Fourteen months into her government, President Sheinbaum announced a 37 percent decrease in daily intentional homicides and the least lethal November since 2015. In keeping with “tradition,” the next few weeks will arguably include significant media coverage of analyses conducted by supporters and detractors alike on whether this violence reduction is, in fact, real or the result of questionable accounting methods where homicides are registered as accidents or where homicides have decreased because disappearances have gone up.
To be sure, understanding what is behind this purported reduction is important from a policy perspective. But two decades of diversified and chronic forms of violence have taught us that it would be premature and misguided to evaluate the state of (in)security in Mexico based solely on the fluctuations of the homicide rate. In light of this, and the distinctive challenges the Trump administration presents, I propose evaluating the first year of Sheinbaum’s security strategy, focusing on the duality of her security approach. That is, how her government has managed the demands of the United States and how it has responded to internal challenges, both existing and emerging.
Dr. Sheinbaum goes to Washington
Unlike modern-era predecessors, Claudia Sheinbaum’s presidential campaign was not crafted in direct contrast to the incumbent. Quite the opposite. Hers was a platform focused on continuity and expansion of the “Fourth Transformation” promised by López Obrador, and, in many policy areas, this promise has remained true. However, without advertising her break from the López Obrador days, her government has changed course on security engagement with the United States and on the overall management of the relationship. A case of bilateral “if you know, you know” or la que entendió, entendió, if you will.
Notably, President Sheinbaum has changed the narrative on fentanyl and followed up with actions that, while not necessarily effective in reducing violence or meaningfully impacting drug supply, are readable and satisfactory to U.S. stakeholders. Whereas the López Obrador government downplayed the gravity of the overdose crisis in the U.S. and framed it as a U.S.-only problem (a position worryingly close to that of China’s), the Sheinbaum administration has explicitly stated it does not want anyone—in the U.S. or other countries—dying from fentanyl overdoses. Considering the overdose death rate in the U.S. is comparable to the homicide rate in Mexico, and that the U.S. government, regardless of the party occupying the White House, has made no secret of its frustration with its neighbor over its role in helping address the opioid crisis, this change in discourse is not trivial.
In addition to this narrative pivot, her government has followed through with actions that have further distanced her from the “abrazos, no balazos” rhetoric, understood in Washington as a reluctance—refusal to some—to act against organized crime. Appointing Omar García Harfuch as Secretary of Public Security and Citizen Protection, a known actor in D.C. through his intelligence-focused work in Mexico City, transferring (in lieu of extraditing) fifty-five individuals linked to criminal organizations wanted in the U.S. for “violent and serious crimes,” and using closed-door official channels, instead of publicly spatting over social media, have arguably paid off in terms of improving the country’s political capital with the Trump administration—an even more remarkable achievement considering President Sheinbaum has only visited D.C. for the FIFA World Cup draw.
Whether this achievement endures will be largely determined by a lasting “pause” or elimination of the so-called fentanyl tariffs, and by successfully avoiding “boots on the ground” or other types of intervention by the U.S. in Mexican territory—an offer that has reportedly been made but aptly declined. While arguably the next three years will keep these questions open-ended, it should not go unnoticed that the day after the first strike in the Caribbean by U.S. forces against an alleged drug vessel, Secretary Rubio was conducting his first visit to Mexico.
This visit left us with all-smiles photos of Secretary Rubio and President Sheinbaum, and a joint statement “reaffirm[ing] cooperation in matters of security based on the principles of reciprocity, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, shared responsibility and differentiated responsibility, as well as on mutual trust”. Mexico and the U.S. also announced the creation of a High-Level Implementation Group “that will meet regularly to follow up on joint commitments and actions undertaken within our own countries” and that explicitly mentions fentanyl and arms trafficking, which are key priority areas to the U.S. and Mexico respectively.
Smoke and mirrors for Mexicans?
Progress with the U.S. has come at a cost for Mexican citizens. To be sure, this cost is not about Mexico giving in to U.S. pressure. Such an interpretation of the current bilateral engagement fundamentally misunderstands the decades of experience the Mexican government, and particularly its Foreign Ministry, has in managing the asymmetry that characterizes the relationship with its neighbor and main trading partner.
The cost for Mexican citizens centers on whether this will be another sexenio of justice denied to the thousands of victims of organized crime in the country. The transfer of prisoners, for instance, was a low-cost, high-reward move for Mexico. But sidestepping extradition meant foregoing a legal process that, among other things, verifies the evidence presented for the extradition request and provides procedural guarantees for the wanted person. The transfer also removed legal avenues for challenging extradition, and, in a nutshell, eliminated due process for people incarcerated in Mexico.
This transfer fits within a wider pattern in which the government seems to prioritize retaining narrative control over security rather than delivering security to its citizens. Consider, for instance, the recent murder of Uruapan’s mayor, Carlos Manzo. Undeniably a tragedy, but regrettably not unique in the Mexican context, where there are high levels of political violence. However, after the killing made international headlines portraying Manzo as a public official who had confronted cartels, the Sheinbaum administration swiftly announced Plan Michoacán with the goal of reducing violence in the state. Conversely, in Sinaloa, a state where violence has escalated significantly since September 2024, but where a pervasive narrative exists portraying the state as the Shangri-la of criminality, the population awaits a Plan Culiacán. The latest victimization survey shows that 80.5 percent of Sinaloans consider their state unsafe, up from 54.9 percent in 2024, and Governor Rocha, accused by Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada of colluding with the Sinaloa criminal organization, remains in office with the public endorsement of President Sheinbaum.
This narrative control is not unique to Morena administrations but is certainly a key element of their political playbook. The daily morning pressers—introduced by López Obrador and retained by his successor illustrate this point. Importantly, this emphasis on crafting reality has also exposed the gap between the election-winning promise to end corruption and impunity and the lack of prosecution for high-level criminal cases linked to political actors. Rocha is one of them, but certainly not the only one. Other notables include current Senator Adán Augusto, linked to the criminal group La Barredora, who also served as Secretary of the Interior under López Obrador, and Vice Admiral Manuel Farías, arrested for his involvement in a multimillion dollar fiscal fuel theft scheme (huachicol fiscal) that has cost the public purse much-needed resources.
With five years left in her tenure, Sheinbaum’s domestic security legacy will largely depend on whether her government effectively dismantles the networks between political and criminal actors that enable illicit activities and erode security for Mexicans. This is the assurance behind Ernestina Godoy’s recent appointment as attorney general, who has promised—again—a victim-centered approach and elimination of impunity. It remains to be seen whether Godoy’s esprit de corps with President Sheinbaum delivers improved coordination among federal agencies and the prosecution of high-level corruption cases, or if it becomes yet another mouthpiece for Morena’s preferred security narrative, albeit not reality.
