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  • Julio Carrión

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Who Will Peruvians Choose to Be Their Next President?

This post is also available in: Português Español

Peru’s presidential race is headed for a runoff after Sunday’s first round of voting, with front-running candidate Keiko Fujimori garnering 39 percent of the ballots, well shy of the majority needed to be elected outright. According to early results, she will face economist and businessman Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who came in second with 24 percent of the vote, in the June 5 runoff. Who is best positioned to win the presidency? How are supporters of the candidates who did not make it to the second round likely to vote? What are the biggest takeaways from the 2016 presidential race thus far? How has the composition of Peru’s congress and policy outlook changed with Sunday’s election?

Cynthia McClintock, professor of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University: “Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, usually called PPK, is the narrow favorite to win Peru’s runoff. Despite Keiko Fujimori’s tally of almost 40 percent, Ipsos polls put PPK several points ahead of Keiko. Massive protests on the April 5 anniversary of the 1992 autogolpe (self-coup) by Keiko’s father were one of the many indications that Peru is intensely divided between ‘anti-Fujimorismo’ and ‘Fujimorismo’. PPK, who served in Peruvian governments but only democratic ones, will represent ‘anti-Fujimorismo,’ gaining votes from the third-place candidate, leftist Verónika Mendoza; the fourth-place candidate, center-leftist Alfredo Barnechea; and fifth-place former president Alan García (with roughly 17 percent, 7 percent, and 6 percent, respectively). However, the race is far from over. Although leftist leaders adamantly oppose Fujimorismo, many disadvantaged Peruvians believe that the former president channeled benefits to the poor. A wealthy former partner in international investment banks, PPK will have to work to win these votes. Keiko also benefits from the perception that, like her father, she will apply ‘mano dura’. Keiko’s strength at the local level is indicated by her party’s having won a majority of congressional seats (about 75 percent more than in 2011)—a rare feat in Peru. Unfortunately, as OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro has highlighted, Peru’s 2016 campaign was disturbing, overall. Peru’s electoral authorities made decisions that were deemed politically motivated by a majority of Peruvians. A center-left outsider was surging, only to be disqualified due to his party’s minor disconformities with its statutes. The fourth-place candidate was disqualified due to hand-outs at a rally; but, despite a very similar violation, Keiko was not. Peru’s next president will be vulnerable to charges that he or she was not the people’s choice.”

Julio Carrión, associate professor of political science and international relations at the University of Delaware: “Following recent trends in the region, the majority of voters opted for center-right options, but the next president will be elected largely on the votes of those who went for the left-wing candidate in the first round. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski has a greater probability of winning these voters and thus a much easier path to the presidency than Keiko Fujimori does. Paradoxically, if one considers the demographics of the existing preferences, one would conclude that those who voted for Verónika Mendoza—largely the poor—would prefer Keiko, whose main appeal is also among the poor. And yet, when an April Ipsos poll asked those who favored Mendoza whom would they vote for if she was not in contention, only 4 percent of them said they would choose Keiko, while 24 percent declared they would vote for PPK. The majority of Mendoza’s supporters are anti-fujimoristas and they would vote for PPK to block Keiko. To secure a victory, Keiko has to do much better in Lima but, once again, PPK has a better chance of carrying Lima than Keiko does. The centrist Alfredo Barnechea did very well among the middle and upper class in the capital, and these voters are more likely to vote for PPK. But Keiko has already secured a solid majority in Congress (so far, projections give her 68 seats in the 135-seat unichameral chamber) and the left will have a much greater presence than has been the case since 2000 (the estimate is that Mendoza’s party will obtain 20 seats). If PPK becomes president, he will be forced to work out informal alliances to push his agenda. And in this, he is more likely to rely on the fujimoristas than on the left. He will win with left-wing support, but he will govern with the center-right.”

Miguel Palomino, manager at Instituto Peruano de Economía: “The results of the first round of Peru’s elections have some similarities to and differences from previous electoral processes. The similarity is the political disconnect between the southern part of the country and the rest. Even though the south has benefited as much—if not more—from the country’s dramatic reduction in poverty rates and improvement in the quality of life for a great majority, the response has been different. In 2016, as in the 2006 and 2011 elections, the south voted strongly against what they perceive is an economic model that has not worked for them. Peruvian political institutions have a long way to go before a significant proportion of the population feels that the economic model has been working in its favor. The difference is that the outcome of the first round should not bring about a scenario of political polarization for the ballotage. Unlike previous elections, both candidates in the second round are relatively friendly to private investment and free market policies. Adding the preferences of citizens, the successful economic model was a clear winner on Sunday, with over two thirds of the general vote. Another important difference from past elections is that a majority of Congress will likely be controlled by Fuerza Popular—Keiko Fujimori’s political organization. This will give Ms. Fujimori enormous power, with or without a successful run-off against Mr. Kuczynski in June. This hasn’t been the case since the mid-nineties, when Alberto Fujimori, Keiko’s father, controlled both the executive branch and Congress.”

Francisco Durand, professor of political science at the Catholic University of Peru: “Given the results, it is quite difficult to foresee a winner. Both Fujimori (who faces a strong resistance) and Kuczynski (quite distant and in need of alliances) are right wing candidates followed by the left (Mendoza) and the center left Acción Popular, both critical of the current economic model. With anti-fujimorismo now quite strong and on the rise, I would see Kuczynski as the more likely winner. Despite the polarization, if Kuczynski moves to the center, many voters will see him as the lesser of two evils. The strongest winner is the left, resurrected by Mendoza and the Frente Amplio, who together with Santos (Democracia Directa) represent a quarter of the electorate. Mendoza and a new generation of legislators will be the center of the opposition. That’s bad news for mining corporations. The main losers are the center, as it has shrunk. Old parties such as APRA and PPC are in urgent need of political renovation or will disappear. The congressional political scenario is quite different. It is more polarized and has fewer parties, which means making agreements will be difficult. If Fujimori wins, she needs a few votes to have a congressional majority but will face strong opposition. If Kuczynski wins, he will have to face Fujimori’s more numerous and organized opposition. Yet, since the two candidates coincide in economic policy matters, there is room for agreement in this issue area.”

The Latin America Advisor features Q&A from leaders in politics, economics, and finance every business day. It is available to members of the Dialogue’s Corporate Program and others by subscription.

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