Brazil has been invited to join U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, a private multilateral organization that was unveiled last month at the World Economic Forum in Davos; Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was noncommittal about joining the new group following a Jan. 26 phone call with Trump. Lula’s conversation with Trump came one week after he spoke with Chinese President Xi Jinping, who urged Lula to “stand on the right side of history” and safeguard the United Nations’ role in global affairs, Chinese state media reported. How likely is Lula to accept Trump’s invitation to join the Board of Peace, and what would it mean for global politics? Is the Brazil-China relationship currently more important to Beijing or Brasília? What can be expected from Brazil’s foreign policy strategy in 2026?
Marcos Caramuru, former Brazilian ambassador to China: “It is unlikely that Lula will join Trump’s proposed Board of Peace, mainly for two reasons. First, Brazil remains a strong supporter of the United Nations and its bodies, despite its dissatisfaction with the composition and performance of the Security Council. Second, Brazil generally avoids initiatives in which one leader clearly wields more influence than the other participants. For similar reasons, Brazil has not joined the Belt and Road Initiative, although these reasons have never been explicitly stated by the Brazilian government. The China-Brazil relationship carries significant weight in Brazilian foreign policy. China has become highly relevant to Brazil in terms of trade and investment, as well as in the convergence of views on the global order and the most pressing international crises. At the same time, however, Lula’s government has made considerable efforts to establish a dialogue with Trump. Moreover, the links between the Brazilian and U.S. economies are strong—particularly in the financial sector and in Brazilian manufacturing, given the scale of U.S. direct investment in Brazil, as well as in trade. Brazilian foreign policy in 2026 is unlikely to diverge from its main orientation over the previous three years. There is no viable alternative but to make every possible effort to maintain constructive dialogue with both China and the United States. At present, Brazil’s convergence of views with China appears clearer; nonetheless, Brazil—like all other countries—recognizes that, despite the peculiar nature of Trump’s views, failing to cultivate good relations with the United States is not an option.”
Dawisson Belém Lopes, professor of international and comparative politics at the Federal University of Minas Gerais: “From Brasília’s perspective, the invitation to join President Trump’s Board of Peace is politically usable but strategically hazardous. Lula is unlikely to embrace the initiative as a new hub of global governance, but he will probably keep the door open to a narrowly circumscribed form of engagement. This explains his noncommittal tone: Brazil may be willing to participate in discussions limited to a specific dossier such as Gaza, but not to endorse a body that aspires to rival or replace the United Nations. For Lula, and for Brazil’s diplomatic establishment more broadly, any move that signals an erosion of U.N. centrality crosses a clear red line. Engagement, therefore, would be tactical and conditional, rather than institutional or enthusiastic. If the Board of Peace were to gain traction, its broader implications for global politics would be troubling. It would further normalize a model of ad hoc, leader-centric and partially privatized multilateralism, in which legitimacy derives less from universal representation than from political alignment and financial capacity. For Brazil, uncritical participation would undermine a longstanding foreign policy narrative centered on reforming—not bypassing—the U.N. system. Lula’s instinct is to avoid being seen as underwriting a post-U.N. order, while still preserving dialogue with Washington and avoiding being boxed into a binary choice between the United States and China. In this context, the Brazil-China relationship is structurally more vital to Brasília than to Beijing, even if it remains highly valuable to both. China is central to Brazil’s trade profile and to its economic hedging strategy in a more protectionist world, whereas Brazil, though a key Global South partner for China, is more substitutable in Beijing’s global calculus. Looking ahead, Brazil’s foreign policy is likely to continue along a path of multi-alignment with clearer guardrails: pragmatic engagement with a Trump-led United States, a firm rhetorical and diplomatic defense of U.N. centrality, selective deepening of South-South ties (including with China) and an emphasis on issue-based coalitions rather than bloc discipline. This is less a tilt than a deliberate bet, designed to maximize autonomy in an increasingly fragmented international order.”
Julia Thomson, Brazil analyst at Eurasia Group: “President Lula is unlikely to accept the invitation to the Board of Peace under its current terms. During the Jan. 26 call, Lula urged Trump to include Palestine representation and narrow the board’s scope to Gaza rather than broader issues. Lula’s request is unlikely to shift Trump’s direction, but keeping the invitation in limbo is a Brazilian tactic to preserve ties with Washington; he is also likely to make a presidential visit to the United States in March. In parallel, Brazilian diplomats see the board debate as a vehicle to reinforce Brazil’s longstanding demand for reform of the U.N. Security Council—an institution Lula considers unfair and unrepresentative of the Global South. Much of his foreign policy has aimed at securing a permanent seat for Brazil. Even so, multilateralism remains the best option for emerging markets like Brazil, and Lula will not be one to jeopardize the United Nations’ role in global affairs. He is far more likely to use this episode to strengthen Brazil’s standing within the United Nations than to pursue any course that undermines it. China also remains critical to Brazil, arguably more than the other way around. Brazil is heavily dependent on Chinese imports of Brazilian commodities, and there is increased Chinese investment coming into the country. Lula’s strategy will continue to balance among global powers—maximizing gains for Brazil while maintaining positive relations with all major players, stabilizing ties with the United States, and expanding links with Europe, India and Asia.”
André Masuko, country risk analyst at The Economist Intelligence Unit: “We are skeptical that Lula will accept the invitation to join Trump’s proposed Board of Peace in the absence of changes to its composition and mandate. Key among these would be a narrowing of the board’s focus solely to addressing the situation in the Gaza Strip, as well as the formal inclusion of Palestine either as a core decision-maker or a full member. Brazil’s reluctance to join the group reflects concerns that the initiative could ultimately serve to legitimize and facilitate a more assertive ‘America First’ foreign policy, further enabling the United States to deploy military and economic power in unconventional ways, as demonstrated by the snatch-and-grab operation that resulted in the arrest of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, in January. As a result, Brazil will remain wary of joining any initiative that risks undermining multilateral institutions, which have long been central to the country’s pragmatic approach to global affairs. We expect Lula to remain noncommittal on joining the Board of Peace at least until a face-to-face meeting with Trump in Washington, scheduled for March, which should provide greater clarity on his eventual decision. In the interim, Lula will seek to advance a broader rapprochement with the Trump administration—following the partial lifting of U.S. tariffs on Brazilian exports late last year—through more tangible bilateral deals. To that end, Lula is likely to offer greater scope for U.S. participation in the exploration of Brazil’s critical minerals and rare-earths reserves, while keeping the Board of Peace on the sidelines to avoid antagonizing China, its main trading partner. Pulling off this balancing act will be challenging amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, but we expect Lula to maintain stable relations with both while avoiding any signal of automatic alignment with either side.”
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