maintained that there is no evidence of “any process affecting regional peace and stability.” In the case of Nicaragua, external aggression and internal authoritarianism go hand in hand: both are integral parts of the regime’s political strategy.

DECISIONS ON NICARAGUA 

The meeting of foreign ministers is, to some extent, a moment when democracy and security, traditionally seen as oppositional forces, may be addressed as legally interrelated. States will act with the perspective that Nicaragua’s dictatorial nature is conflictive and confrontational both within and outside of its territory.

Nicaragua has violated many of the Inter-American System’s core agreements, especially the Pact of San José and the Rio Treaty, violations tied to Article 2 and Chapter VI of the OAS Charter. The regime’s conduct also infringes upon separate regional treaties, such as Central America’s 1991 Tegucigalpa Agreement on Democratic Security.

Contrary to Brazil’s assertion, Nicaragua’s trajectory from 2018 to the present demonstrates the country’s anti-democratic evolution. In obstructing its citizens’ right to self-determination, Nicaragua violates Article 23 of the Pact of San José and undermines the integrity of the Inter-American System protected under Articles 2 and 3. According to Article 22 of the OAS Charter, states are responsible for the legitimate defense of the inviolability of human rights and universal suffrage, rendering Article 20 ineffective.

In the twenty-first century, aggressions against the territorial integrity of one state by another often go beyond conventional military action. Many unconventional forms of aggression, such as cyberattacks, planned extrajudicial killings of political opponents, terrorism, and even transnational organized crime, fall within the scope of the Rio Treaty. By invading neighboring states (Costa Rica and Honduras) to execute Nicaraguan citizens, many of whom hold refugee status, outside of their territory, and by weaponizing third-party migration as an act of aggression against other states, Nicaragua has violated Article 3 of the Rio Treaty.

Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo actively allowed charter flights carrying migrants en route to the U.S.-Mexico border to move further inland. Given that states treat migration as a matter of national security, the entry and exit of foreigners is a key concern for authorities responsible for protecting a state’s sovereignty. And between 2023 and 2024, Nicaragua acted deliberately to facilitate the irregular passage of more than 300,000 people through Nicaragua on their way to the United States.

Furthermore, in the last eight years, Nicaragua has acted belligerently in most of its interactions with members of the Inter-American System, including Brazil, Colombia, and Jamaica—going so far as to confiscate OAS property. This defiant stance is another example of the systematic disrespect shown toward members of the Pact of San José and the Rio Treaty, which inhibits the peaceful settlement of disputes and the protection of citizens’ rights.

An overwhelming majority of member states that abide by the principle of nonintervention have formally recognized Nicaragua’s disrespect for the rule of law and its violations of a broad spectrum of human rights. This posture has been validated through sixteen OAS resolutions since 2018 and is reiterated in almost every session.

COLLECTIVE ACTION BEYOND DENUNCIATION

Inter-American mobilization, whether collective or not, can focus on adopting concrete measures to restore democratic order and the rule of law and resume peaceful regional cooperation. This necessitates a proportional response to the damage Nicaragua inflicts.

Any such response would test the sincerity of member states in fulfilling their own commitments. This forthcoming meeting will likely mark the beginning of a new approach to regional relations with Nicaragua, one that moves past empty warnings in favor of more substantive measures. In this regard, at least three multilateral actions can be adopted based on recommendations from international leaders. These actions defend the integrity of the OAS Charter, the Pact of San José, and the Rio Treaty without circumventing the principle of nonintervention.

First, ministers should consider establishing a commission to recommend, within a short time span, effective (penalizing or behavior-changing) measures within the framework of the Inter-American System’s legal agreements, specifically those which Nicaragua has directly violated over the course of its membership.

Second is the recognition of Nicaragua’s diverse, representative, and legitimate democratic civic movement, whose political mobilization is impeded by the prevailing police state. The regime’s most recent decision to annul elections is based on the threat that these groups represent to the dictatorial political class. Civic organizations reflect the sentiment of the Nicaraguan people, the vast majority of whom feel they do not live freely.

Third, each State should consider adopting precautionary, unilateral measures regarding Nicaragua’s actions, provided they remain within the framework of international law. These actions may include withdrawing their ambassadors for consultations, as Costa Rica and Panama have done, so that they themselves can attest to the scope and dimension of the political dysfunction in Nicaragua. Non-participation in meetings (of a cultural, economic, political, or other nature) in which Nicaragua is present—such as the meeting of regional electoral authorities to be held in Mexico City in September 2026—is another worthwhile option.

These three options align with the prevailing political reality in the Americas: members of the Shield of the Americas are currently forming a bloc that promotes a political configuration that rejects everything Nicaragua does.

Nicaragua is once again a litmus test for the integrity and sincerity of the Inter-American System at a time of great division among the member states. However, collective coercive mobilization led by countries in the Shield of the Americas would provide an opportunity to make progress on issues these countries consider fundamental, such as universal suffrage and territorial integrity.

Coordinated but unilateral action may be able to serve as a roadmap for action toward Nicaragua despite the limitations of the OAS principle of nonintervention.