Laura Fernández, the candidate of the conservative Sovereign People’s Party, won Costa Rica’s presidential election on Sunday with more than 48 percent of the vote, according to provisional results from Costa Rica’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Fernández, who was minister of the presidency under outgoing President Rodrigo Chaves, won without the need for a runoff; second-place finisher Álvaro Ramos of the National Liberation party received just 33 percent of the vote. What will Fernández likely prioritize first after she takes office on May 8? What does her landslide victory indicate about the preferences of Costa Rican voters? To what extent will Costa Rica’s relationship with the United States likely change under Fernández?
Francisco Chacón, former member of Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly for the National Liberation Party (PLN) and former minister of communications: “Fernández won in six of the seven provinces, reaching 57 percent or higher in coastal regions. Abstentionism—at 30.9 percent—diminished significantly, by about 10 percentage points compared to 2022. The election was largely viewed as a referendum on current President Rodrigo Chaves, who handpicked Fernández and is expected to be appointed minister of the presidency. The results point to widespread discontent that goes beyond the traditional political system to encompass the current institutional apparatus, which Costa Ricans feel is not responding to their needs. The incoming president promised ‘deep and irreversible’ change, but specific priorities remain vague. Fernández will likely continue Chaves’ fiscal discipline and pursue the opening of certain sectors, including energy, and maintain cordial relations with the United States. With around 31 seats in the Legislative Assembly pending a final count, Fernández’s Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO) fell short of the qualified majority needed (38 seats) to enact some of its most controversial proposals, including a constitutional reform to consolidate executive power, allow consecutive presidential terms and declare a state of emergency that would curb individual liberties. It also impedes the PPSO from automatically appointing Supreme Court justices (14 of 22 are up for re-election during the next four-year term), though that will depend on a unified opposition. Still, the PPSO has enough seats to approve the budget, control the legislative agenda and pass ordinary laws.”
María Fernanda Bozmoski, director of impact and operations and lead for Central America at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center: “Laura Fernández and her movement sold a simple, but very powerful idea: If Costa Ricans wanted change, they should vote for continuity. More than one million Costa Ricans responded positively to that premise, signaling approval and a liking of the current Chaves administration’s style and priorities. Fernández will be inaugurated on May 8 with a large mandate, and she will enjoy a simple majority in the Legislative Assembly. She must quickly respond with concrete actions to her country’s top concern: security. During one of the presidential debates, Fernández spoke of a state of exception in Costa Rica to quickly bring down crime and homicide rates. Expect the mega-prison, modeled on El Salvador’s CECOT, to be accomplished in the first months of her term. The prison will be built during what Fernández has called the ‘third republic’ in Costa Rica, which would entail reforms in the judicial branch and other institutions. With current President Chaves as her incoming minister of the presidency, relations with the United States will deepen, given shared priorities on counter-narcotics, crime, illegal migration and sustaining Costa Rica’s role as a reliable economic partner in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, given minimal expected changes to the cabinet, the transition between Chaves and Fernández will likely also be minimal.”
José Rojas Alvarado, learning & development manager at the Oxford Policy Engagement Network (OPEN) at the University of Oxford: “Fernández will begin her term by setting the legislative agenda; she is expected to prioritize initiatives that were central to her campaign, particularly those related to judicial reform and the fight against organized crime. She is also likely to reintroduce bills that failed to advance under the Chaves administration, including the reform to work schedules known as the ‘4×3 work week’ and the large-scale government infrastructure project known as ‘Ciudad Gobierno.’ While her party’s legislative majority gives the president influence over committees and the agenda, it does not guarantee passage of the administration’s more ambitious reforms. Her victory should be understood less as an isolated electoral outcome than as part of a broader transformation in Costa Rica’s political culture. Growing frustration over deteriorating security conditions and unresolved social challenges has increasingly translated into distrust toward state institutions. That shift, however, predates this election. As early as 2018, a leading presidential candidate suggested withdrawing from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an idea that would have been politically untenable at the time. Since then, this shift has become more pronounced, expressed in support for states of exception, sustained attacks on the press and recurrent confrontations with other branches of government. Chaves has promoted these positions, making Fernández’s victory in large part a popular endorsement of his governing style. In this context, Costa Rica’s relationship with the United States is unlikely to shift fundamentally under Fernández. Deep economic ties and longstanding diplomatic alignment favor continuity, particularly in areas discussed between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Chaves, including cooperation against organized crime and broader geopolitical issues such as concerns over China’s expanding commercial presence in the region.”
Pablo Duncan, senior partner at CLC Communications and Public Affairs: “Laura Fernández is likely to soon prioritize consolidating governability and the executive branch’s operational capacity. Her tenure as minister of the presidency under Rodrigo Chaves gave her a practical understanding of how the state apparatus functions and how to navigate negotiations within a fragmented Legislative Assembly. This suggests that her early moves will focus on securing political control and ensuring effective execution, rather than advancing immediate structural reforms. Her first-round victory, with more than 48 percent of the vote, reflects a clear voter preference for leadership perceived as firm and pragmatic, alongside a rejection of traditional parties and classic models of political intermediation. For a significant segment of the electorate, the promise of order and decisiveness outweighed concerns related to institutional confrontation. A landslide victory in the first round also tends to decompress institutional conflict in the short term. The principal challenge is therefore not an immediate clash between branches of government, but the management of political authority in the face of entrenched bureaucratic inertia. From an international perspective, particularly regarding bilateral relations with the United States, Fernández is a recognizable figure. Her meeting a year ago with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio signals early mutual recognition. Accordingly, the relationship is likely to remain shaped by structural factors, including the United States’ role as Costa Rica’s main trading partner and the policy priorities of the Donald Trump administration. At this stage, no clear signals point to substantive shifts, making continuity in trade, security cooperation and regional coordination the most plausible scenario. Throughout her career, Fernández has demonstrated a strong capacity for adaptation. While it remains premature to define her governing style with precision, her critique of excessive bureaucracy and regulatory overload suggests that more ambitious state reforms may follow.”
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