In a shootout on Feb. 22, Mexican soldiers killed Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho,” the leader of the powerful Jalisco New Generation drug cartel (CJNG). Authorities said the operation left more than 70 people dead, including soldiers, cartel members and civilians, and the cartel set off a wave of violence and roadblocks across Mexico in retaliation. How damaging is Oseguera’s killing to the CJNG, and what is the cartel’s future? What now faces Mexico now as the CJNG regroups and other leaders fight for control? What does the operation say about cooperation between Mexico and the United States, which contributed intelligence to the mission?
Rebecca Bill Chavez, president and CEO of the Inter-American Dialogue: “El Mencho’s demise is a major operational victory that demonstrates the Mexican state can marshal the intelligence, coordination and political will needed to target even the most powerful criminal actors. It also challenges the assumption that President Claudia Sheinbaum would simply replicate AMLO’s approach, as evidenced by closer security cooperation with the United States and a greater willingness to confront cartels directly. Mexico executed the mission, but U.S. intelligence played a critical role, reflecting a more pragmatic relationship after several years of strained cooperation. That said, decapitation is not dismantlement. The CJNG is a diversified, territorially embedded organization. Removing a kingpin can trigger violent competition as factions jockey for control. The real test is whether this strike is followed by sustained pressure targeting financial networks, weapons supply chains and political protection networks. Institutionally, the challenge is also significant. With judges now selected through popular elections, political and criminal pressures could erode judicial independence, increasing the risk that arrests end in impunity rather than convictions. Operational gains must be matched by credible prosecutions and strong rule-of-law institutions. For the bilateral relationship, the operation demonstrates that cooperation can deliver results while respecting Mexican sovereignty. But U.S. pressure over fentanyl and cartel violence will not abate. If cooperation deepens through intelligence sharing, financial tracking, arms interdiction and coordination on precursor chemicals, both countries stand to benefit. If it falters, calls in Washington for unilateral military action will resurface. A unilateral incursion on Mexican soil would trigger a profound diplomatic rupture and undermine cooperation across the bilateral relationship.”
Vanda Felbab-Brown, senior fellow for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution: “The retaliatory, demonstrative violence that the CJNG unleashed after El Mencho’s death has subsided. Killing some 70 people, destroying private properties and businesses, jeopardizing roads and causing a national security emergency, the violence served no material purpose. The mayhem instead sought to reinforce the group’s brand as Mexico’s most brutal and brazen criminal group. If the CJNG fails to do that, far more intractable violence will escalate in Mexico and potentially last for months or years as rival criminal groups seek to increase their turf at the CJNG’s expense. Moreover, the various smaller criminal groups which the CJNG’s coercion kept in vassal-like relationships may seek to break away, especially if the Sinaloa Cartel promises them smaller duties or violently pressures them to switch sides. Examples of escalation-ready areas include Michoacán, where the Carteles Unidos have intensely fought with the CJNG; Chiapas, where the CJNG fought the Sinaloa Cartel; as well as Baja California and Baja California Sur, where La Mayiza has been hammering both the CJNG and La Chapiza. Indeed, a fragmentation of the CJNG or a prolonged uncertain leadership transition may further weaken La Chapiza, which has been rumored to rely on CJNG help in its ‘civil war’ with La Mayiza. A reconfiguration of CJNG leadership and power may also trigger violence over corruption networks—such as in Chiapas. Recent revelations show the state’s elite police force was on El Mencho’s payroll. Getting El Mencho was an important deliverable of the Claudia Sheinbaum administration to the United States to keep Washington satisfied with bilateral security cooperation and deflect U.S. military strikes in Mexico. With luck, the Mexican government may be able to build on El Mencho’s death to further weaken the CJNG, with the group falling apart like the Zetas did a decade ago. More likely, however, the resulting lasting violence will consume Sheinbaum’s presidency.”
Jane Esberg, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania: “El Mencho’s killing means Mexico has ‘won’ a battle in its criminal conflict, but it is no closer to winning the war. Research on the effects of leadership removal suggests that the CJNG will either splinter or experience significant internal conflict over succession, particularly because Oseguera has no clear successor. This might weaken the CJNG, but, if anything, is likely to exacerbate violence—including against civilians—as turf wars break out. Specific cartels rise and fall. The structural conditions that allow criminal groups to thrive, including corruption, impunity and economic development, remain. We have seen this time and time again. The arrest of the head of the Guadalajara Cartel in 1989 spawned several competing groups, including the Sinaloa Cartel. After the killing of its leader in 2009, the Beltrán Leyva Organization splintered into warring parts. Truly addressing the criminal conflict requires tackling major systemic problems alongside strengthening security. That both Mexico and the United States are treating El Mencho’s death as a victory shows the emphasis placed on ‘quick wins’ in a conflict where there are no silver bullets. The incident has certainly helped Sheinbaum demonstrate her willingness to use a strong hand against the cartels, pleasing Trump. But the ‘kingpin strategy’ of removing cartel leadership is a continuation of policy that has not worked in the past.”
Amanda Mattingly, former U.S. diplomat and founder of ACM Global Intelligence: “Going after ‘El Mencho’ was a bold and gutsy move by Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. The operation demonstrated that the Mexican military can confront cartels if and when there is political will, as well as enough pressure. And Sheinbaum is under enormous pressure from the U.S. government to do more to address the drug cartels and criminal networks that engage in drug production, drug trafficking, human trafficking, migrant smuggling and money laundering, among other ‘business lines.’ Yes, Sheinbaum came into office in 2024 with a more security-forward approach than her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s economic pressure and veiled military threats have forced her hand. The economic risks alone are significant. After all, 80 percent of Mexico’s exports are destined for the United States, which translates to about $535 billion. Threats of tariffs or the breakdown of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement are just too great for Mexico to ignore. As it turns out, the operation against El Mencho also demonstrated that security cooperation between U.S. and Mexican authorities is actually quite good. Intelligence sharing and tactical coordination likely enabled Mexico’s seizure of about 1.8 tons of fentanyl, destruction of almost 2,000 drug production labs, arrests of about 40,000 people linked to the CJNG and Sinaloa cartel, and an unprecedented number of extraditions to the United States in the last year. Sadly, despite this progress, it is also likely that the CJNG will regroup. Past drug kingpin takedowns have led to fierce infighting and turf wars as cartel members battle for control. As one former CIA officer once told me, ‘You can take out the snake, but you’re left with a lot of serpents.’”
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