In a defeat for President Daniel Noboa, Ecuadoreans voted down all four measures that were presented in a Nov. 16 referendum pushed by Noboa’s government. The rejected measures would have allowed foreign military bases in Ecuador, started a process to draft a new constitution, eliminated state funding for political parties and reduced the size of the National Assembly. Why did voters reject all of the proposals? How might Ecuador’s approach to fighting domestic and transnational criminal groups change in response to the defeat of the ballot questions? What do the results mean for Noboa’s agenda moving forward, as well as the overall stability of his government?
Sebastián Hurtado, CEO & founder of PRóFITAS in Quito: “Barely six months after Noboa’s comfortable re-election, support for his referendum collapsed even in traditional strongholds, signaling broader dissatisfaction with the government rather than with the individual questions. The vote also exposed a sharp socioeconomic divide: Low-income areas rejected the proposals by margins of up to 70 percent, while higher-income districts tended to support them. Persistent crime—2025 is on track to become the deadliest year on record—and deteriorating public services, especially in health, contributed to voter pushback. For many, the referendum appeared untimely and disconnected from more urgent demands for security, service delivery and employment. The referendum result will not significantly change Ecuador’s approach to fighting criminal groups. With constitutional redesign off the table, the government will continue relying on operational tools rather than expanded executive authority. Strong cooperation with the United States—particularly on narcotics, migration and intelligence—will remain central. Expect more negotiated security legislation in the National Assembly and continued reliance on the armed forces and allied state institutions to maintain pressure on domestic and transnational criminal networks. A Bukele-style approach based on mass incarceration and sweeping institutional control is even less likely after the referendum defeat. The defeat weakens Noboa’s political capital and gives new momentum to a still-fragmented opposition. Even so, immediate instability is unlikely: He maintains a working majority in the National Assembly and considerable influence over key state institutions. His ability to pursue ambitious reforms is now more limited, pushing him toward incremental, negotiated legislation. The rejection of a constituent assembly removes a major source of medium-term uncertainty—reflected in a notable drop in country risk this week—but also raises expectations for more concrete results. Failure to deliver could undermine his government later in the term.”
Diana Dávila Gordillo, assistant professor of comparative politics at the Institute of Political Science of Leiden University: “Ecuadoreans largely rejected all four questions because they touched on sensitive issues of sovereignty, representation and democratic stability. Allowing foreign military bases sparked concerns about external interference and diminished territorial sovereignty. Proposals to cut state funding for parties and shrink the National Assembly raised fears of power concentration and weaker representation. A constituent assembly raised fears of regressive reforms, especially those linked to the rights of nature. There was also strong anti-government sentiment after the violent response to Indigenous protests, failures in health and security systems, and economic woes. The defeat constrains Noboa’s security strategy. Without authorization for a foreign base, the pursuit of externally anchored approaches will be limited. International cooperation will continue, but likely through lower-visibility channels such as intelligence sharing and joint maritime operations. At its core, however, intelligence, police coordination, prison control and anti-corruption efforts have been shown to be weak under Noboa’s government and are unlikely to improve. Ecuadoreans can expect his continued reliance on the military and highly repressive actions against the population. Politically, the result weakens Noboa’s momentum. He will need to pivot from ambitious structural reforms to pragmatic, results-oriented governance, prioritizing measurable improvements in security and economic conditions. For this, he will need to rely on his party’s presence in the National Assembly, which is an underutilized asset so far. While the defeat does not immediately threaten his tenure, it heightens his vulnerability. Failure to deliver quick gains in public safety or economic relief could further erode support and increase political instability.”
Abelardo Pachano, president of Finanview in Ecuador and former Ecuadorean central bank president: “The government may have lost its proposals, but from a broader macroeconomic and political perspective, the country appears to have benefited in several ways. In economic terms, we have secured at least 24 months of a more rational and predictable environment for decision-making among key economic agents, creating space for essential adjustments in macroeconomic policy. I do not foresee a significant risk of political instability for the administration. It is true that it expended a considerable amount of political capital, yet this could be rebuilt if the government recognizes the need to distance itself from its previous stance and actively seeks a broader and more sustainable political consensus—an objective that is, nonetheless, inherently complex. In security matters, the strategic path forward lies in strengthening international cooperation, particularly with the United States, under frameworks initiated during the Moreno administration. This approach remains key in addressing the country’s security challenges with technical and operational support.”
Eileen Gavin, head of sovereigns at Verisk Maplecroft: “The referendum became a vote on Noboa himself, whose rhetoric in the run-up was divisive. He assigned blame, variously, to the left-wing and Indigenous opposition, ‘agents provocateurs’ and the Venezuelan criminal network Tren de Aragua for incidents including violence at anti-austerity protests and a major leak from the SOTE oil pipeline that Petroecuador itself attributed to flood damage. In office for two years, Noboa’s ‘third way’ brand of politics, latterly renamed ‘New Ecuador,’ has not yet delivered on its core promises of public security, economic growth and political peace. The referendum result also reflected pushback against Noboa’s autocratic tendencies, which have seen intense presidential clashes with the judiciary and legislature. With the 2025 homicide rate estimated at 50 per 100,000 (up from 38.8 in 2024 and 47.3 in 2023), Noboa has insufficient progress to show for 24 months of internal armed conflict. His key objective of actively securing U.S. military support will now have to be reconsidered and restricted to financing, equipment, external training and intelligence support. Noboa marked his anniversary by hailing the fall in sovereign risk metrics since 2023. Having reshuffled his cabinet and pledged dialogue with the National Assembly and other stakeholders, frustration may yet prompt him to fall back on executive orders to push through his agenda. That could prove risky. Although elections are not due until 2029, Noboa might recall that his immediate predecessor, right-winger Guillermo Lasso, failed in his brinkmanship both with protesters and the National Assembly.”
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