Venezuela’s government and the opposition announced July 14 that they would engage in formal talks beginning Aug. 1. Rather than Nobel laureate María Corina Machado, who has unsuccessfully tried to return to Venezuela after the country’s devastating June earthquakes, the opposition’s representatives will be led by Dinorah Figuera, who recently returned to Venezuela from Spain, where she was in exile. What will the talks accomplish, and why is interim President Delcy Rodríguez’s government engaging in them? Why is Figuera leading the opposition’s representatives? What are the potential concrete outcomes of the talks, and how likely is it that they will lead to an election?
Michael Shifter, senior fellow and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue: “U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on July 20 that talks on Venezuela’s long-awaited democratic transition will begin in early August. Although the negotiations will involve Venezuela’s interim government, led by National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, and Dinorah Figuera, president of the opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly recognized by the United States, the Trump administration—and Rubio in particular—will play the decisive role in shaping the outcome. Under Venezuela’s current tutelary relationship with Washington, Delcy Rodríguez’s government had little choice but to accept negotiations with Figuera. Pressure on Rubio to launch a democratic transition process has intensified, particularly after the Rodríguez government’s widely criticized response to the devastating earthquakes in late June. For the government, engaging in structured talks with Figuera could help avert a total collapse of its domestic and international legitimacy, which has eroded sharply since the disaster. Unlike opposition leader María Corina Machado, Venezuela’s most popular political figure, Figuera appears more focused on rebuilding electoral institutions dismantled under Chavismo than on negotiating a power-sharing arrangement or pressing for an immediate election date. The Trump administration has largely sidelined Machado, apparently concerned that her more confrontational approach toward the Rodríguez government could destabilize an already fragile situation and jeopardize what it frequently portrays as one of its signature foreign policy achievements. While the outcome of the talks remains uncertain, they are likely to focus on technical electoral reforms, with genuinely free and internationally recognized elections postponed for the foreseeable future.”
Gustavo Roosen, member of the Advisor board and president of IESA in Caracas: “The agenda of these talks is likely to focus on the architecture of free elections: reconstituting the electoral authority, auditing the voter registry, restoring voting rights to the Venezuelan diaspora, agreeing on electoral procedures, guaranteeing the participation of exiled political leaders and reshaping the supreme court with independent, professionally qualified judges. Dinorah Figuera heads the opposition delegation because, as president of the National Assembly elected in 2015, she represents the only Venezuelan institution that continues to enjoy formal recognition from the United States. Her role gives the opposition both institutional legitimacy and continuity in this process. On the government’s side, the talks involve the interim administration headed by Delcy Rodríguez, which Washington also recognizes for the purposes of this transition process. The talks should produce a road map toward credible, internationally accepted elections. Whether that objective is achieved will ultimately depend on the parties’ willingness to translate political commitments into enforceable institutional reforms. The need for a negotiated democratic transition has become increasingly urgent. After 26 years of institutional erosion and economic collapse under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro—further aggravated by the June earthquakes—Venezuela requires a legitimate political settlement capable of restoring democratic governance and creating the conditions for national reconstruction.”
Maryhen Jiménez, assistant professor of politics at Maynooth University in Ireland: “International actors, including the United States, have long been involved in trying to address Venezuela’s crisis, yet the intervention in January has seemingly shifted the rhetoric and scope of U.S. involvement. This does not, however, guarantee a durable agreement. Historically, the Venezuelan government has approached such spaces instrumentally, often using them to buy time, an approach rooted in an authoritarian logic that sees alternation of power as unacceptable. Sectors of the opposition have, at times, also prioritized other forms of contestation to dislodge the ruling elite. The key question is whether the United States will be able to bring these actors to meaningful engagement. Furthermore, while the ruling elite tends to quickly adapt to changing environments, the opposition often arrives at talks fragmented. In this round, Figuera is invited as president of the 2015 National Assembly. Yet this body lacks the democratic legitimacy of Edmundo González, the 2024 election winner, or María Corina Machado, the winner of the 2023 primaries. Importantly, the opposition does not currently count on a functioning, broadbased mechanism through which different views and strategic preferences can be reconciled into a shared agenda. It seems vital for these actors to coordinate around clear goals and internal decision-making rules, as they have in the past. Lastly, negotiations that are inclusive, allowing for active plural civil society participation, tend to prove more sustainable. Venezuelans are not meaningfully involved in this process at the moment. Top-down elite arrangements may function in the short term, but a serious democratization process would need to be anchored in Venezuelan society, its diverse needs and aspirations.”
Charles Shapiro, professor of practice at the San Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela (2002-2004): “It’s about time. Negotiations on organizing elections should have begun soon after Nicolás Maduro’s Jan. 3 ouster. The ‘Phase 1’ economic reforms the Trump administration is promoting can only go so far without rule of law and a legitimate government in place. The challenge is monumental. The opposition rightly has zero confidence in the electoral rolls and even less in the National Electoral Council (CNE)— the instrument for Maduro’s theft of the 2024 presidential election—or the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, which ratified the steal. In a protectorate, the imperial power runs a country through local princes; those local princes pretend to be independent and sovereign. Delcy Rodríguez and her chavista cabinet are the local princes. My best guess is that the U.S. instructed Delcy and her posse to participate in the Aug. 1 talks. They would not have agreed otherwise since they cannot win a free and fair election. With their miserable response to the twin earthquakes, support for Delcy is even lower than it was on Jan. 3. The United States, not the opposition, chose Dinorah Figuera. She is a low-profile former member of the 2015 National Assembly who lacks influence within the opposition. In essence, the United States will be negotiating with Delcy through Figuera. The United States wants to keep María Corina Machado sidelined. Negotiations between Rodríguez and Machado would underscore both Rodríguez’s political weakness and Machado’s moral authority. Delcy and her brother Jorge Rodríguez will drag out discussions as long as possible and aim for a super complicated, impossibly legalistic process similar to what the chavistas used to delay the 2004 recall referendum. Jorge Rodríguez, who was then chair of the CNE, stage managed the 2004 delay by forcing nongovernmental organization Súmate, which Machado co-founded, to collect the same petitions twice and then rejected thousands over invented technicalities. The real question is if the U.S. administration really wants elections or is more interested in appearances. If it’s the former, it will have to instruct Delcy to get serious. A final note: As of this writing, Jailer-in-Chief Delcy Rodríguez continues to hold 371 political prisoners because we have not instructed her to release them. Shame on us.”
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