Colombia on May 14 joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s flagship international development program, on the sidelines of President Gustavo Petro’s recent visit to Beijing. Colombia becomes the 22nd country in Latin America and the Caribbean to join the initiative, which has more than 140 members worldwide. What will Colombia’s membership in the BRI mean for China’s presence in Latin America? How likely is Colombia’s BRI membership to be reversed by the next presidential administration that assumes power after general elections, which are scheduled for May 2026? What is the significance of this agreement in the context of ongoing geopolitical tensions?
Sergio Guzmán, political risk analyst at Colombia Risk Analysis: “By both Latin American and global standards, Colombia came late to the BRI party. Although its arrival was received with bells and whistles, it remains unclear that Colombia will get the benefits Gustavo Petro suggests it will obtain from it for several reasons. China is not as generous or naive about Latin America as it was when it started signing on partners in 2014 and financing all sorts of infrastructure projects throughout the region. It is fair to say that China has become more meticulous about risk and more strategic about financing, which suggests it won’t necessarily flood Colombia with attention or money at this time. Moreover, although Petro is direly in need of cash to finance Colombia’s fiscal deficit, the country’s public contracting law is inflexible about having a transparent tender process and having projects be fully financed in agreement with the country’s fiscal rule. That means that even if China offered, Colombia couldn’t necessarily take a honeypot deal for infrastructure finance that has caught other countries in a debt trap. However, the recent announcement by the United States to vote to block multilateral financing from projects won by Chinese firms is an important setback that will push Colombia and other countries away from the IMF, IDB and World Bank and seek for funding elsewhere like the BRICS bank, which may subject transactions to fewer environmental, social, financial and reputational controls than those currently in place—potentially opening a stream of financing that would not benefit Colombia’s transparency or governance of public resources.”
Jennapher Lunde Seefeldt, associate professor of government and international affairs at Augustana University: “Colombia has traditionally been economically and militarily aligned with the United States, receiving billions in aid and military assistance. As a strategic partner during the Cold War (and a current NATO global partner) and the ‘War on Drugs,’ Colombia’s history is significantly intertwined with America’s hegemonic ambitions. But with Trump’s increasingly anomalous policy decisions, China is seizing the opportunity to support the region that the United States has marginalized. This could facilitate a marked shift in geopolitical influence. Colombia is seeking new partners to ensure stability for assistance and development in light of U.S. foreign assistance cuts and the recent suspension of IMF funds. China’s rhetoric details protecting BRI members from other countries that use ‘tariffs as weapons’ and those that have increased protectionist and isolationist policies—namely, the United States. Public sentiment in Latin America increasingly believes that China has fairer and more transparent trade practices and respects Latin America more than the United States does. Whether Colombian BRI involvement persists depends on whether Petro can finally create a stable cabinet to get effective policies implemented in the time he has left before the 2026 elections. He needs to demonstrate that this arrangement can benefit Colombians, and not just the macro-Colombian economy or China. Longevity also depends on how damaging Trump’s actions have been, and might continue to be, for the U.S.-Colombian relationship. China is ready and waiting to further entrench in Latin America, which may provide some economic and developmental relief in a region that desperately needs it. But the shifting geopolitical environment may upend any historical clout the United States has in the region.”
Peter DeShazo, visiting professor of Latin American, Latino and Caribbean Studies at Dartmouth College and former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs: “Colombia’s joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not insignificant in terms of the deepening U.S.-China rivalry in the Western Hemisphere, but neither does it constitute a major course change in Colombia’s international relations. The economic benefits that President Petro claims BRI participation will generate—increased Chinese investment and commodity purchases that will shrink Colombia’s trade deficit with China—may or may not play out. No concrete or binding commitments were agreed to. More significant are the symbolic/political dimensions of the agreement. China benefits by making diplomatic inroads with a country long seen as the closest partner of the United States in South America, at a time when the U.S.-Colombia relationship is at the lowest ebb in decades. The Trump administration fired off warnings both before and after Petro’s visit to Beijing regarding possible U.S. economic measures against Colombia, further evidence of its overall displeasure with Petro. The demise of USAID will have a particularly adverse effect on Colombia and the U.S.-Colombia relationship, given the large size and importance of the USAID mission in support of the 2016 peace process and democratic governance and rule of law. The failure of Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ strategy to counter criminal/insurgent groups and to stem ballooning coca cultivation also strains the bilateral relationship—and it constitutes an enormous challenge for the Colombian government that will emerge from the 2026 elections. The United States needs to shift gears and inject a new dynamic of cooperation into its relationship with Colombia, not because of rivalry with China, but rather for reasons of longstanding U.S. national interest in Colombia as a stable, democratic and prosperous U.S. partner in the region.”
Laura Lizarazo, senior analyst for the Andean Region at Control Risks: “Colombia’s entry into the BRI has no immediate material implications, being only a nonbinding declaration of intent that does not allocate any resources to any specific project or field. It is worth noting that, at the time of joining the BRI, most Latin American countries already had China as their main trading partner and a strong penetration of Chinese loans and investment, which is not Colombia’s case. The scope and reach of any future loan, investment or cooperation initiative developed under the BRI will depend on subsequent negotiations between Bogotá and Beijing, which remain uncertain. However, during his visit to Beijing on May 13, President Petro did outline Colombia’s primary interests regarding the BRI: boosting decarbonization through clean energies and connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans through railways and interoceanic fiber-optic networks. Given China’s interest in projecting itself as the most respectful global superpower and the most reliable trade partner amid growing geopolitical tensions with the United States, Beijing is very likely to welcome and support Petro’s priorities for Colombia—particularly as Washington has withdrawn critical foreign assistance funds and adopted a punitive approach to bilateral relations with Bogotá and other longstanding partners. It is precisely this coercive attitude that has damaged the United States’ image and opened fresh opportunities for Beijing to boost its reputation in turn. This is, in fact, what is happening in Colombia. In a recent survey by pollster Invamer, 62 percent of respondents held a positive view of China in April, compared to only 40 percent who viewed the United States favorably. The negative perception of each country stood at 26 percent for China and 54 percent for the United States. These results reflect a broader trend across South America, where the public increasingly sees China in a positive light, in contrast with the United States. The likelihood of the next president reversing Bogotá’s BRI membership will depend on the diplomatic and economic costs of entering the initiative regarding bilateral relations with the United States.”
Martha Maya Calle, deputy global director & regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the Institute for Integrated Transitions: “Colombia’s recent decision to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) comes at a time of heightened tension with its principal trading partner, the United States. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated over several contentious issues, including the deportation of migrants, the withdrawal of U.S. funding for civil society organizations involved in peacebuilding and a significant reduction in military aid. Colombia faces potential trade repercussions from the United States, including the threat of high tariffs and the looming risk of decertification—a judgment that questions Colombia’s commitment to combating drug trafficking. Such a move could have serious consequences for the support Colombia currently receives from Washington. The agreement signed on May 14 with China is a nonbinding memorandum of understanding. It does not entail immediate economic benefits or access to infrastructure projects, but rather marks the beginning of a longer process to align standards and establish new trade routes. Still, the decision is a pragmatic step forward: Colombia becomes the 22nd country in Latin America and the Caribbean to join the initiative. Notably, China is already the top trading partner for most countries in the region and maintains robust economic ties with nations such as Brazil (China’s largest trading partner in Latin America, despite not being part of the BRI), Chile and Peru. Participation in the BRI also opens the door for Colombia to engage with the BRICS New Development Bank, currently chaired by Dilma Rousseff, which could offer new avenues for financial assistance and credit. It is crucial, however, to recognize that Colombia’s alignment with China and potential engagement with BRICS should not be seen as an immediate substitute for the economic relationship it maintains with the United States—a relationship that accounts for a significant portion of Colombia’s trade. Instead, this move demands careful and nuanced diplomacy to preserve the fragile but impactful support the United States continues to provide, particularly in the areas of post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding.”
The Latin America Advisor features Q&A from leaders in politics, economics, and finance every business day. It is available to members of the Dialogue’s Corporate Program and others by subscription.
