Brazilian opposition Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, former President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, has risen to draw even with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in recent opinion polls ahead of this October’s election. The development points to a competitive race, similar to the 2022 election, in which Lula defeated Jair Bolsonaro by less than two percentage points. What is driving Flávio Bolsonaro’s rapid rise in the polls? What factors between now and the election will decide the outcome? What do these dynamics suggest about Brazil’s broader political landscape, including the prospects for polarization, the role of third-way candidates and the potential for shifts among key voter blocs?
Thais Pavez, political scientist and director of Estratégia Política Consultoria: “Until recently, there was distrust toward the sons of Jair Bolsonaro among his more moderate voters—especially around issues like corruption—but Flávio Bolsonaro was progressively legitimized within the bolsonarista camp, evidencing the resilience of this political field despite the imprisonment of its main leader. This projects a more hard-fought electoral scenario, leaving little room for a third way. The polarization seen since the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 remains a structuring axis of Brazil’s political system. It involves the consolidation of political identities marked by mutual rejection. Within the bolsonarista camp, the anti-Workers’ Party stance is key. Flávio Bolsonaro’s candidacy represents at once continuity and an attempt at renewal. On the one hand, he embodies the maintenance of the bolsonarista camp and has already demonstrated a capacity to mobilize its most loyal core, reinforcing conservative agendas. On the other hand, there is an attempt to soften his image and broaden his reach among undecided or moderate voters. Flávio Bolsonaro also incorporates elements of renewal within bolsonarismo, in line with the rise of politicians that combine politics, entrepreneurship and savvy digital language. Among the decisive factors until the elections, the following stand out: 1.) Flávio Bolsonaro’s ability to reduce his public disapproval and project himself as a less radical leadership; 2.) the management of internal tensions within bolsonarismo, especially between its more ideological wing and sectors linked to the business community and the financial system; and 3.) the impact of issues related to corruption, which may both wear down candidacies and reinforce anti-system sentiments among certain segments of the electorate.”
Julio E. Ligorría, senior director of public relations and government affairs at Roar Media: “Flávio Bolsonaro’s rise is mostly a story about Lula’s decline. His father’s endorsement consolidated a loyal base of 20 to 25 percent almost overnight, but the gains beyond that reflect anti-incumbent anger more than personal appeal. Food inflation hit 8 percent in 2024, damaging Lula’s standing despite a sharp deceleration to 1.4 percent in 2025. Household debt now reaches 80 percent of Brazilian families with 29 percent of monthly income going to debt service. A Genial/Quaest survey in early March put Lula’s approval at 44 percent with 59 percent saying he does not deserve another term. And in a first for Lula, women disapprove of his administration more than they approve of it. The Banco Master scandal has compounded the damage, pulling in supreme court justices and central bank officials from both Bolsonaro and Lula eras and leaving voters convinced the political class has failed across the board. Between now and October, the outcome hinges on whether Flávio can assemble a credible economic team and whether São Paulo Governor Tarcísio de Freitas wins re-election easily, making him Flávio’s most powerful national surrogate in the final stretch. One risk Flávio’s camp is not talking about is his unresolved corruption case in Rio de Janeiro, where prosecutors charged him with running a salary kickback scheme as a state deputy. If it resurfaces during the campaign, Lula gains a corruption weapon against the Bolsonaro name that mirrors what the right has used against the Workers’ Party for years. With more than 80 percent of first-round votes going to the two front-runners, there is little oxygen for third-way candidates. The race will be decided by a narrow band of voters who dislike both options, choosing based on which side they fear less.”
Thomas Traumann, journalist and political risk consultant: “Brazil is experiencing a calcified polarization, a divide that cuts across politics and splits society not only in terms of state projects, but also in values and beliefs. It is a polarization similar to that seen in the United States. The eldest son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro quickly rose in the polls as soon as his father confirmed him as a candidate. Although he has no administrative experience and avoids presenting even a draft of an economic program, Flávio is tied with President Lula in polls simply for being the heir to bolsonarismo. So far, Flávio Bolsonaro’s only message is that he is not Lula. For now, that is enough. But it remains an open question how he will navigate the campaign once the public is reminded of his involvement in corruption cases in Rio de Janeiro. Now in his third term, Lula, 80, is showing signs of political wear and tear. His Workers’ Party has governed Brazil for 18 of the past 24 years. This third term has delivered solid economic indicators: average growth of 2.7 percent, unemployment at its lowest level in decades and wages rising above inflation. These macroeconomic figures, however, have not translated to government popularity—a majority of the population disapproves of the administration. A crisis of affordability, along with household debt and high interest rates, have created a sense of unease that the Lula administration has yet to address. Lula and Jair Bolsonaro inspire both love and hatred in equal measure, and the fact that a son of the former president is among the candidates eliminates any possibility of a third contender. As in 2022, this is likely to be a race defined by rejection. It is reasonable to assume that the result will be as close as in 2022, when Lula won by 2.1 million votes out of a total of 118.5 million.”
Mariano Machado, principal analyst for the Americas at Verisk Maplecroft: “Six months out, Flávio Bolsonaro is rising in the polls because the right settled on inheritance over reinvention. Jair Bolsonaro’s family managed to block a cleaner succession and kept the brand in-house throughout, with Flávio offering a less abrasive public style than his father. Once the polls showed a dead heat with Lula, Brasília took note: The Liberal Party rebuilt its strength as legislators switched sides and moved back above 100 deputies, while Congress began treating Lula as beatable rather than assured of victory. The election will hang on whether Lula can turn macroeconomic stability into a feeling of well-being among voters. Inflation has eased and unemployment is low, yet most Brazilians still say their income is not keeping pace with prices. That gap is lethal, and Lula knows it—hence the government’s push on diesel subsidies, debt renegotiation and consumer relief. But the window is narrow: High-profile corruption cases, electorally mandated cabinet departures and continuing friction between the presidency, Congress and the judiciary have further reduced the government’s room for clean execution. Brazil’s centrão can swing the election either way but cannot contest it. Third-way candidates matter more as bargaining assets than as plausible presidents. Goiás Governor Ronaldo Caiado’s presidential candidacy under the PSD might help his party to build a larger congressional bench, but it does not yet offer a real route to the presidency. The major battleground is Minas Gerais, Brazil’s second-largest voting state and, since 1998, the nation’s political bellwether. Lula’s push to get Senator Rodrigo Pacheco onto the Minas gubernatorial ticket—de facto in charge of his fourth presidential bid in the state—is telling in this respect.”
Pedro Fragoso Pires, foreign legal consultant at Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP: “The same factors that drove the Brazilian population to bring Lula back straight from prison in 2022 may bring Bolsonaro’s family back to power is 2026. Unsatisfaction with the current administration and high levels of corruption are driving Flávio Bolsonaro’s rapid rise in the polls. Many people did not vote for their candidate of preference in the latest election, but rather against the other candidate. Factors between now and the election that will decide the outcome are the ability of right-leaning political parties to join forces toward only one candidacy and not compete among themselves, the outcome of the Banco Master investigation and the expected cooperation agreement to be entered into by its controlling shareholder, Daniel Vorcaro, the outcome of an investigation on social security administration fraud and an anticorruption agenda. The dynamics suggest we will see the same polarization of the last presidential election. Third-way candidates want to take advantage of those voters who cannot stand the polarization anymore and this may affect Lula and/or Flávio Bolsonaro.”
Luiza Aikawa, research and analytics lead at the Brazilian Institute of Research and Data Analysis: “Given the current degree of political polarization in Brazil, Flávio Bolsonaro’s upward trajectory in presidential polls has materialized comparatively late. This is largely attributable to the fragmentation of the political right, where multiple pre-candidates had been drawing from Jair Bolsonaro’s ‘core electorate’ of approximately 30 percent of voters. Flávio’s capacity to reclaim his father’s voter base had been hampered by the absence of endorsement from prominent figures within his own political camp, most notably the former president’s wife, Michelle Bolsonaro, and the conservative federal congressman from Minas Gerais, Nikolas Ferreira. Recent public disputes within this group are symptomatic of a moment of heightened tension in which Flávio and his innermost circle have begun to demand loyalty from allies who had remained at a relative distance. As they converge around his candidacy, he is expected to progressively consolidate his father’s polling rates. This scenario begins to reflect what analysts have predicted for months: the margin of contest will be exceedingly narrow. Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro will compete for a small segment of the electorate that has yet to commit to either candidate. The decisive variable mirrors the dynamics of 2022: each candidate’s ability to mobilize allied support around a winning coalition. This will entail negotiations over electoral arrangements calibrated to state-level contests for governorships, Senate seats and seats in the Chamber of Deputies. For 2026, there will be no viable ‘third way,’ only a dispute over the support for other candidates.”
Peter Sufrin, independent Washington-based analyst: “Election tension, with all of its fraught complexity, is nothing new in Brazil. One should bear in mind that Lula defeated Bolsonaro by less than two percentage points in 2022 and that Rousseff defeated Neves by a narrow margin as well in 2014. Officially, Brazil remains a democracy, with an enshrined constitution and committed to free and fair elections, particularly since the country’s return to democracy in 1985. Perhaps of greater importance is the persistence of popular polarization, as evidenced by Flávio Bolsonaro’s recent rise. And as the Mensalão, Lava Jato and Banco Master scandals over the first quarter of the 21st century demonstrate, corruption and its implications for top Brazilian politicians remain at the forefront of the populace’s concerns—Flávio himself was implicated in the Rachadinha affair, and Lula was imprisoned on charges of corruption and money laundering in connection with the Car Wash case. Whatever transpires between now and October, the political race is framing Brazil as a vibrant democracy, complete with competitive candidacies, resilient politicians and ultimate accountability. Whether or not Brazil’s leadership can chart a course out of legacies of patronage and clientelism, or whether endemic inertia in the polity persists, remains at front and center. In the end, the contest between Lula and Flávio serves as a backdrop to the historical and ongoing dialectic between regression and democracy in Brazil. Come election time in October, the nation may very well witness a denouement.”
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