Three soldiers were killed and eight others were injured in a drone attack on July 20 in the rebel-plagued Catatumbo region of northern Colombia; Colombia’s military said members of the ELN paramilitary group were behind the attack. Colombia’s rebel groups used explosive-laden drones in violent assaults on at least 115 occasions last year, according to Colombia’s Defense Ministry. How effectively are Colombia’s armed forces responding to rapid shifts in military technologies being used by rebel paramilitary organizations? What geographic regions and economic sectors in Colombia are most at risk from rebel drone attacks? How has escalating organized criminal violence in Colombia affected political dynamics ahead of the country’s general election next May?
Henry Ziemer, associate fellow for the Americas at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): “The lethality of the recent attack in Catatumbo, along with reports that the drones used by the ELN had thermal sensors, suggests a rapid evolution taking place in Colombia’s armed conflict. Compared to other countries like Mexico, the use of armed drones by criminal groups in Colombia is more recent, with reports only beginning to crop up around 2023. However, the pace of adaptation and tactical innovation by groups like the ELN has been striking. In addition to the use of thermal optics, Colombian armed groups have also experimented with the use of first-person view or ‘kamikaze’ drones rigged with explosives that detonate on contact. These drones, a familiar sight on the battlefields of Ukraine, offer a degree of precision and maneuverability previously inaccessible to non-state guerrillas. To date, Colombia’s armed groups have largely sought to use drones to augment their combat power. The majority of attacks, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, have targeted Colombian military and police forces, and have been concentrated in places like Catatumbo and Cauca, already criminal hot spots. To address this threat, the Colombian government has moved quickly, procuring additional DroneShield jammers, as well as seeking to manufacture its own domestically produced ‘Dragom’ armed drone. These are welcome measures, and they should certainly help increase awareness among police and military personnel about the risks and options for defeating drone attacks. However, they are no substitute for efforts to disrupt the supply chains through which criminals obtain their drones. These networks remain poorly understood and ill-regulated, as seen in the fact that many of the drones used in Colombia are commercial off-the-shelf models. Preventing drones from getting into the hands of criminals in the first place remains the surest method of reducing the risk from these tools. As Colombia heads toward presidential elections next year, it seems likely major campaign events and rallies will incorporate jammers and drone countermeasures. But the real test will be whether Colombia can secure remote polling stations in vulnerable communities.”
Laura Lizarazo, associate director of global risk analysis at Control Risks in Bogotá: “Since at least 2021, the Colombian state has actively invested in updating and enhancing its aerial surveillance, defense and attack capabilities in response to the adoption of new technologies and warfare tactics by non-state armed groups, notably guerrillas. The Colombian Aeronautical Industry Corporation (CIAC) has designed and manufactured three drone models. In April, the Ministry of Defense launched its first Operational Training against Unmanned Aircraft Attacks, and the Aerospace Force’s Remotely Piloted Aircraft School has updated its Tactical Drone Operator course to address emerging threats and attack trends. However, this remains a largely reactive posture and is not yet part of a comprehensive state strategy that integrates new legal frameworks and regulations, security policies, defense technologies, intelligence capabilities, updated military doctrines and specialized training. Budget constraints and high leadership turnover are likely to further limit the military’s ability to anticipate, prevent and respond to evolving warfare tactics employed by groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Central General Staff (EMC). These guerrilla groups, facing a militarily superior state, increasingly rely on indirect forms of confrontation. Consequently, the use and development of drone technology will very likely continue and expand in the coming years. Drone attacks by guerrilla groups targeting state forces are concentrated in conflict hotspots where there are active armed confrontations, including in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander, Huila, Nariño, Putumayo, Guaviare and Vaupés departments. Companies with large physical footprints (infrastructure, oil and gas, transport, logistics, construction and consumer goods) operating in or near these areas face elevated incidental risks and collateral damage.”
Maria Velez de Berliner, chief strategy officer at RTG-Red Team Group, Inc.: “The U.S. House Appropriations Committee proposed to reduce Colombia’s military aid by $208.8 million in 2025-2026, close to 50 percent of last year’s budgeted assistance. This means Colombia’s armed forces will continue to lag behind the rebel paramilitary organizations, which are strategically and tactically better armed than the military. Because the armed forces lack equipment and command and control over the territory, rebel forces continue to wreak havoc in practically every corner of the country, directly or through equally effective proxies. As of today, the areas most at risk for rebel drone attacks are: Catatumbo, Choco, Northwest Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Putumayo and Arauca, where the security situation continues to aggravate exponentially and the number of internally displaced grows daily. National insecurity will play a significant, if not decisive, role in next year’s presidential and legislative elections. The attempted assassination of the leading presidential hopeful, Miguel Uribe Turbay of the Democratic Center party, changed the equation of those elections. As the leading candidate, Uribe Turbay promised a change from the socialist leadership of today to a more politically pragmatic, violence-contained future. Unlike current leadership, every presidential or Senate hopeful will have to focus on imprisoning criminals, securing the peace, mitigating violence and bringing the rebel forces to account for the variety of crimes they commit on a daily basis against unarmed civilian populations. Based on current experience everywhere in Colombia, anyone who proposes the contrary will lose. Effective law and order are what Colombian voters (who are not associated with or paid for by the rebels) want.”
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