Guyana is advancing its military capacities with new surveillance technology, Brigadier Omar Khan, chief of staff of the Guyana Defence Force, announced on June 24. Khan’s comments came amid escalating tensions between Guyana and Venezuela over the Essequibo region, which Guyana controls but Venezuela claims; the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro swore in a governor of the disputed territory after regional elections in May. How have diplomatic tensions between Venezuela and Guyana evolved since the May 25 elections in Venezuela? How likely is an open military conflict between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region, and how would it play out? What role should multilateral organizations, including the Organization of American States, play in mediating tensions between the two countries?
R. Evan Ellis, Latin America research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute: “With the assistance of the United States and others, and with new oil resources, Guyana’s continued strengthening of its security forces supports its sovereign responsibility to exert state control over national territory. That includes maritime domain awareness, especially since petroleum operations are key contributors to national wealth. Sovereign control over land inherently includes the Essequibo region, recognized as part of Guyana by the 1899 Paris arbitration decision, until changed by authoritative international legal action, such as the case currently before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Whatever the legal merits of Venezuela’s claim, its current unilateral actions, including sham ‘elections’ and establishing a ‘governor’ there, directly contravene ICJ directives not to do so. Similarly, without a change in Essequibo’s legal status, Venezuela’s military threats constitute aggression—in violation of international law—and invoke Guyana’s legitimate rights to self-defense, including the legal right of partners such as the United States to help protect it. In reality, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s illegal actions are a cynical effort to divert attention from the regime’s criminal activities, economic mismanagement and robbery of the July 2024 national election. Many Maduro opponents believe Venezuela has a valid legal claim to Essequibo, if pursued by legal means. Although Venezuela’s military is numerically vastly superior to Guyana’s, Maduro will probably not invade because of the risk that his military, which long ago traded competence and capability for corruption and loyalty, would become bogged down in Essequibo, where there are few all-weather roads or other infrastructure. Indeed, a shamed Venezuelan military, with weakened oversight in the field by Cuban agents, could turn on the criminal regime that destroyed it as an institution.”
Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, founding fellow of the Caribbean Policy Consortium: “The June 5 inauguration of Neil Villamizar as governor of Venezuela’s pretend state of Guayana Esequiba following the farcical May 25 elections is another manifestation of Nicolás Maduro practicing the science of muddling through. It represents another page of Venezuela’s decades-old intimidation playbook and follows the naval incursion this past March into Guyana’s maritime space, threatening one of the oil platforms in the Stabroek Block. These two recent developments prompt observers to wonder about two possibilities. One is the likelihood that Maduro might push the intimidation envelope further and actualize his long-standing annexation threat. A second involves the prospects for mediation by the OAS. Maduro is unlikely to exercise the annexation option; the Miraflores power brokers must know that such a move carries more risks than rewards, in both geopolitical and geoeconomic terms. Among other things, the United States has aligned unambiguously with Guyana. Surely, the United States’ recent military actions in the Middle East should give Maduro pause in relation to annexation. Moreover, Brazil, which shares a border with every South American nation except Chile and Ecuador, is opposed to such an approach given the wider continental border disruption implications. Plus, Brazil views itself as a guarantor of peace on the continent. As to the second possibility, there is no mediation role for the OAS, given that the controversy is currently before the ICJ. I anticipate further muddling through by Maduro, but not the committal of political suicide with an attempt to annex the Essequibo.”
Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, professor emeritus at the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York: “Military provocations by Venezuela (such as land and marine border incursions and violations of Guyanese airspace) as well as Venezuela’s threats to potential investors have been a feature of this dispute since the 1960s, aggravated under nationalist governments, with periods of relative calm in between. Today’s heightened military activities/preparations by both sides, arising from the rally-around-the-flag attempts by a Venezuelan regime that is under regional and international pressure, are significant but not indicative of any desire for larger open military conflict. Despite occasional proposals by ultra-nationalists in and outside government, Venezuela hasn’t advocated for a solution to this conflict by force, but rather has devoted itself to assuring that the global community knows that it has consistently objected to the 1899 arbitral award and to preventing the development of the disputed zone. After all, those who are currently administering and developing a disputed area will have a great advantage in international recognition. Venezuela’s options today have narrowed even more than in the past, because where once it could count on the United States and some regional support, it is today isolated and weaker economically and politically than at any time in recent history. The Venezuelan sense of urgency today is palpable, as it looks east to an Essequibo that is at the heart of Guyana’s extraordinary and sudden oil wealth at a time when Venezuela’s oil sector is in decline. Bringing popular attention to the dispute—however disinterested the population might be—and going so far as to appoint a governor for the territory is a performative move primarily intended to demonstrate determination. Despite Guyana’s understandable resistance, even if the ICJ rules in Guyana’s favor, the problem may not go away. A permanent solution would allow Venezuela to gain some benefit via limited preferential investment in energy, aid projects or other areas. While the OAS would seem to be the key regional organization to undertake peaceful settlement, Venezuela cannot be expected to trust an organization that has shown such hostility to the regime. A new mixed commission under U.N. auspices would be a better bet.”
Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, managing partner of Aurora Macro Strategies: “Diplomatic tensions between Venezuela and Guyana increasingly appear more as a feature than a bug. Maduro’s appointment of a Venezuelan governor in Essequibo remains largely symbolic, a red-capped admiral serving as a focal point for nationalist propaganda and politically convenient narratives of gringo imperialism (that is, ‘we got robbed in 1899’) and tough-hombre sovereignty (for example, ‘take your ICJ directive and shove it’). Operationally, the Venezuelan military—though superior on paper—suffers chronic neglect and deliberate fragmentation intended to prevent coups, significantly limiting its effectiveness. Caracas hasn’t deliberately invaded a neighbor since Bolívar’s era, and current conditions render coordinated military annexation even less probable. The primary risk involves incursions by nonstate actors—including Indigenous territorial forces (Pemon), criminal networks (gold-mining sindicatos) and vaguely state-affiliated groups (colectivos, ELN, dissident FARC)—using gray-zone tactics like border skirmishes, hybrid provocations and online disinformation. A secondary risk arises at the subnational level, particularly in Bolívar, where Governor Justo Noguera Pietri is alleged to have ties to violent militias amid ongoing conflicts with Indigenous communities. Neighboring Delta Amacuro poses lower immediate risks but historically struggles to control local military leaders, elevating potential threats. Guyana’s June 24 announcement of enhanced surveillance was strategically timed—not responding to a specific incident but proactively signaling deterrence, maintaining international visibility post-election, bolstering domestic nationalism and projecting decisive governance. Georgetown likely sees no existential threat but strategically highlights victimization by an aggressive, globally unpopular neighbor, boosting diplomatic leverage and coordination with key partners like Exxon amid offshore oil development—a tactic I myself would almost certainly adopt were I Irfaan Ali. Multilateral organizations, notably the OAS, should proactively mediate and reinforce international norms, though the OAS’ cautious approach has historically been constrained by Petrocaribe sensitivities. Venezuela’s declining economic influence now offers the OAS an opportunity to adopt a more assertive role at a geopolitically propitious moment.”
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