Across democracies from Washington to Brasília, polarization has become the shorthand explanation for institutional strain and electoral volatility. The term has become a default explanation for everything from social media skirmishes to electoral outcomes, institutional clashes, and even democratic erosion. Politics, many argue, has turned into a permanent state of confrontation, resembling a football match more than public deliberation. Yet polarization is often treated as a cause when it may be a consequence.
A growing body of research suggests a more nuanced reality. A recent study by More in Common divides Brazilian society into six groups, organized into three broader categories: progressives, conservatives, and what researchers call the “invisibles”. The most ideologically mobilized extremes account for just 11 percent of the population. By contrast, 54 percent fall into the “invisibles,” split between the disengaged (27 percent) and the cautious (27 percent).
These groups are defined less by rigid ideology than by pragmatic concerns such as economic security, access to health care, and public safety. They are poorer on average, less formally educated and more religious. Many do not strongly identify as either petista or bolsonarista. They resemble what has long formed the backbone of Brazilian electoral politics, voters primarily focused on material stability rather than ideological alignment.
We insist on explaining Brazilian society as polarized, but the data shows that the majority of Brazilians are not ideological militants.
A second study, “Mapa das Ideologias Brasileiras,” reinforces this point. Although 59 percent of respondents identify as right–leaning and 34 percent as left–leaning, the research maps nine distinct ideological currents across three axes: left–right–center; nationalism–cosmopolitanism; and moderation–radicalism. The resulting landscape is heterogeneous. Most ideological clusters operate within democratic boundaries. Many combine conservatism with statism, social concern with pragmatism.
The broader message, once again, is that most Brazilians are not situated at the ideological extremes, but somewhere in between, combining elements of conservatism, statism, social concern, and pragmatism.
The United States presents a parallel. More in Common’s “Beyond MAGA” study shows that only a minority of Donald Trump’s voters consider the MAGA label central to their identity. A substantial share supports him instrumentally, prioritizing economic performance or border security over ideological confrontation. While the most ideological and mobilized segments receive more attention, they do not represent the entirety of the Republican electorate.
The parallel is not meant to suggest that Brazil and the United States share identical political dynamics. Yet in both cases, research challenges the simplistic image of electorates perfectly divided into hardened ideological blocks.
The perception of division, however, is real.
Here lies the deeper tension, and where polarization intersects with the broader pressures facing democracies.
The book Brasil no Espelho portrays a society marked by fatigue, insecurity, and profound mistrust.
Most strikingly, the research shows a sharp rise in affective and moral polarization since 2018, the year Jair Bolsonaro was elected. While ideological self-placement remains relatively centered, emotional distance has widened. Brazilians are increasingly inclined to reject brands, public figures or institutions associated with opposing political positions. Even if most citizens are not ideologically radical, their emotional distance from those on the other side seems to have increased.
This distinction is central. A democracy can remain ideologically moderate while becoming emotionally fragmented. This can be observed in everyday interactions, in the difficulty of political dialogue, and in the heightened suspicion toward institutions.
The pressure on democracy does not stem solely from the rise of ideological extremes. It stems from the interaction between distrust, fatigue and declining confidence in institutional delivery.
These surveys offer a snapshot of a given moment or point to trends over time, not a permanent diagnosis. Societies evolve, sometimes rapidly. Since 2013, Brazil has experienced a compressed cycle of shocks: mass protests, recession, corruption scandals, impeachment, the imprisonment and political return of Lula, the Bolsonaro presidency and the January 8 attack on Brasília. Each episode tested institutions and deepened suspicion. Social media amplified outrage, rewarding moral confrontation over negotiation.
The data suggests that the moderate center did not disappear. It became tired.
This brings us to the broader democratic challenge. When moderate majorities perceive institutions as ineffective or unresponsive, emotional polarization fills the vacuum. Extremes gain visibility not because they are numerically dominant, but because they project clarity and moral certainty in moments of uncertainty.
As Brazil approaches its next general elections, alongside consequential electoral cycles in the United States, public debate will likely frame politics as a clash between irreconcilable poles. The evidence points to a more complex reality.
The electorate is not overwhelmingly extreme. It is increasingly skeptical, fatigued and emotionally distant.
Understanding that distinction is essential.
