Seventeen people were killed and 14 others were injured in a suspected gang shooting on July 27 at a bar in the Ecuadorean town of El Empalme; nine people were killed in a separate shooting on July 19 in the resort area of Playas. Ecuador’s homicide rate was 38 per 100,000 last year, a more than six-fold increase since 2018 as transnational organized criminal groups have significantly increased their presence in the South American country. What factors explain the recent gang-related mass shootings? How effectively has President Daniel Noboa managed the battle against Ecuador’s transnational criminal organizations, and what should he do differently? How might the shootings affect the timeline of Noboa’s planned referendum to allow foreign militaries to operate in Ecuador?
Renato Rivera, senior researcher at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC): “Ecuador’s increases in homicides and massacres—which in the first half of 2025 represent 10 percent of all murders—constitute a second wave of criminal fragmentation. This phenomenon responds to two principal factors: the fragmentation of three criminal groups and the extradition of José Adolfo Macías Villamar, alias Fito, to the United States. In the first case, groups like los Tiguerones, Lobos and Chone Killers are experiencing internal divisions stemming from the assassination or detention of their leaders, as well as disputes over control of emerging illicit economies, such as illegal mining. In the second case, Fito’s extradition in July highlighted the loss of power of Los Choneros, leading to an escalation of massacres motivated by revenge and criminal reorganizations. This power vacuum has been exploited by rival organizations, especially Los Lobos, and by transnational groups to secure drug and arms trafficking routes. Between January and June, Ecuador recorded a 47 percent increase in homicides as compared to the same period in 2024, with an average of 25 murders per day, making this period the most violent in the country’s history. Faced with this context, Noboa’s administration has prioritized a strategy focused on militarization and penal populism, through states of emergency, tougher penalties and legitimizing the declaration of an ‘internal armed conflict.’ This approach has been accompanied by a narrative that links the fight against organized crime with the presence of foreign military bases and attempts to delegitimize the Constitutional Court, which has annulled decrees and laws such as the National Solidarity Law, which authorizes the declaration of the National Action Plan. However, this securitization of discourse has not translated into a comprehensive criminal policy. Since November 2023, the government has shown limited progress in combating illicit arms trafficking—which is responsible for nine out of 10 homicides—as well as money laundering (two sentences per year) and implementing measures such as asset forfeiture. The combination of criminal fragmentation, increasing violence and the absence of structural strategies projects a scenario of high instability ahead of the referendum scheduled for the second half of this year.”
Carla Álvarez, professor in the School of Security and Defense at the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales in Quito: “The rampant violence currently enveloping Ecuador is taking place in a context of profound political and institutional instability. This fragility has led to a dual phenomenon: Security has become a central issue in the political debate, and, at the same time, politics has taken on an increasingly security-oriented tone. Every government proposal is constructed from a narrative of urgency, seeking immediate popular support rather than sustainable solutions. In this context, violent events such as those that occurred in Playas and El Empalme are not exceptions, but rather extreme manifestations of a structural dynamic. Between November 2023 and April 2025—that is, during Daniel Noboa’s first term—330 murder cases involving multiple victims took place, according to the Observatorio En Llamas (‘On Fire’ Observatory) of the Universidad Central del Ecuador. In the first half of 2025 alone, 4,557 violent deaths were recorded, projecting a new historical record of more than 9,000 homicides by the end of this year. Although the government has demonstrated expertise in constructing security narratives—which have succeeded in generating social consensus and support for its proposals—security management remains an unfinished task. Without effective and articulated implementation, political discourse runs the risk of becoming devoid of content, weakening the state’s ability to confront criminal organizations and undermining its own political initiatives, such as the referendum later this year.”
Isabel Chiriboga, Ecuadorean political analyst and former assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center: “Between January and June of this year, Ecuador recorded 3,087 violent deaths, a 58 percent increase from the same period in 2024. The recent mass shootings are a symptom of a deeper problem: Unlike other countries in the region grappling with insecurity, Ecuador has identified more than 22 criminal organizations. This extreme level of fragmentation fuels frequent and violent clashes, as groups compete for control over territories and revenue streams across Ecuador. Their ties to international drug cartels further intensify competition over major illicit markets, including cocaine trafficking, illegal gold mining, counterfeit goods, human trafficking and more. President Noboa has taken on the challenge of dismantling this complex criminal ecosystem that long preceded him. His efforts have included a series of emergency decrees and legislative proposals such as the declaration of an internal armed conflict that enables sustained military intervention against transnational criminal organizations, the recently passed law targeting criminal economies, intelligence reforms aimed at centralizing information to improve interoperability, and most recently, community-based initiatives to curb youth recruitment. However, results remain uneven. The state still struggles with institutional fragmentation and a lack of sustained funding for both security and social investment. The projected $5.5 billion fiscal deficit for 2025, coupled with IMF-imposed limits on public spending, will continue to limit efforts to invest in long-term crime prevention strategies. With violence costing Ecuador up to 10 percent of its GDP, or $19 billion, annually, the stakes are high. While the recent shootings and spike in homicides may further inflame public anger ahead of the national referendum in December, such events have, tragically, become common. It’s worth recalling that in 1999, Ecuadoreans voted to allow a U.S. base in Manta to support counternarcotics efforts. Today, many Ecuadoreans again support renewed foreign support, recognizing that external assistance may be the only way to confront a crisis that continues to overwhelm national institutions, despite their discontent with the current government’s progress on security matters.”
Grace Jaramillo, professor at the University of British Columbia: “Daniel Noboa’s second inauguration on May 24 triggered expectations for a comprehensive policy to gang-related mass shootings and transnational crime. Notwithstanding, the string of shootings—not only in Esmeraldas, but across the coastal region—prove that homicide rates keep going up, not down, and that the comprehensive plan that Noboa promised at his second inauguration is far from becoming public, let alone a reality. His administration has instead concentrated on passing emergency laws that do little to correct this dramatic course of events, such as reforming public sector laws to be able to immediately lay off more than 5,000 public employees across different sectors, on top of a law to exert control over NGOs and civil society organizations. The last straw of the series of misaligned reforms was the attempt to take down the Constitutional Court, the recourse of last resort for upholding the rule of law and preventing human rights and other abuses from other branches of government. The president’s campaign to again erase the independence of the judiciary—as former President Correa did—has backfired, as the current Constitutional Court is still one of the most respected institutions for horizontal control of democracy. It has been seen as another attempt to distract the attention of the lack of progress in curving down criminal violence. The latter strategy can also affect the chances of Noboa’s planned referendum to allow foreign militaries to operate in Ecuador if citizens perceive there will be no democratic controls to excesses.”
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