Brazilian Defense Industry
Ministry of Defense. Hisaac Gomes e Érico Alves (gov.br)

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Brazil’s Quiet Arms Ambition: How Brasília Builds Military Power Without Becoming a Military Power

Brazil is not usually thought of as an arms-producing power. It faces no immediate conventional security threat, has not sought to project military force beyond its borders, and has generally pursued its international ambitions through diplomacy rather than war. Yet Brazil has long sought to maintain and expand its role as a manufacturer and exporter of sophisticated weaponry. Brazilian arms have been used in conflicts ranging from full-scale wars in the Middle East to counterinsurgency operations in Africa and Latin America. Brazilian firms have also often partnered with European counterparts, seeking technology transfer to build capabilities over the long term.

As a result, defense items contribute both to its economy and to its ambitions to be seen as a player on the global scene. Although it is dwarfed by other arms producers and has slipped from the position it held during the 1980s when it sold extensively to warring Middle Eastern customers, Brazil can point to success in key niches, particularly building and selling military aircraft and rockets. 

Its navy is building frigates with German participation and submarines with French assistance, including one planned nuclear-powered submarine. In ground vehicles, by contrast, Brazil is far from the position it once hoped to occupy. Once poised to become a leader in armored vehicles, it is now largely limited to producing or assembling variants of Italian-designed systems. 

Budgetary constraints and the absence of any immediate security threats limit how much Brazil is willing to spend on defense. That puts it at a disadvantage compared to competitors such as Turkey and South Korea, which buy in large quantity at home many of the products they sell abroad. Still, successive Brazilian governments have viewed the defense sector as part of overall development strategy. With new products becoming available for sale, Brazil is likely to remain in the arms business.

 

Embraer Flies High

The star of Brazil’s defense industry is Embraer. Originally a state-owned enterprise and now privatized, with the state retaining a minority interest, Embraer is best known as a manufacturer of passenger aircraft. But it has also made important strides in defense, beginning in the early 1980s with the EMB 312 Tucano, a turboprop aircraft that could be used for light attack or as a trainer.

The Tucano proved popular in Latin America, with sales to Argentina, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela. Colombia and Venezuela used it in combat operations against insurgent groups. It also found markets in Angola, where it was also used for counterinsurgency, as well as Mauritania, Egypt, and Iran.

Embraer has built on this success with the EMB 314 Super Tucano, an enhanced version with higher altitude and greater speed capabilities. It entered service in 2003 with the Brazilian Air Force’s purchase of 99 aircraft, becoming a key element of the Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM), which was designed to monitor a vast, lightly populated area facing threats from narcotics trafficking, illegal mining, and spillover from Colombia’s internal conflict.

Like its predecessor, the Super Tucano has been widely adopted in Latin America, where its relatively low cost makes it attractive. Embraer has also sold a version meeting NATO standard to the Portuguese Air Force, which it hopes will lead to further European sales. The company is also looking to market the Super Tucano internationally as a counter-drone platform.

Brazil has made an even bigger impression in global defense aviation with its C 390 Millennium, a medium transport and tanker aircraft. It is the heaviest aircraft Embraer has built and competes against the latest version of the American Lockheed Martin C 130 Hercules. Czech, Portuguese, American, British, and Argentine subcontractors have all provided components for the Millennium. Equipped with jet engines, the aircraft flies faster and carries larger loads than its American competitor. But it is also a much newer product and therefore lacks the Hercules’ long operational history, including in austere tactical environments, as well as its support network.

That has not deterred buyers. The aircraft entered service with the Brazilian Air Force in 2019; Brazil has purchased 19. It has found European buyers in Portugal, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Czechia, Sweden, and Lithuania, and it has also been purchased by South Korea and Uzbekistan. The Millennium has been displayed at air shows around the world, underscoring that a Brazilian aircraft can compete successfully with a storied American product. At the same time, Northrop Grumman is working with Embraer to customize the tanker version, the KC 390, for potential sale to the United States and allied air forces.

 

Missiles and rockets

Brazil is also strong in rocketry. AvibrasASTROS, or Artillery Saturation Rocket System, is a truck-launched surface-to-surface missile system that can be configured with multiple options for number and range of projectiles. It has been proven in combat, notably in the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War, and Angola’s long counterinsurgency campaign.

Privately owned Avibras, however, has financial difficulties since the decline of Middle Eastern demand in the 1990s. It is now undergoing reorganization with Brazilian billionaire Joesley Batista taking a controlling interest.

Despite its problems, Avibras has important projects that may gain traction as its reorganization is completed. It has had under development for the Brazilian army the subsonic AV-TM 300 Matador cruise missile, which can be launched from the ASTROS II platform. With a 300-kilometer range – the maximum permitted under the Missile Technology Control Regime – it is being marketed internationally as a lower cost alternative to the U.S. Tomahawk or the French Apache. Avibras is also beginning work on the S+100 tactical missile, also designed to be compatible with the ASTROS II launcher. With supersonic capacity and a high-altitude ballistic arc, it would be more difficult to shoot down than the Matador or comparable systems.

Avibras has also been involved in a dispute over intellectual property with SIATT, another Brazilian firm that was originally its partner in the creation of the MANSUP, the National Anti-Surface Ship-to-Ship Missile. MANSUP is moving from testing and qualification toward operational adoption with the Brazilian navy. Avibras worked on the airframe and propulsion systems, while SIATT worked on guidance and navigation. EDGE, a firm owned by the government of Abu Dhabi, has purchased a 50 percent share in SIATT and the MANSUP missile is being purchased by the United Arab Emirates’ navy.

 

Defending the Blue Amazon

Brazil is upgrading its naval capabilities under its “Blue Amazon” doctrine. This doctrine stresses the importance of the seas along its entire 4655 mile-long coastline, including its exclusive economic zone, and compares them to the Amazon in long-term strategic significance. The discovery of major offshore oil deposits has increased the priority Brazil gives to its navy. Brazil also views the wider South Atlantic as an area of interest, creating the need for a true “blue water” navy. 

In 2020, Brazil contracted four Tamandaré-class frigates through Águas Azuis, a consortium involving Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, Embraer Defesa & Segurança, and Atech. The first, F200 Tamandaré, entered the navy’s operational sector in April 2026 and the government has since moved toward ordering four additional frigates.

The navy is also working with France’s Naval Group to build four diesel-electric submarines, based upon the French Scorpène-class vessels. This program is far along, with three submarines having been commissioned and the fourth undergoing sea trials. A fifth submarine, to be nuclear powered, is also under construction. Although the submarine is being built in cooperation with Brazil’s French partner, the nuclear power plant itself is being built entirely by Brazil’s navy using low enriched uranium.  

Technical and financial difficulties mean that the nuclear-powered submarine, originally proposed in the late 1980s, may not be ready until deep into the 2030s. It is also open to question whether the program makes sense for Brazil. Brazilian naval officers hope for an eventual fleet of three nuclear submarines, which would provide full and rapid coverage of its waters. Opponents argue that prestige is the dominant motivation, since such a submarine would allow Brazil to claim some kind of nuclear role in its defense even though it has abandoned any effort at developing a nuclear weapon.

Brazil will likely be interested in eventually producing warships for export. For now, however, President Lula da Silva recently announced his intention to order four more Tamandaré-class frigates, which will keep the shipyard where they are being built busy for several years.

The effort also complements attempts to rebuild Brazil’s civilian shipbuilding capacity, which has suffered from competition from China, South Korea, and Japan. One element of this effort is a requirement that Petrobras build ships and offshore oil platforms domestically.

 

The fall from armored-vehicle ambition

Brazil’s record in armored vehicles is more mixed. Engesa, a now defunct private firm with close ties to the Brazilian army during the military governments, initially had success with the development in the 1970s of the EE9 Cascavel (Rattlesnake), a six wheeled armored vehicle with a turret gun, and the EE 11 Urutu (Pit Viper) armored personnel carrier. These were originally designed to replace aging American-built vehicles at a time when the United States, embroiled in Vietnam, could not meet Brazilian needs.

The Cascavel and Urutu sold well internationally filling a niche for rugged, relatively low-cost armored vehicles. They found customers in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, including Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Engesa’s success led it to build a prototype main battle tank during the 1980s, the EE T1 Osório, aimed at the Middle Eastern market. Although the Osorio had advantages in cost, mobility, and fuel consumption, it faced a powerful competitor in the M1A1 Abrams produced by U.S. firm General Dynamics. 

When Saudi Arabia opted for the Abrams in 1991, both for technical and strategic reasons, the Osório was doomed. It failed to obtain other customers and never went into production. Engesa also suffered from financial problems resulting from Iraq’s failure to pay for vehicles it had received. It faced additional competition from the flood of used NATO and Warsaw Pact equipment that entered developing-country markets after the end of the Cold War. After Brazil’s return to democracy, official support was no longer forthcoming and Engesa went bankrupt in 1993.P

Several firms still provide upgrades for the many Cascavels and Urutus in service worldwide. But Brazil is no longer an indigenous producer of ground vehicles the way it is in military aviation and rocketry. 

The Brazilian army works directly with Italian defense firms on building variants of foreign-designed products both for its own use and for export, including armored vehicles based on Italian designs.

 

The search for autonomy

Brazil’s defense exports have long been seen as an opportunity for economic diversification in a country powered heavily by agricultural and natural resource. Well into the twentieth century, Brazil played only a limited role as an arms producer and often purchased advanced weapons from foreign suppliers. During World War II, Brazil developed a close security relationship with the fighting on the Allied side and then continuing to receive purchased or donated American equipment in the following decades.

The relationship was never free of tensions. It soured during the presidency of Jimmy Carter when restrictions were imposed on arms transfers in response to human rights violations committed by Brazil’s military government and to nonproliferation concerns. Brazilian leaders became committed to enhancing their country’s own defense production capabilities to achieve greater autonomy, earn needed foreign exchange, and obtain technology transfer that could benefit the wider economy.

Still, American firms remain subcontractors for key elements of the products Brazil manufactures domestically. Brazil lacks the capacity to manufacture jet engines. The Super Tucano uses engines made by the Canadian subsidiary of Pratt & Whitney (part of RTX, formerly Raytheon.). The Millennium’s engines are manufactured by International Aero Engines, a consortium that includes Pratt & Whitney, as well as German and Japanese firms. 

Brazil’s preferred partners in leading roles, however, are often European. The relative absence of the United States likely reflects both lingering suspicion dating back to U.S. restrictions on arms transfers during military rule and the tougher U.S. approach to export controls and transfers of sensitive technologies.

There have been exceptions, notably Brazil’s purchase of Sikorsky UH 60 Black Hawk helicopters. But Brazil’s drive for strategic autonomy seems particularly aimed at avoiding dependence on the United States. This view was reflected in its 2014 decision to purchase the Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen over the American Boeing F/A 18 Super Hornet as its front line fighter aircraft, replacing the obsolescent subsonic AMX A-1, an Italian-designed aircraft assembled in Brazil by Embraer. Brazil’s army has also been procuring new drone systems and has specifically required that potential bidders not be subject to the U.S. international Traffic in Arms (ITAR) restrictions. 

 

A difficult business

Brazil has traditionally followed “developmentalist” economic ideology, which led the state to undertake megaprojects as the construction of its capital Brasilia, the Itaipu dam, and the Trans-Amazon Highway. It also supported state-owned and private businesses such as Embraer, Avibras, and Engesa, which flourished especially during the 1980s. At that time, Brazil sold arms to both sides of the Iran-Iraq War as well as to other regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Libya, becoming the world’s tenth-largest exporter of major arms.

Beginning in the 1990s, however, Brazil’s defense sector took a major hit. By 2024, it ranked only 23rd among arms exporters. However, it has enjoyed a recovery of late, and exports continue to be crucial for Brazil’s defense sector, especially as its armed forces, although the second largest in the Western Hemisphere, suffer from chronic budget constraints that limit their own purchases of Brazilian-made equipment. 

Defense production for both domestic use and export represents 3.58 percent of gross domestic product. But Brazil must compete not only against established U.S., European, and Russian manufacturers, but also against newer entrants such as Turkey and South Korea. Compared with those players, Brazil’s own defense needs are limited. It borders ten states and has a huge coastline, but it faces no important immediate threat beyond potential impact from internal security problems within Colombia and Venezuela. Its armed forces are relatively small for its population and their purchases cannot support the sector’s growth to the same extent as in countries with larger procurement needs.

Brazil seeks a role in world affairs commensurate with its size and potential. It has generally pursued this goal through diplomatic means, such as its membership in the BRICS grouping of states and its efforts to obtain a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Apart from participation in peacekeeping operations, it has not sought to project its own military power outside of its borders. 

Even so, developing a position as a significant arms supplier, especially to developing countries, adds to Brazil’s global position while contributing to its economy. Brazil has made impressive strides as an arms producer and exporter. In an increasingly turbulent world, it can be expected to try to build on them.

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