Ecuador’s electoral authorities on April 26 dissolved two opposition parties, Construye and Unidad Popular, after having suspended major left-wing party Revolución Ciudadana ahead of local elections in November. Multiple members of the Ecuadorean opposition have denounced what they have characterized as political persecution by the administration of President Daniel Noboa and accused the National Electoral Council of acting in its favor, El País reported. What can be expected of Ecuador’s upcoming local elections in terms of competitiveness and the balance of power among political forces? What factors will likely define the election, and how will the actions against the left-wing parties affect the vote? How do the developments fit into Ecuador’s broader political trajectory, particularly regarding democratic stability, governance and polarization?
Michael Shifter, senior fellow and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue: “In advance of the upcoming local elections, the Noboa government has made several decisions that seek to avoid or minimize significant setbacks. The first was in late March by the government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) to move the date of the elections from February 2027 to November 2026. The rationale was based on the forecast that an unusually powerful El Niño would likely hit Ecuador around the end of the year or early next year, causing possible flooding and making voting more difficult. As a result, the campaign that normally runs for 45 days would now be reduced to about 15, which benefits candidates from the governing party. The second key decision, made by the government-aligned Contentious-Electoral Tribunal (TCE), was to suspend the Revolución Ciudadana (RC) political party led by former President Rafael Correa. The reason related to allegations that in the last election, the RC campaign received funds linked to the drug trade from the Maduro regime. The decision is of dubious legality and forces RC candidates to find other parties to support them within a truncated calendar. Both decisions seem politically motivated, aimed at undermining opposition candidates. They should be understood within a context of Noboa’s declining popularity and his administration’s ‘desgaste,’ reflected in the resounding defeat of a popular referendum last November. To date, moreover, the government’s ‘mano dura’ security policy has not yielded positive results. In 2025, Ecuador registered more than 50 homicides per 100,000, the highest in its history and—Haiti aside—the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean. Noboa’s authoritarian tendencies, coupled with a militarized crackdown that does not seem to be working, put the government on shaky ground.”
Belén Aguinaga, program officer at the Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF): “Ecuador’s upcoming local elections are likely to be highly polarized and far less competitive than previous ones, not only because of the political climate, but also because of the institutional decisions made in recent months. The suspension of opposition parties like Revolución Ciudadana and the dissolution of Construye and Unidad Popular have intensified concerns that the electoral playing field is becoming increasingly restrictive for opposition forces. Regardless of the legal justifications offered by the National Electoral Council, the timing of these measures has reinforced perceptions that the institution lacks independence from the executive branch. The election will likely be shaped by three interconnected factors: rampant insecurity, economic frustration and declining public trust in democratic institutions. Concerns over violence and governance remain central for voters, but there is also growing skepticism toward the credibility of the electoral process itself. Analysts and civil society organizations have already warned that Ecuador is experiencing democratic backsliding, with electoral and other institutions like the top prosecutor’s office increasingly seen as politically influenced rather than independent, while the government has constantly undermined the Constitutional Court. At the same time, the actions against left-wing and opposition parties could produce mixed political effects. They may weaken organizational structures and limit opposition participation, but they could also mobilize voters who see these measures as politically motivated or excessive. More broadly, these developments fit within Ecuador’s deepening polarization between ‘correísmo’ and ‘anti-correísmo,’ a dynamic that continues to dominate national politics and complicate democratic governance. The risk is not only greater political fragmentation, but also a continued erosion of institutional legitimacy and public confidence in the democratic system itself.”
Sebastián Hurtado, CEO and founder of PRóFITAS in Quito: “Ecuador’s 2026 local elections are positioned to favor the ruling Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN) party, which currently has minimal representation at the provincial and city levels of government. While support for Noboa has eroded to a loyal base of 35 percent, this is enough to win local contests that do not require a majority vote, especially if opposition candidates struggle to participate. This is the case following decisions from the National Electoral Council (CNE) and other authorities aligned with the Noboa administration. Key opposition figures, including the mayors of Quito, Cuenca and Guayaquil (the latter imprisoned since February), face administrative or criminal investigations. Simultaneously, the fast-track suspension of Revolución Ciudadana forces the country’s largest opposition party to seek suboptimal ballot access. These hurdles are compounded by the CNE’s decision to move the election to November 2026 from February 2027, citing the potential impact of El Niño. This compressed timeline limits the opposition’s chances to challenge the CNE’s decisions and capitalize on any further erosion of Noboa’s popularity before the vote. It also shortens the official period when campaigning is allowed, while the Noboa administration can leverage policy tools and privileged media access throughout the election cycle. These developments will likely expand ADN’s territorial reach and bolster regime stability, albeit at the expense of political plurality. Investors generally favor this expedited timeline as it minimizes the window for populist spending and prevents sensitive policy decisions from being delayed until next year. However, ADN’s success hinges on Noboa’s ability to avoid major security or energy crises, as he will likely be the most visible face of the election.”
Grace Jaramillo, professor at the University of British Columbia: “It is never savvy or politically convenient to ban movements or political parties, let alone before an election. The decision has lowered even more the legitimacy of a key institution of democracy, the National Electoral Council, at a moment when Ecuadorean public opinion is already on edge about diminishing rights and freedoms. It has affected president Noboa’s administration the most, since his party directly benefited from the decision after going as far as confining the mayor of the largest city of the country, Guayaquil, to one of the most dangerous detainment centers, even when he was cooperating with judicial procedures in a case against him. Elections are political escape valves for citizens to express dissatisfaction. At the local level, they are about options to solve everyday problems that have become insurmountable in the largest cities of the country, including the capital. We have learned from Latin American struggles with democracy and Ecuadorean history that alternation of power at all levels of government is the only guarantee of steady governance and democratic learning. In sum, the decision of the National Electoral Council goes beyond brinkmanship between traditional polarization left-to-right, it tarnishes the transparency of the process and makes the playing field even more uneven and adds to the increasing sense of rising authoritarianism in the country.”
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