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A day after Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election in November, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro congratulated him and called Trump’s victory “a new start” for bilateral relations. During his first term in office, Trump toughened sanctions on Venezuela, including on its oil industry. While Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, Sen. Marco Rubio, has pushed for harsher sanctions on Venezuela, oil industry executives have argued that such a move would only lead to higher gasoline prices and encourage Venezuela to become closer to Iran and China, The Washington Post reported. What direction is Trump likely to take on Venezuela sanctions? Which of the competing U.S. priorities on Venezuela will carry the most weight? What will Trump’s presidency and policy decisions mean for Venezuela’s opposition?
Luis Vicente León, president of Datanalisis in Caracas: “President-elect Trump wants to be a non-interventionist, peace president who solves problems and advances U.S. interests. Relating to Venezuela, Trump’s priorities are to control illegal migration, lower U.S. energy prices and inflation, and contain the influence of China and Iran. Secretary of State-Designate Rubio will implement Trump’s priorities while promoting democracy in Venezuela. In pursuing these U.S. priorities, my hope is that Trump’s policies will not punish the Venezuelan people with more harsh economic sanctions. We have learned that the maximum pressure policies of 2019-22 did not dislodge Maduro from power, but instead dramatically reduced the income of Venezuela, suppressed oil production and revenues, impoverished millions of Venezuelans and greatly exacerbated migration. Based on supported estimates, nearly five million people emigrated from Venezuela from 2019-22 to the United States and other countries. Maximum pressure also forced Venezuela to sell oil at sharp discounts to China, purchase Iranian condensate as diluent and rely on Russia for support. These deleterious effects—all plainly against U.S. interests—were reversed in 2023-24 when the United States issued oil licenses to Chevron and other western companies to operate in Venezuela as long as they control all aspects of and monies from their projects. Oil production and national income increased, inflation was tempered and migration was markedly reduced. While serious problems persist, millions more now have improved access to food, medicine, gasoline, electricity and transportation. For 2023, the estimates show a net migration of only 136,000. The licenses also minimize corruption and allow for much greater transparency in projects controlled by the private sector. And the licensing policy facilitated the historic coordination of Venezuela’s political opposition and its most effective participation in the electoral process in a decade. This has allowed the opposition to pursue its demands for change, demonstrating ongoing engagement and influence. Given these relative successes, I expect that Trump will enhance this pragmatic approach to serve both U.S. interests as well as the Venezuelan people.”
Michael Shifter, senior fellow and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue: “U.S. Venezuela policy under Trump 2.0 has been the subject of endless speculation. Future policies are hard to predict—with Trump, especially so. One option is a variation of the ‘maximum pressure’ policy under the first Trump administration, possibly even doubling down on diplomatic confrontation and harsh economic sanctions, as Marco Rubio has advocated. The problem, however, is the strategy pursued in 2019 is widely deemed to have been a failure, even counterproductive. It helped entrench Nicolás Maduro in power, aggravated already dire humanitarian conditions and significantly fueled migratory flows. It was largely driven by domestic politics, an electoral strategy aimed at winning Florida in 2020. To be sure, as opposition leaders rightly argue, circumstances today are different. Maduro got trounced in the July 28 election, and any claim to popular legitimacy has disappeared. Leftist governments in Colombia and Brazil refuse to recognize Maduro as president. Yet, it is notable that when Trump recites the foreign policy successes of his first term, he never mentions Venezuela. He is no longer motivated by Florida politics. It is doubtful that promoting democracy ranks high among his priorities in Venezuela.”
Julia Buxton, British Academy Global Professor at Liverpool John Moores University: “Trump inherits multiple foreign policy challenges. U.S. engagement in (or disengagement from) ‘hot’ zones of military conflict and geostrategic tension will absorb the incoming presidency. Venezuela’s protracted political stalemate is a second-order concern. Nevertheless, a coherent country strategy is required due to the direct impacts of Venezuela’s crisis on the United States, most saliently migration and energy security. Venezuela is simultaneously marginal and significant to U.S. interests. This is a historic characteristic of bilateral ties. It has encouraged conservative, short-term thinking in narrow U.S. policy circles and generated misguided interventions. Such is the state of the current Venezuela strategy—in as much as one exists—that Biden leaves to Trump, and which Biden in turn inherited from the first Trump administration. In the seven years since Trump approached Venezuela’s complex crisis with a response of ‘maximum pressure’ on Nicolás Maduro, the incumbent is still in power and counting the days to a third-term inauguration. U.S. sanctions have created powerful personal interests in Maduro’s continuity and embedded a vast illicit economy. Trump’s ruse of recognizing a parallel presidency was a costly misadventure for all concerned. Drilling down on sanctions will not alter the dynamics that keep Maduro in power. Trump has the power to acknowledge and reverse strategic failure, but his hands are unusually tied. In recognizing Edmundo González as the legitimate victor in the July presidential contest, the Biden administration has regifted Trump the messy problem of an influential opposition lobby without the means of taking power.”
Gustavo Roosen, member of the Advisor board and president of IESA in Caracas: “On Nov. 19, the United States government recognized Edmundo González Urrutia as the elected president of Venezuela. The constitutional date for the inauguration is Jan. 10. The G7, which brings together the most prominent countries in the international community, has imperatively demanded that the Venezuelan electoral council show evidence of the July election results. Likewise, most of the Latin American countries have insisted without success on that publication. In an interview with Eric Cortellessa of TIME Magazine, President-elect Donald Trump highlighted that his two priority objectives were ‘the border and the illegal immigration and increasing energy production.’ The president-elect’s objectives would be affected if the Venezuelan presidential transition does not occur on the indicated date and, as a consequence, the United States government decides to impose sanctions on Venezuela that have an impact on the production and export of oil and gas. In addition, such sanctions will result in an increased departure of Venezuelans abroad, particularly to the north. China is keen to recover the money that Venezuela still owes it. The United States and the international community must continue the negotiation process with the government and the opposition aiming at promoting the acceptance of the result of the elections, as 70 percent of the electorate clearly expressed on July 28.”
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