Introduction: The Shape of Dictatorship in Nicaragua
This briefing offers an overview of the current problems faced by Nicaraguans in 2026. Specifically, it shows the impact of political radicalization on economic development, corruption, state capture, and public perceptions of the future in both personal and national contexts. The piece also details U.S. responses to the Nicaraguan radicalization, which have primarily taken the form of economic sanctions.
After the political crisis of 2018, the incumbent government, realizing that it lacked legitimacy and popularity, reorganized its platform to increase its capacity for rule by force. The regime embarked on an authoritarian radicalization that, by 2026, has become institutionalized through four pillars of power controlled by the current copresident, Rosario Murillo.[i] The pillars of power are guided by a hierarchical structure of no more than 200 individuals, composed of the regime’s closest allies and loyalists, military officers, and bureaucrats who coordinate social control and political repression.
The first pillar of the Murillo government’s political strategy is isolation and alliances with rogue states. The dictatorship removed itself from most international agreements to minimize scrutiny, while establishing alliances with non-democratic actors (Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba, for example) raising tensions with the United States.
Another pillar is the criminalization of democracy, enforced via expanded state policing and legal changes that curtail civic and political rights. The use of intimidation tactics weakens civic activism and social protest and erodes hopes for change among Nicaraguans. The system relies on a judiciary that acts more like a political commissariat—a police force that gathers intelligence, often by instructing the judiciary, and exercises force, while also engaging in internal purging of the system—and on a military that places its loyalty to the regime above the Constitution. The regime has subordinated the Constitution to the Law of Self-Determination as the Supreme Law of the Land and uses it as a tool to repress, intimidate, and expel. In 2025, it reformed the Constitution to practically ensure presidential succession without due process of law. The regime has also authorized the police to identify and detain people based on unsubstantiated allegations or hearsay from informants, police, or Ortega-Murillo officials.
The third pillar is economic, and it reinforces the composition of an economic elite through state capture by the Ortega-Murillo circle. The regime has set up a structure through forced confiscations, tax extortion, and multimillion-dollar economic transactions with China in mining and merchandise imports. It also relies on remittances from people expelled during the period of intensified repression, which generates 32% of the country’s national income. Macroeconomic stability coexists with rising inequality, including lower incomes, a larger informal economy, and a lack of judicial security.
The fourth pillar works to exert control through censorship. The regime’s propaganda machine instills fear in order to facilitate social control, working side by side with the repressive apparatus that persecutes and detains civilians, particularly religious authorities, youth leaders, and people in the private sector. Through these four pillars, the dictatorship aims to hold a presidential election in November 2027 without any semblance of legitimacy, ultimately prolonging its stay in power.[ii]
Lagging Behind Central America: Nicaragua After the Authoritarian Radicalization
Living conditions in Nicaragua have undoubtedly deteriorated since 2018. Despite the propaganda and censorship tactics that Rosario Murillo, Nicaragua’s current president, has used both inside and outside the country, the numbers do not lie. It is a country that, by any indicator, has fallen behind.
Growing regional disparities
Only Nicaraguans who manage to travel abroad realize how far behind the country has fallen. The problem is that few people travel; even by air, the number of passengers departing Nicaragua remains similar to 2018 figures—around half a million—despite population growth and high migration.
Faced with censorship and propaganda, most people are unaware of the lag. They see evidence of economic activity in their daily lives and sometimes conclude that maybe only they are doing poorly, focusing instead on their own situation.
But the country lags behind the rest of Central America. Nicaragua not only has the highest proportion of undernourished people, but this has increased since 2018. In the rest of the region, efforts have led to declines of over 1% in that period, improving food security.
FIGURE 1: MALNOURISHED POPULATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE NATIONAL POPULATION
Source: Social Progress Index
In education, the country has taken a step backward. University enrollment dropped from over 200,000 students in 2017 to 82,000 in 2026. School enrollment has also declined. The quality of universities has deteriorated both academically and in terms of freedom.
Nicaragua, along with El Salvador (also one of the region’s more repressive authoritarian regimes), has the highest percentage of young people who neither study nor work in Central America. In El Salvador, incarceration reduces enrollment; in Nicaragua, the lack of jobs and educational opportunities discourages enrollment, prompting people to leave instead.
FIGURE 2: YOUTH WHO NEITHER WORK NOR STUDY AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE NATIONAL AGE GROUP
Source: Social Progress Index
According to the Social Progress Index, Nicaragua’s university quality score has stagnated at 21 points since 2011, after a brief rise in 2018 and a subsequent decline by 2025. Other countries score above 40. Academic freedom is also reported as nearly nonexistent.
FIGURE 3: ACADEMIC FREEDOM SCORES ACROSS CENTRAL AMERICA
Source: Social Progress Index. Scores range from 0-100, with 0 indicating the least amount of academic freedom.
Politics is no game
Nicaraguans themselves recognize the lack of freedom in their country. Under Rosario Murillo, her son, Laureano Ortega, and the rest of their family circle, the rule of law has deteriorated across all levels, placing Nicaragua behind the rest of Central America.
This is especially notable given the severity of democratic backsliding in the region as a whole: from President Nayib Bukele’s authoritarian measures in El Salvador to populist leadership in Costa Rica and Honduras, and ongoing struggles in Guatemala. Yet Nicaragua stands out for the extent of repression. In just eight years, the criminalization of constitutional rights has reached unprecedented levels.
Corruption in Nicaragua also surpasses that of neighboring countries: the World Bank ranks Nicaragua lowest in the region for corruption. Judicial security is effectively nonexistent, as property can be confiscated arbitrarily. While corruption across Central America involves customs fraud, social security abuse, and influence peddling, Nicaragua’s centralized power structure enables total state capture and systematic plundering of the economy. Despite Murillo’s consolidation of power, the country has not improved. Nicaragua experienced the highest migration rate in the post-COVID-19 period. Although it represents 15% of the region’s population, it accounted for 26% of unauthorized migration to the United States from 2021-2025. People have voted with their feet in response to repression and economic hardship.
TABLE 1: CENTRAL AMERICAN ACCUMULATED U.S.-MEXICO BORDER ARRIVALS, 2021-2025
|
|
Migrants |
As a share of the national population |
As a share of total |
|
El Salvador |
232,145 |
4% |
14% |
|
Guatemala |
517,636 |
3% |
30% |
|
Honduras |
512,950 |
5% |
30% |
|
Nicaragua |
444,052 |
7% |
26% |
|
Four countries |
1,706,783 |
5% |
100% |
Source: Author’s figures based on official statistics from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and estimates of ‘gotaways.’
Overall, the country lives in a police state; there are more police in the country than doctors or teachers combined—the voluntary police is almost twice as large as the country’s primary and secondary teachers. Even by regional comparison, Nicaragua lags behind, except on the number of police in the streets.
TABLE 2: COMPARING THE SIZE OF NATIONAL POLICE FORCES ACROSS CENTRAL AMERICA
|
|
Doctors (nationally) |
Doctors (per 10,000 people) |
Police (nationally) |
Police (per 10,000 people) |
Teachers (nationally) |
Teacher/pupil ratio |
|
Guatemala |
24,000 |
16 |
43,538 |
23 |
250,000 |
4.0% |
|
Honduras |
20,250 |
19 |
23,609 |
24 |
81,000 |
2.5% |
|
Nicaragua |
6,200 |
9 |
28,400* |
42 |
39,000 |
1.7% |
|
Costa Rica |
9,400 |
27 |
12,600 |
23 |
80,000 |
6.4% |
Source: World Bank Development Indicators; national police statistics from each country; World Health Organization. *The Nicaraguan voluntary police is composed of 76,000 members.
An unequal economy
Compared to regional peers, Nicaragua continues to lag economically. In recent years, per capita income in the Northern Triangle countries has nearly doubled. Despite the government’s use of loans to support economic recovery, Nicaragua did not achieve similar progress.
Despite rising remittances, which now make up 31% of per capita income, overall income has not increased significantly. Nicaragua also has higher labor vulnerability, largely due to its large informal sector, which comprises more than three-quarters of the workforce—the highest proportion in the region.
Additionally, Nicaragua has one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios (84%) and relatively low reserves (38% of external debt), second only to El Salvador.
FIGURE 4: PER CAPITA INCOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
FIGURE 5: PER CAPITA INCOME DEPENDENCY ON REMITTANCES: NICARAGUA AND THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
Nicaraguans’ Views of the Economy and Freedom: Not Very Good
Nicaraguans are not satisfied with life in a police state. They do not feel free, nor do they perceive themselves as financially well off. The intention to migrate has remained unchanged over the past three years, and economic conditions have not improved. Murillo continues to lead the country down the wrong path, and pressure for change is urgent.
From macroeconomic conditions to the household
The Nicaraguan government claims to focus on social policy and that economic growth translates into well-being for Nicaraguans. The numbers themselves show a different reality. The average Nicaraguan’s annual per capita income shows little progress (from $2,000 to $2,700 between 2018 and 2025), and any growth comes from the boom in remittances. Moreover, public spending has not increased despite increases in tax revenue, particularly from remittance recipients.
There is less formal employment and more informality, resulting in lower incomes.
The contribution of family remittances to private consumption is above 40%.
FIGURE 6: REMITTANCES AS SHARE OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, 2018-2025
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua
At the bottom of the pyramid, the economic profile of Nicaraguans is bleak: monthly household income is below $300 ($500 for those receiving remittances), fewer than half can save—and only modestly (about $500 or three months of reserves)—and 40% are in debt, mostly for consumption. It is a difficult reality in a country where more than half of household heads are women who stay to care for their children and have few opportunities to improve their quality of life.
Therefore, growth does not translate into improved economic conditions for families: employment is not growing, wages are not rising, but remittances are what keep income stable. What is happening is a relatively stable economy in the short term, largely reliant on remittances (exports and remittances together accounted for 68% of GDP in the first quarter of 2026), because production-led exports leave less than 30% of all income generated in the country.
The result is that Nicaraguans continue to live hand to mouth on an average of US$250 per month, which is an insufficient income. Meanwhile, there are discrepancies in government spending, investment, and revenue. The country has collected twice as much in taxes over eight years, at an annual rate of 10%, but public spending has grown by no more than 2% annually on average, while public investment, 60% financed by external borrowing, has grown by 7%. Taxes aren’t being returned to the people; they’re being passed elsewhere.
TABLE 3: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, INVESTMENT, AND REVENUE (US$ MILLION), 2018-2025
|
Year |
Government spending |
Public investment |
Remittance tax contributions |
Government revenue |
External debt service |
|
2018 |
$1,916 |
$982 |
$225 |
$2,038 |
$249 |
|
2019 |
$1,889 |
$695 |
$252 |
$1,942 |
$329 |
|
2020 |
$1,879 |
$1,184 |
$278 |
$2,127 |
$353 |
|
2021 |
$2,176 |
$1,461 |
$322 |
$2,114 |
$375 |
|
2022 |
$2,151 |
$1,379 |
$484 |
$3,093 |
$437 |
|
2023 |
$2,163 |
$1,410 |
$699 |
$3,550 |
$606 |
|
2024 |
$2,290 |
$1,718 |
$786 |
$3,956 |
$723 |
|
2025 |
$2,190 |
$1,710 |
$925 |
$4,569 |
$781 |
|
2026 |
$2,256 |
$1,761 |
$1,027 |
$4,888 |
$839 |
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua; author’s estimates of remittance tax contributions.
About the country’s direction and the economy
A comparative analysis of public opinion surveys among Nicaraguans inside the country shows widespread dissatisfaction. Perceptions of the economic situation—and the country overall—are negative and have worsened in recent years. Income has grown little despite rising living costs, and public opinion reflects this experience.
Nearly half (44%) believe the country is heading in the wrong direction, a higher percentage than in 2024. This does not account for the fact that many people avoid expressing their views out of fear, with one in four refraining from talking because they do not feel free to speak.
FIGURE 7: NICARAGUANS’ OPINIONS ON THE DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY
Source: Orozco, Manuel. Surveys conducted since 2019 as part of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Working Group on Nicaragua.
However, when it comes to strict economic matters, people do speak out. Their dissatisfaction reflects resistance, as economic hardship is seen as political—it depends on who is in charge, and that is Murillo. Similarly, nearly half believe the economic situation is worse. Among those who think conditions are improving, that group has shrunk significantly. In addition, those who think the economy is better are among remittance recipients who are economically better off.
Certainly, economic concerns weigh heavily on people; they have consistently been the country’s main problem, except during the peak political crisis from 2018 to 2020. When repression and COVID-19 arrived, the economy deteriorated, prompting migration due to Ortega’s poor management.
FIGURE 8: NICARAGUANS’ OPINIONS ON THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY
Source: Orozco, Manuel. Surveys conducted since 2019 as part of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Working Group on Nicaragua.
Eight years later, the current leadership—who sought sole control of power—has no excuse for the country’s situation. People experience it directly and understand that economic hardship, whether inflation, unemployment, or general conditions, is the most urgent issue. They also feel that insecurity has increased in a country whose police once claimed it was the safest in the region.
TABLE 4: NICARAGUANS’ IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN PROBLEM IN THEIR COUNTRY; 2019, 2024, 2026
|
|
2019 |
2024 |
2026 |
|
Inflation and prices |
1.30% |
33.40% |
40.50% |
|
General economic conditions |
30.20% |
23.60% |
18.60% |
|
Unemployment |
23.40% |
19.50% |
13.30% |
|
Other |
10.00% |
3.50% |
9.80% |
|
Crime |
2.70% |
10.00% |
8.70% |
|
Corruption |
1.60% |
0.80% |
1.90% |
|
Bad government and politicians; political crisis |
22.20% |
2.40% |
2.30% |
|
Don’t know or did not respond |
5.70% |
5.30% |
4.90% |
Source: Orozco, Manuel. Surveys conducted since 2019 as part of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Working Group on Nicaragua.
This is not just a macroeconomic issue—the average Nicaraguan lives it daily and finds it difficult.
The desire to migrate has not disappeared
These hardships are consistently reflected in the intention to migrate. Roughly one in twenty households wants to leave the country, equivalent to more than 250,000 individuals. The reason is economic: 80% say they want to leave to improve job prospects or earn a higher income. This intention is like that in other countries in the region and remains at levels seen before migration restrictions and humanitarian relief measures. If conditions worsen, people will seek to leave. Even during the post-COVID-19 period, when the United States restricted entry under emergency health measures (Title 42), people continued to leave, escaping repression.
FIGURE 9: PERCENTAGE OF NICARAGUANS WITH INTENTIONS TO MIGRATE
Source: Orozco, Manuel. Surveys conducted since 2019 as part of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Working Group on Nicaragua.
Perception of freedom
People also recognize that they do not live in a fully democratic or free society. Slightly more than 70% of Nicaraguans believe they are not free or only partially free. About 30% believe they are fully free. These tend to be individuals who are economically better off, not necessarily those receiving remittances. There is no direct correlation between remittances and perceived freedom, but there is a relationship between feeling free and having a higher income.
Murillo has not only imported goods and taken loans from China, but she has also replicated their political model, subordinating civil and individual freedoms to State authority.
FIGURE 10: PERCEPTION OF FREEDOM AMONG NICARAGUANS, MARCH 2026
Source: Orozco, Manuel. Surveys conducted since 2019 as part of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Working Group on Nicaragua.
Data shows that those who do not feel free are also the ones who believe the country is in bad shape, heading in the wrong direction, or worsening. This sense of freedom of deprivation often appears as silence on political issues; however, under certain circumstances.
Corruption in Nicaragua Under the Murillo Dictatorship
The modus operandi of 21st-century dictatorships shows greater sophistication in maintaining power. Their success lies not so much in the kleptocratic model itself, but in the methods they use to evade international and public scrutiny—concealing how a regime represses, keeping the population unaware of the systemic ways corruption and state capture operate, and keeping the middle and upper classes on a tight leash so they do not step out of line.
As long as they can operate successfully in this way, international pressure will remain moderate, and the likelihood of a social uprising will be low—both of which, along with outdated leadership, typically bring down dictatorships.
The Ortega-Murillo dynasty controls state capture and is distinguished by disguising a kind of low-intensity dictatorship so that external pressure does not escalate and the population does not rise up. It is not that they do not repress or even kill, nor that they do not steal ruthlessly; rather, the method they use allows them to get away with it without much public awareness.
In most cases, when ordinary people do not perceive the magnitude of the theft being committed, the regime continues exploiting the population. It is almost a perfect kleptocracy—yet there are always cracks through which the core of Murillo’s system becomes visible.
Dimensions of state capture
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines state capture as a situation in which there are “efforts by firms or groups to shape state laws, policies, and regulations for their own benefit, providing illicit private gains to public officials.” The Ortega-Murillo clan has established its own mechanism, operating quietly so that ordinary citizens are unaware of the corruption, influence-peddling, and favoritism embedded in these operations among elites tied to the ruling circle.
Kleptocracy and privilege
The ruling family has co-opted access to state resources and public institutions. One emblematic case is Rafael Ortega, a businessman enriched through state funds who, as administrator and manager of petroleum distribution companies—including Distribuidora Nicaragüense de Petróleos (DNP), a quasi-state entity—once controlled over 30% of the market for at least ten consecutive years (in an annual crude oil business of about $500 million) until sanctions were imposed. He was later repositioned through service contracts with the state and eventually compensated when the entity was absorbed by the government.
Since the early years of Daniel Ortega’s presidency, his son Laureano Ortega has leveraged the country’s Dialogue, Alliance, and Consensus Model with the private sector to appropriate the customs system and authorize the release of goods without tariffs for his businesses and associates. Although China and Nicaragua signed a free trade agreement in 2024, tariffs and related costs still exist for certain goods. Under the new Special Economic Zones law, Ortega has offered direct tax exemptions for Chinese companies in which it holds investments. Imports from China grew from $600 million in 2019 to $2 billion in 2025.
Other figures sanctioned on corrupt transactions by the US government include Juan Carlos Ortega, Camila Ortega (whose husband is closely linked to key political allies), and Rafael Ortega’s son, are also involved in business operations that rely on the state for private gain rather than national benefit.
Taken together—excluding wealth accumulated before 2018—these kleptocratic opportunities can generate more than two digits in millions annually for the family (not counting partners) through sales operations, financial compensation, oil distribution revenues, tariff exemptions, and other benefits.
Debt-fueled extraction
External debt that benefits political and economic elites is another clear example of state capture. The regime takes on external debt to finance projects tied to allies within the power structure, often investing in activities that do not align with the country’s development needs. More than three-quarters of public investment goes into public works—primarily road construction—rather than social investment.
Meanwhile, public spending on education remains below $600 million. Since 2018, Nicaragua has taken on over $400 million in external loans, largely benefiting a small number of companies—mostly construction firms—that earn minimum profits of about 15% of contract value. At the same time, the state repays around $600 million annually using taxpayer funds. In effect, Murillo authorizes the state to enrich her associates while the public bears the cost of the incurred debt.
Covert extortion and confiscation
Fiscal extortion—beyond informal fees and bribes paid by citizens—has targeted around 100 medium- and large-sized companies accused of unpaid taxes by tax authorities. There is also extortion directed at middle- and upper-class individuals seeking to return to the country, with fees of $1,000 or more imposed to resolve entry denials.
Additionally, the ruling family has spent nearly five years implementing a recovery program against purged business figures and former allies. Properties belonging to former regime associates have been confiscated under charges such as money laundering and tax evasion or placed under restrictions that prevent any financial transactions. Assets belonging to individuals labeled as traitors have also been seized, repurposed, or even destroyed and resold to regime allies.
The interventions of Riverside Coffee and BHMB Mining, a company with U.S. and British capital, illustrate a fast-track approach: immediate confiscation followed by transfer to allied companies—in this case, Chinese firms.
Economic favors
Murillo has relied on loyalist local officials as instruments of political control and populist diffusion. While family members manage business operations, she has maintained clientelist networks by allocating funds to municipalities in exchange for their political allegiance. These funds are part of influence-peddling mechanisms in which local officials invest in projects that benefit executive-level politicians.As in the regime’s collusion with larger business figures, the balance of power in these deals is asymmetrical: local officials may be punished if they are caught exceeding the “acceptable” limits of corruption.
Staying under the radar
These forms of corruption occur not at the base of society, but at its apex. Financial and commercial operations are conducted among elites through contracts and networks far removed from public view. The middle class often remains silent out of fear, while ordinary citizens are unaware of the scale of the theft.
These activities do not generate significant employment; people only see surface-level signs—Chinese investments, new roads, luxury properties—without understanding the underlying mechanisms or how their own taxes finance elite profits.
The IMF has remained largely silent on this reality, despite available evidence. People suspect corruption, but cannot point to it if they cannot see it.
Sanctions in the Face of Repression and Kleptocracy
The various acts of repression, corruption, and abuses of authority have been responded to with sanctions in addition to international condemnation. U.S. sanctions are not merely symbolic reminders, but part of the country’s foreign policy to penalize actors complicit in the atrocities committed in Nicaragua and the kleptocratic structure that benefits from state capture.
The trajectory of sanctions
Sanctions serve as a mechanism of accountability in response to the physical, economic, and political deprivations inflicted by the dictatorship over the past decade. So far, the United States has imposed more than 85 sanctions on institutions (25) and individuals (60) around the world, not including 23 judges listed under the Engel List. The European Union has sanctioned 31 individuals, Canada 35, the United Kingdom 14, and Switzerland 14. Those sanctioned belong to the circle of power operating within the administrative structure that sustains the repressive system.
FIGURE 11: SANCTIONS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS OR CORRUPT ACTORS IN NICARAGUA, 2017-2026
Source: United States Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, Nicaragua Related Sanctions.
Penalizing repression
The sanctions from April 2026, which include Luis Cañas, carry symbolic weight. He is one of the few historical Sandinistas loyal to Murillo—originally punished for criminal behavior, including theft and land seizures, and later reinstated when the regime needed loyal operatives to continue the repression that began in April 2018. Cañas has played a central role in repression at multiple levels, including hiring snipers, carrying out arbitrary detentions, and gathering intelligence on civic leaders and citizens. He has also acted as a gatekeeper controlling entry and exit from the country and has been involved in extorting individuals denied entry by charging fraudulent political visa fees. He is directly responsible for the illegal closure of more than 5,000 civil society organizations, under his ministry, his authority includes the control, authorization or removal of license of registration of non-profit organizations.
This sanction also carries political significance, as the international community and the United States continue to link Nicaragua’s situation to repression—one of the U.S. State Department’s key concerns—and as part of an ongoing pressure campaign that could escalate to direct penalties against Daniel Ortega.
The entire Ortega family has been sanctioned and remains under scrutiny. Few figures within the inner circle remain unsanctioned, including Valdrack Jaentschke and Denis Moncada Colindres, Nicaragua’s Co-Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who maintain limited diplomatic channels with the United States.
Combating kleptocracy
Perhaps the most notable matter in the current wave of U.S. sanctions is its focus on dismantling the kleptocratic and corrupt structures used by the ruling family. The United States has put pressure on the regime to prevent further illicit use of the state. More than 20 institutional sanctions have targeted structures used for illicit gain.
One of the most significant actions involved sanctions against the petroleum businesses operated by Rafael Ortega and his former spouse. This was a multimillion-dollar operation that generated substantial annual profits through arrangements with Petrocaribe. The sanctions effectively removed the family from the oil business, even as Nicaragua shifted its energy dependencies amid the Venezuelan crisis.
Sanctions imposed in April also aim to disrupt the family’s efforts to build a new financial empire by disrupting the family’s efforts to do it through mining concessions granted to Chinese companies. Through institutions such as the Ministry of Energy and Mines and ENIMINAS, the regime has granted over 10,000 square kilometers of mining concessions to companies linked to Zhong Fu Development S.A. in just four years. At the same time, the regime continues confiscating private property and extorting businesses to weaken and replace them.
TABLE 5: SANCTIONED ENTITIES LINKED TO STATE CAPTURE AND KLEPTOCRACY IN NICARAGUA
|
Money laundering and oil businesses (2010–2019):
|
|
|
Front companies and private ventures of the Ortega-Murillo’s children (2015–2022): |
|
|
Mining exploitation (2022–2026) linked to Zhong Fu Development, S.A.:
|
|
The family’s economic model is highly destructive to Nicaraguans, benefiting only the ruling clan. The dictatorship has capitalized on high gold prices by using confiscations, illicit concessions, and extortion through taxation and the economy to profit. This year, Nicaragua is expected to increase gold exports from 600,000 to 800,000 ounces.
FIGURE 12: EXPORTS OF GOLD FROM NICARAGUA AND EXPANSION OF MINING ACTIVITY, 2020-2026
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua.
What comes next? Murillo and Laureano’s miscalculation and U.S. pressure
For the United States, Nicaragua represents a unique case in which the regime has maintained a relatively low profile despite ongoing pressure. The U.S. sees democratic transformation as likely to emerge gradually through political dynamics such as the eventual death of Ortega, internal family or clientelist conflicts, uncontrolled corruption, or unexpected social unrest.
As a result, U.S. pressure differs from its approach to countries like Cuba or Venezuela. The goal is to avoid triggering another wave of migration, organized crime, intensified repression or ties with malign states, while still maintaining pressure that disrupts the regime’s operations. For figures like Laureano Ortega and companies such as Zhong Fu Development, sanctions increase operational costs and may require restructuring export networks, particularly those tied to the United States.
At this stage, the effort focuses on continuing to pressure the regime to dismantle its repressive and kleptocratic structures, particularly its alliances with China. In a way, coining Feeley’s phrase about CABEI’s role in the past, in displacing CABEI and other financial institutions as the main lender, China has become the new ‘banker of the dictators’.
FIGURE 13: CHINESE LENDING TO NICARAGUA, 2025 AND 2026
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Nicaragua).
At the same time, civic opposition must highlight the scale of corruption affecting ordinary Nicaraguans, many of whom struggle to meet basic needs, and expose the mechanisms of State capture in order to draw indignation and demoralize the regime. This matter remains critical, especially given that institutions such as the IMF have acknowledged that economic growth stems from remittances (a byproduct of repression-driven migration).
[i]Constitutional Reforms in Nicaragua in 2024 created the designation of a shared presidency, making Rosario Murillo co-president along with her husband, Daniel Ortega. However, due to his declining physical condition, Ortega’s role is largely symbolic.
[ii] For background analysis prior to 2024, refer to the following: The Consequences of Nicaragua’s Radicalization and Options for US Foreign Policy, 2025; Risk Mitigation Efforts for Radicalization and Dynastic Succession in Nicaragua, 2024; The Authoritarian Wave in the XXI Century: Toward A Democratic Reset 2024; The Political Situation in Nicaragua, 2023; A Push for Freedom, Ensuring a Democratic Transition in Nicaragua through International Pressure, 2022; Dictatorial Radicalization in Nicaragua: From Repression to Extremism?, 2022; Justice and democracy in Nicaragua: necessary steps for political change, 2018; International Norms and Mobilization for Democracy, 2002.
