Brazil’s outsized global aspirations and its newly acquired diplomatic weight were on full view in Tehran last May. That was when Brazilian President Lula da Silva triumphantly announced that he and his Turkish counterpart had persuaded Iran to shift a major part of its uranium enrichment program overseas—an objective that had previously eluded the US and other world powers. Washington, however, was not applauding. Secretary of State Clinton’s reaction was quick and disapproving. She angrily condemned both Brazil and Turkey for pursuing the negotiations, which she saw as threatening to the fragile agreement among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to impose new sanctions on Iran for violating its nuclear treaty obligations. What Lula claimed as a negotiating success was viewed in Washington as irresponsible and unhelpful meddling by Brazil.
As Lula, Brazil’s most widely admired president ever, prepares to leave office, US-Brazilian ties are deeply strained—by disputes over Iran and a range of other matters—and need close attention. The country’s new president, Dilma Rouseff (or Dilma as she is universally known), who takes charge on January 1, will not find it easy to repair the damage and build toward a more productive and trustful bilateral relationship. In the past two years, the two governments have openly clashed over many issues as Brazil has sought to expand and consolidate its ambitious international role. Despite a still large reservoir of genuine good will between the countries, the situation may worsen in the coming period. How adroitly and carefully Dilma and her advisors manage Brazil’s foreign policy will surely affect the quality of the country’s relations with the US. So will the importance that the Obama administrations assigns to Brazil and the care with which he and his policy team conduct US-Brazilian diplomacy.
Still, it is almost inevitable that Brazil and the US will, for some years to come, be bumping up against one another in this hemisphere and worldwide. They both have a central stake in global politics and a deep concern about the world’s problems. Their policies and agendas, however, will reflect their divergent interests, priorities, and approaches to international affairs. They will certainly not always be able find common ground or keep their disagreements in check. At least on some issues, tension between them are sure to increase. Indeed, on most matters, the US-Brazil relationship will involve both conflict and cooperation—as do US ties with other global actors like China, Russia, India, and Japan as well as many European nations.
In the past year or so, the US and Brazil have squabbled over several hemispheric questions—as Brazil has taken on a more and more assertive role in Latin America. Brazil surprised and irritated the US, and neighboring Colombia as well, when it joined its South American neighbors in opposing a newly announced military arrangement giving US expanded access to Colombian military bases. By subsequently mending fences with Colombia and announcing its own, albeit far more modest, military accord with Washington, Brazil demonstrated a welcome flexibility and accommodation. It also made clear, however, that US military initiatives in South America will henceforth require prior consultation and agreement from Brazil. This is hardly an unreasonable demand. Although not widely welcomed in Washington, it was strongly endorsed by every South American nation, including Colombia.
Brazil has been far less accommodating in its policy toward Honduras’s political crisis, which occupied center stage in inter-American affairs for much of 2009 and is not yet fully resolved. Despite their agreement on how initially to respond to the military coup that deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, Brazil and the US, as time went on, ended up pursuing sharply divergent approaches to the political impasse in the small Central American nation. While Washington and many other governments (including all but one of Honduras’s Central American neighbors) have recognized the validity of Honduran elections and the authority of the country’s new president, Brazil continues to demand major concessions to ousted president Zelaya. The US-Brazilian disagreement has sustained a divisive standoff in hemispheric relations affairs.
The US and Brazil also have polar opposite positions with regard to Cuba’s role in hemispheric affairs. In this instance, it is Washington that stands alone in its refusal to end its diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba. Every other country in the Americas has re-established normal relations with the island. For most Brazilians and other Latin Americans, US policy toward Cuba is virtually incomprehensible—and recent Republican victories in the US congressional elections will block for some time any further changes in Washington’s approach to Cuba. Brazil and the US clashed in 2009 over the conditions under which the Cuban government might be allowed to resume its membership in the OAS. Both countries, however, now appear willing to tolerate the difference in views, and new flare-ups over Cuba now seem unlikely.
The US and Brazil will surely collide on these and other hemispheric questions in the years ahead, but the two countries have also demonstrated a capacity for cooperation in regional affairs. The US strongly supported Brazil’s lead role in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti following President Aristides departure from the country in 2004, and has worked closely with Brazil on humanitarian relief in the aftermath of the country’s devastating earthquake. Washington has also expressed support for Brazilian leadership in developing a more politically and economically integrated South America. It has spoken favorably of the so-called Union of South American Nations or UNASUR—even though a stronger, more institutionalized UNASUR could well restrict the role of the OAS and diminish US influence in hemispheric affairs. And Brazil has, from time to time, helped to moderate the anti-American campaign of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, even though the US and Brazilian governments have taken very different approaches to addressing the challenge that Chavez represents. As noted above, Brazil has also reached a framework agreement on military cooperation with the US.
The US-Brazil relationship is likely to be more troubled in coming period by global, not regional, issues. These are today increasingly important for both countries. At the same time, however, the international arena will also provide opportunities for cooperation.
What has most exasperated Washington and unsettled US-Brazilian relations in recent years is Brazil’s close, supportive ties to Iran. Brazil is a leading defender of Iran’s nuclear program—claiming, despite mounting and broadly accepted evidence to the contrary, that it is directed only toward civilian purposes. It has over lookedIran’s repression at home, its continuing support of terrorist groups abroad, and its unrelenting threats toward Israel. Washington was particularly galled when, last May, Brazil joined with Turkey to negotiate an agreement with Iran that was designed to halt a US-led drive for new UN sanctions against Tehran for its persistent violations of UN resolutions regarding its nuclear development activities.
Neither Brazil nor the US managed this incident particularly well. A letter from Barack Obama to Lula da Silva initially appeared to encourage a Brazilian negotiating initiative with Iran. Washington subsequently backed away from the letter and made clear its strong opposition to Brazil’s involvement, but the Lula government proceeded as if it had US agreement. Still, the US—if it had not been so narrowly focused on preserving a big power consensus for stronger sanctions against Iran—might well have recognized that there was potentially some value in the deal negotiated by Brazil and Turkey, that it might have provided a starting point for further negotiations, and not have simply rejected it out of hand. Perhaps they were overreaching—but Brazilian officials were motivated, in good measure, by the belief they could help ease tensions and build the confidence needed to facilitate the US-led talks with Iran.
Iran will surely be a cause of repeated friction in US-Brazilian relations, primarily because of Brazil’s continuing defense of Iran’s nuclear program and its right to enrich uranium. While the US is persuaded that Iran’s nuclear ambitious are directed toward building an atomic weapon, Brazil remains supportive of Iran and oppose sanctions against the country (although it has pledged to respect those that have been imposed by the UN). The US and Brazil together might usefully explore the question of what evidence would be sufficient to conclude either that Tehran is pursuing a weapons capability or that its intentions are peaceful. Narrowing the gap between the two countries on this central question would be helpful step toward greater accord. The US might also consider bringing Brazil, perhaps Turkey as well, into the six power negotiations with Iran (the five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany). Brazil’s presence at the table should diminish Iran’s distrust of the negotiating process and potentially increase the odds of some meaningful advance. Given the absence of discernible progress in the talks to date, there is no good reason to believe Brazil’s participation would make it harder to reach agreement.
Over time, Brazil’s own nuclear development plans may themselves emerge as a principal source of contention in US-Brazilian relations. To be sure, Brazil has signed the UN Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and is bound to forego nuclear weaponry by its own constitution, by an agreement with Argentina, and by the Latin American-wide Tlateloco treaty. The US today has little concern that Brazil is preparing to develop an atomic weapon. But Brazil has embarked on a uranium enrichment program, and will almost certainly acquire the technical skills and capacity soon to build such a weapon. Brazil and the US are already at odds over Brazil’s refusal to sign the NPT’s additional protocol, which calls for more intrusive inspections of enrichment facilities than the original treaty.
Brazil’s rejection of the new protocol is seen by Washington as weakening global non-proliferation efforts at a time when they most need to be reinforced. Brazil, on the other hand, claims it is entirely within its rights and asserts that it is the US and Russia who are most in violation of the NPT because of their failure to vigorously pursue its nuclear disarmament provisions. US-Brazilian frictions on this issue will be harder to contain as Brazil and several other countries come closer to a weapons capacity.
Ideally, nuclear development should be an area for intense cooperation between the US and Brazil—not a matter for bilateral dispute. US scientific and technical resources could play an essential role in Brazil’s efforts to develop a world-class nuclear energy industry. Washington’s three-year old agreement with India (a country that already possesses a nuclear arsenal) could well serve as model for a US technology transfer accord with Brazil. What the US would surely want from Brazil in exchange, however, is sustained support for the NPT and other nonproliferation initiatives—which Brazil has so far been reluctant to provide.
Trade has long been a source of friction in US-Brazil relations. Last year, trade tensions rose sharply after Brazil prevailed in its WTO suit against Washington, claiming US cotton subsidies violated international trade rules. Because there is no prospect that the US Congress will consider curbing the subsidies until the legislation mandating them terminates in 2012, the WTO authorized Brazil to retaliate with countervailing tariffs on an array of US products. After some acrimony, Washington managed to paper over the dispute and postpone the retaliatory tariffs for the next couple years by agreeing to compensate Brazil directly for its lost cotton sales (thereby, in essence, subsidizing both US and Brazilian cotton growers). And cotton is not the only problem.
US agriculture protectionism is rampant and unlikely to diminish anytime soon. Indeed, the prospects are that it will be major source of discord in US-Brazilian bilateral relations for years to come. Subsidies, tariffs, and quotas sharply restrict the US sales of half a dozen or more of Brazil’s major export crops. Sky-high subsidies and huge import taxes, for example, have effectively closed the US market to Brazilian ethanol, which is substantially cheaper and more energy efficient than the US variety. Brazilian oranges and sugar also face high import barriers. Brazil appears likely to launch other WTO challenges to US policies that protect agricultural goods from foreign competition.
Their continuing clashes over trade notwithstanding, Brazil and the US share a wide range of common interests in global commercial arrangements. By joining forces, the US and Brazil, the world’s two leading food exporters, would substantially increase the chances of reviving the nearly moribund Doha global trade talks and help direct them toward a productive outcome—a declared priority of both nations. That would require Brazil and the US to make politically difficult concessions, not only on agricultural issues, but also on trade in services, industrial tariffs, and intellectual property. Brazil would have to press its closest Doha allies (including India and China) to give ground on these issues. The US faces a bitter domestic political battle.
Brazil has worked hard in recent years to gain increased authority in multilateral forums for developing nations. It is hard to dispute the claim that these nations, with their increasing global economic weight, deserve stronger representation and influence in such institutions as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, and others. This issue, however, has not been an area of tension with the US. On the contrary, the US has stood behind Brazil’s efforts to gain more voting power for emerging markets at the IMF and World Bank. It supported replacing the G-7 (made up only of larger, highly industrial countries) with the G-20 (which includes the most important developing countries) as the principal forum for debating global economic questions. The US has not stated whether or not it endorses Brazil’s aspirations for permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but President Obama’s support for India’s permanent membership on the Council suggests that Washington may be prepared to endorse a reform of the Council—a critical prerequisite for Brazil’s ascension.
It is clear that Brazil and the US will have major roles in addressing the increasingly urgent issues of climate change and energy development. How Brazil manages the Amazon and exploits its newly found petroleum will have enormous impact on global effort to deal with climate and energy challenges. So, of course, will US policy, when it is finally formulated—although domestic political factors will likely defer this several years into the future. What is still uncertain is whether on these and many other international and regional issues, they will end up cooperating or clashing, or some measure of both, but they will have to confront one another time and again in many different arenas.
A question that has often been raised in both Brazil and the US is whether the two nations’ should be seeking to develop a “strategic” partnership or alliance. What such a partnership or alliance would mean in practice and whether or not it would genuinely serve the interests of either or both countries are topics worth debating, but any significant progress in that direction appears remote for the time being.
For its part, Brazil has steadfastly sought over the past dozen years or more to demonstrate its independence from the US. And it has clearly shown its ability to pursuits regional and international aims with minimal US support or cooperation, to widely diversify its global relations and build strong ties to an array of both industrial and developing countries, and to play a central role in regional and international forums, sometimes in accord with the US but often in opposition. Brazil does not seem ready to shift toward a close, cooperative relationship with the US.
Despite Brazil’s rising profile and influence, the US does not yet see Brazil either as one of the world’s crucial economic or financial actors or as a country that has much to contribute in regard to US security challenges. Indeed, two other countries in the hemisphere —Mexico and Canada—are considered more important to the US economy than Brazil. On this score, US perceptions could shift, however as Brazil’s new oil discoveries begin to demonstrate their potential, or if the country can sustain its current robust economic growth without interruption for the next five years or so.
It will be harder for Brazil to show its relevance to US security interests. The Western Hemisphere, perhaps aside from the upsurge of criminal violence in Mexico, does not present a major security threat to the US. And Brazil is a long way from the Middle East or Asia, where US security interests are most at stake today. Moreover, in Washington, Brazilian foreign policy is not viewed as consistently reliable or responsible. Brazil’s relations with Iran and its defense of that country’s nuclear activities make US authorities especially wary. They are also troubled by the lack of attention in Brazilian diplomacy to such issues as democracy, human rights, and nuclear proliferation.
Still, even as US-Brazil relations have become strained in recent years, the two countries have never considered themselves adversaries. Both governments, with few exceptions, have sought to moderate and defuse their disputes and have been willing to tolerate considerable disagreement. For the US and an increasingly powerful Brazil to build and sustain a constructive relationship into the future, however, may demand far greater effort and attention by both governments than has been the case to date. Both sides need to better understand the interests, priorities, and positions of the other on important regional and global issues—and to be routinely informed of proposed decisions and actions of the other. More systematic consultation might have avoided (or at least reduced the intensity of) both the conflict over the Brazil-Turkey-Iran negotiations and the friction over the US-Colombia security agreement. The US and Brazil should also be able to identify more opportunities for cooperation on many of the issues discussed above, in which both countries have a major stake. Even modest initiatives—such as the 2010 US-Brazilian defense agreement—can help bolster the bilateral relationship. The slow progress toward implementing the two nations’ 2008 accord on biofuels has been disappointing, but it still points the way to collaboration in an important area.
No one should think US-Brazil relations will be easy to manage in the coming period. They will surely be tested by frustration and disappointment on both sides; conflict may be more common than partnership. That should be expected when two powerful countries have to contend with one another, no matter who is in charge.
Originally published in Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica.
