Haitian police and military officers, with support from private U.S.-based security contractor Vectus Global, in recent months have increasingly used explosive “kamikaze” drones to attack suspected gang targets located in dense urban areas of Port-au-Prince, Human Rights Watch said in a March 10 report. In addition to more than 1,200 suspected gang members, the drone attacks killed at least 60 civilians—including 17 children—not believed to be tied to any criminal group in the 11-month period ending in January, the report found. What does the increasing use of “kamikaze” drones say about the nature of the conflict between Haiti’s gangs and the country’s security forces? How much of a difference have drone strikes made in terms of gangs’ control of Port-au-Prince? How will the escalating civilian death toll from government-authorized drone strikes affect Haiti’s political situation as the country looks to hold national elections later this year?
Henry Ziemer, associate fellow in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “The Haitian security forces embraced drones as a stopgap measure against what seemed to be an impending criminal takeover of the country. The pace of operations, with more than 1,200 reported deaths in 141 operations, makes this one of the deadliest air campaigns we have ever seen in the Western Hemisphere, far surpassing the number of casualties recorded in U.S. boat strikes in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. Uncrewed aerial vehicles provide a convenient way of projecting often-lethal power into gang strongholds where it would be risky to send human forces. This was likely necessary given the manpower constraints faced by both the Haitian National Police and now-departed Multinational Security Support Force. But drones only provide half of the equation, at best. They can be used to push out gang forces from certain areas, but drones cannot effectively clear and hold that terrain, allowing other armed groups to move into the vacuum. For this reason, even though the drone attacks have seemingly been successful at stalling the gangs’ momentum, the majority of Port-au-Prince remains under de-facto gang control, and the country’s murder rate reportedly increased in 2025. Additional troops are on their way in the form of the new 5,500-strong Gang Suppression Force (GSF). However, it seems unlikely that drone attacks will stop once the GSF arrives. Instead, the Haitian security forces, backed by contractors from Vectus, may try to use armed drones to disrupt gangs’ communications and assassinate leadership before the GSF moves in to secure the area. While this may be effective at breaking the power of Haiti’s heavily armed criminal groups, it will require tight coordination between the GSF and the units currently in charge of the drone campaign. Furthermore, civilian casualties and a perceived lack of accountability for collateral damage could erode the credibility of both the GSF and Haitian security forces.”
Robert Muggah, co-founder of the Igarapé Institute: “Can drone warfare defeat criminal governance? The early evidence suggests that it cannot. Either way, Port-au-Prince has become an unlikely laboratory for a question with global implications. Since early 2025, Haitian security forces and private contractors have reportedly conducted more than 140 drone operations against gang-controlled neighborhoods in the capital. Rights groups say at least 1,243 people were killed and 738 were injured in less than 11 months. The United Nations’ human rights office warned that many strikes were ‘likely unlawful.’ Yet by the most important strategic measure—territorial control—the gangs are still winning. Armed groups continue to hold an estimated 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, roughly where they were when the campaign intensified. The strikes have done three things: imposed real casualties on gang personnel, disrupted command activity in specific neighborhoods and introduced an overhead threat that alters the psychology of urban control. The U.N.-authorized Gang Suppression Force, the successor to the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission, remains under-strength and underfunded. Haiti’s police and justice apparatus is brittle. Despite tactical gains, drones cannot reopen schools, restore courts or rebuild resident confidence. Clear without hold is temporary, a lesson that counterinsurgency theorists learned decades ago, and Haiti is relearning at a cost. The political stakes are rising fast. Haiti is due to hold its first general election in a decade later this year, with 280 parties already registered. But with gangs controlling most of the capital (and some experimenting with drones themselves), every civilian killed by a government-authorized strike gives opponents new grounds to challenge the transition’s legitimacy. The authorities can frame the drones as proof of resolve; critics will cast them as proof of foreign-enabled authoritarian drift. In an environment of thin public trust, civilian casualties are politically cumulative. Haiti’s drone campaign reveals a state that can kill at distance more easily than it can govern, investigate or deliver justice. That isn’t a security strategy: It’s a symptom of institutional collapse dressed up as one.”
Diego Da Rin, analyst for Haiti at Crisis Group: “So-called ‘kamikaze drones’ were first used in March 2025, as Haitian security forces were rapidly losing ground to Viv Ansanm, the gang coalition that had once more launched coordinated attacks on multiple fronts across the capital. Despite efforts from the Kenyan-led security support mission and resistance from local self-defense groups, the gangs kept advancing steadily, hoping to overthrow the government. Fears grew that the capital could soon fall entirely under gang control. In response, Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé put together a security task force that includes staffers from a foreign private military company, who are in charge of operating the drones. Drones have allowed the Haitian state to strike gangs inside their hard-to-reach strongholds but have been ineffective in regaining territory because there are not enough ground forces to secure territorial control of the areas targeted aerially. Furthermore, while drones have helped put the gangs on the back foot and instill fear within their ranks, they have also terrorized the estimated 2.7 million people living in gang-controlled areas. Humanitarians delivering life-saving aid worry about the growing risk of being hit, as authorities have not coordinated with drone operators to prevent accidental strikes. Haiti now awaits the arrival of international military contingents, which will be part of the newly approved Gang Suppression Force. Port-au-Prince should enforce stricter rules of engagement for the use of lethal force, in order to push back the gangs without further alienating a population that rarely encounters the state beyond the security operations in their neighborhoods.”
Sophie Rutenbar, nonresident fellow with the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and former mission planning officer for the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti: “The increasing use of kamikaze drones indicates the serious weakness of the Haitian state. The state’s hiring of mercenaries to conduct what Human Rights Watch says are, in many cases, targeted extrajudicial killings are not the moves of a strong government or a robust state security apparatus. Nor are they the actions of a state that is accountable to its people—little to no information has been released about the contract with Vectus Global, not even the amount of the contract, who leads the group deployed in Port-au-Prince or what targeting criteria they employ. The drone strikes seem to have contributed to reducing visible gang activity, placing gangs on the defensive and creating space for the Haitian National Police to advance. However, the police have not regained control of substantial new territory, and while drone attacks have killed hundreds of rank-and-file gang members, they have not taken out a single gang leader. At the moment, Haitians want nothing more than to return to relative normalcy. Yet it may be easy for residents living in areas protected by vigilante brigades to view civilians injured or killed by drones as collaborators, given that they were living in gang-controlled areas. If those civilians got the chance to vote in a free and fair election, they would likely seek to express their anger with the current government. However, the current security situation and Haiti’s record of violence and disenfranchisement in recent elections do not bode well for the quality of national elections planned for later this year.”
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