The January 3 U.S. operation to arrest Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro on drug trafficking charges sent shock waves throughout Latin America. These were particularly pronounced in Mexico, given President Trump’s associated comment that the U.S. needs to “do something about Mexico”, where drug cartels “run the country”. He later added a now oft-repeated promise: “We are going to start now hitting land, with regard to the cartels.”
These developments raise concern that the United States will soon deploy its military unilaterally in Mexico. Although this scenario cannot be dismissed, it is far from the most likely outcome. More important, the absence of US intervention will not forestall continued and increasing coercive pressure on Mexico to deal with drug trafficking. This pressure is likely to translate into to bilateral conflict throughout 2026, albeit alongside deep Mexican security cooperation with the Trump administration.
The unilateral use of force by the United States in Mexico in the coming months is unlikely for at least three reasons.
First, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum appears to have successfully threaded the needle between pressure from within her political alliance to aggressively condemn the U.S. action and the need to avoid increasing bilateral tensions. This task was made harder when former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) broke his political silence to strongly criticize the U.S. operation. This intervention was echoed loudly by the radical wing of his, and Sheinbaum’s, political alliance.
Sheinbaum delivered a carefully crafted statement two days after the U.S. operation. She expressed her deeply felt opposition to U.S. intervention, referring specifically to its violation of the United Nations Charter and core principles of Mexican foreign policy, including non-intervention, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for national sovereignty. She did not, however, explicitly condemn the United States. Instead, she appeased the radical elements in her movement with a less visible condemnation in a Foreign Ministry communique. Sheinbaum also emphasized Mexico’s continued willingness to cooperate extensively with the United States in the battle against organized crime, as long as the United States does not cross Mexico’s red line: respect for its sovereignty. Indeed, Mexico has already beefed-up its security cooperation, extraditing an additional thirty-seven important drug cartel operatives, bringing the total to over a hundred since Trump took office. Mexico also arrested two of the US’s most wanted criminals and turned them over to FBI Director Kash Patel during his late January visit to Mexico City.
Second, Sheinbaum redoubled Mexican efforts to highlight the effectiveness of Mexican drug-fighting efforts in Washington policy circles. She ordered her foreign minister, Juan Ramón de la Fuente, to reach out to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and directed Mexican Security Minister Omar García Harfuch to speak with his counterparts to emphasize Mexico’s close and consistent collaboration. She also spoke with President Trump on January 12 in an apparently amicable conversation that highlighted security cooperation and operating through established channels such as the U.S.-Mexico Security Implementation Group.
This does not mean that the United States is limiting its pressure on Mexico in the wake of the Venezuela operation. To the contrary, the State Department’s readout from the Rubio-De la Fuente call tersely noted “the need for stronger cooperation to dismantle Mexico’s violent narcoterrorist networks and stop the trafficking of fentanyl and weapons [and for] tangible results to protect our homeland and hemisphere.”
Third, arresting Maduro has thus far turned out to be a low-cost success. There is no scenario, however, in which a unilateral U.S. military action in Mexico would be low cost. Due to the domestic political pressure on Sheinbaum noted above and nationalist sentiments in the Mexican military and of the president herself, Mexico would inevitably condemn such action and find a way to strike back, most likely by dramatically curtailing bilateral cooperation, including security cooperation. This likely scenario is apt to continue giving Washington pause, which in turn provides Mexico a clear incentive to continue emphasizing the nationalist constraints on Sheinbaum.
U.S. hesitation to act unilaterally, however, does not equate with reduced U.S. pressure on Mexico, as the readout from the January 23 meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Security Implementation Group makes clear. Although the State Department noted the “concrete accomplishments” achieved thus far that “highlight the results of our close bilateral cooperation”, it also insisted that more needs to be done to end the fentanyl crisis. Specifically, Mexico must accelerate “the extraditions and transfers of high-value transnational criminal organization (TCO) targets.”The inevitability of this pressure on Mexico is also rooted in the new U.S. National Defense Strategy which includes Latin America as part of protecting the U.S. homeland. The document also highlights drug trafficking as a direct security threat and notes that while the U.S. is willing to cooperate with its hemispheric partners, it is prepared to act decisively and unilaterally if necessary.
Additional bilateral conflict in 2026 seems inevitable. The two countries are likely to clash over the USMCA review due to contentious issues such as rules of origin in the auto sector and Mexican energy policy. As the U.S. midterm elections approach, Mexico will almost certainly become a target of politicians using trade, migration, and fentanyl to gain electoral support, likely forcing Mexico to defend its image. The two countries are also apt to clash sharply over Cuba.
Fortified by his Venezuelan success, President Trump seems to have Cuba in his sights, while overturning the Cuban regime is a long-standing desire of Secretary of State Rubio. U.S. control over Venezuelan oil exports means its large shipments to Cuba have ceased, making Mexico Cuba’s top oil supplier. Although the U.S. energy secretary said the United States will allow Mexico to continue oil shipments for now (likely to avoid a political collapse that could translate into a flood of Cuban migrants to the United States), the United States has made its displeasure with this Mexican policy plain. In a calculated response to this pressure, Mexico cancelled its January shipment of oil to Venezuela. Should Washington demand that Mexico terminate this subsidy, however, it will be difficult for President Sheinbaum to comply for historical, ideological, and political reasons, likely producing another point of bilateral tension.
The U.S.-Mexico relationship will be characterized by persistent friction in 2026, much like 2025, even though unilateral U.S. military action in Mexico is unlikely. Nevertheless, the two countries should maintain close cooperation on a range of issues, including the headline-grabbing challenge of drug trafficking and organized crime. As has often been the case in this complex, asymmetric relationship, U.S.-Mexico interaction will be defined by cooperation punctuated by conflict.
