China’s foreign affairs ministry on Jan. 6 blasted the U.S. seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife as a “blatant use of force against a sovereign state” and called on the United States to release them. At the same time, U.S. President Donald Trump has reportedly told interim Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez to sever economic ties with countries including China, which has been a key diplomatic and economic partner of Venezuela in recent years. What does Maduro’s ouster mean for China? To what extent may it embolden China to attack Taiwan? What does it mean for Chinese investment in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America?
Zhao Minghao, professor at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai: “The Trump administration’s military operation in Venezuela essentially constitutes armed intervention aimed at seizing another nation’s oil resources. Such moves to consolidate U.S. hegemony across the Western Hemisphere could undermine Chinese interests in that region. While the United States hopes to reduce its burden for safeguarding the international order, what it wants in its own neighborhood is expansion. Trump’s ’Donroe Doctrine’ is assertive geopolitically, as it attempts to cripple the influence of the world’s other major powers, including China, on the neighbors of the United States. The Trump administration has hyped up the notion of a ‘China threat’ in Latin America and expressed concern over China’s supposed control of the Panama Canal and other assets. Under pressure from Trump, the Latin American countries may take measures to curb imports from China and scrutinize China-related projects. China-Latin America cooperation in finance and technology could be subjected to U.S. obstruction. The Trump administration is seeking to curb the expansion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America. It has forced Panama to quit the initiative and sees the China-backed Chancay Port project in Peru as a thorn in its side. The Trump administration is attempting to use the threat of military force to deal with competition from China and to use security issues as leverage to pressure Latin American countries.”
Margaret Myers, senior advisor at the Asia & Latin America Program of the Inter-American Dialogue and managing director of the Institute for America, China and the Future of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies: “U.S. actions in Venezuela are deeply concerning to many governments in the region, as leaders weigh how far Washington might be willing to go in pursuit of its interests in the hemisphere—and what a national security strategy ‘with teeth’ will look like in practice. In this context, China comes across as a more stable, status-quo power, as many observers have noted. Still, it is hard to say whether these comparatively positive perceptions will translate into tangible near-term gains for Beijing in Latin America. In Venezuela, Chinese officials remain engaged, but both Venezuela’s future and the fate of Chinese assets there remain highly uncertain. Prospects for repayment of Venezuela’s outstanding loans to China are also slim. In the rest of the region, the United States appears intent on restricting Chinese investment in projects that intersect with U.S. national security concerns, particularly those that could be leveraged by Beijing in the event of a future U.S.-China conflict. Chinese involvement in critical infrastructure and surveillance architecture has long raised concerns in Washington, and pressure to avoid such engagement is unlikely to ease. Still, trade with China is foundational for much of the region, serving as an economic lifeline for several countries. Regional governments have for years navigated a delicate balance between China and the United States. As that balance grows more precarious, interest in diversifying partnerships beyond the United States and China is intensifying.”
Connor Pfeiffer, senior director of government relations at FDD Action: “Nicolás Maduro was China’s most important partner in Latin America. His capture is a clear message to the hemisphere that when the chips are down, Beijing is unwilling and unable to offer more than diplomatic protest in the face of serious U.S. pushback. One of the key challenges the Trump administration will navigate during a transition is unwinding decades of economic entanglement between China and Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro. Venezuela’s oil wealth should benefit the Venezuelan people and finance the rebuilding of the country after decades of failed socialist rule, not serve as a steady stream of sanctions-discounted oil to fuel the Chinese economy and service debt on crumbling infrastructure projects. If accompanied by real steps toward a democratic transition, the Trump administration’s plan for managing Venezuelan oil revenue can provide a crucial boost in that direction. Beyond Venezuela, the Trump administration now has a massive opportunity to begin rolling back China’s advances across the region, where China is now the top trading partner for four of the five largest economies outside North America. The 2025 National Security Strategy is right to prioritize bolstering the United States as the hemisphere’s economic partner of choice, recognizing that Latin American partners are clamoring for a credible U.S. economic counteroffer to financing and investment from Beijing. To achieve that goal, the United States should develop and implement a clear strategy to leverage U.S. government tools, including the International Development Finance Corporation, and international financial institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank to mobilize private financing and investment in the region.”
Roselyn Hsueh, professor of political science at Temple University: “Trump’s capture of Nicolás Maduro has raised alarm globally. China immediately blasted the United States for violating the sovereignty of its Latin American ally. Venezuela has been the primary destination for China’s arms exports in Latin America. With Venezuela discussing resuming diplomatic ties with the United States, China’s influence is bound to diminish. China’s imports of Venezuelan oil had already been in decline. Unlikely to change, however, are China’s investments in infrastructure, green energy and information communications technology in Latin America, markets for the growth and development of Chinese-made electric vehicles and telecommunications equipment. Rather, the more serious implication of the United States’ brazen nabbing of a sitting president, however dubiously elected, is the precedent that it sets for unilateral cross-border policing. There is now a blueprint for China to capture another country’s leader (the democratically elected president of Taiwan, for example) under the pretense of domestic law violation. Claimed by China and recognized by 12 countries (seven in Latin America), Taiwan was recently completely encircled by the Chinese military, an escalation from military drills. The Trump administration needs to be aware that its actions in Venezuela upends the United States as a moderating force for peace and security during a time of major ongoing global conflicts. In addition to growing threats to the democratic U.S. ally in East Asia, on balance, Taiwan’s unparalleled role in the semiconductor industry holds greater strategic value for the United States’ economic growth and development in the age of AI than Venezuela’s beleaguered oil industry.”
Hari Seshasayee, co-founder of Consilium Group and visiting fellow at the Observer Research Foundation: “It is now clear that the U.S. operation in Venezuela was not intended to bring about regime change—instead, Washington now controls Venezuela via the Chavista regime. This has had three immediate geopolitical consequences: First, it has reduced Cuba’s influence in Venezuela by removing its main ally, Nicolás Maduro. Second, the United States now reigns supreme in terms of foreign influence in Venezuela. Third, it has set a new, lower standard for what is acceptable in cases of foreign interventions, something that will likely embolden large powers to strive for similar objectives in their own spheres of influence. The nature of Chinese economic engagement in Latin America has evolved from large loans and investments in extractive industries to almost a cessation of funding and investments in renewable energy and value-added sectors. This trajectory may now be recalibrated, but it is unlikely to decline drastically. In the short to medium term, China’s influence in Venezuela has been effectively paused indefinitely with the U.S. operation. Washington calls the shots, and any new Chinese engagement will likely require tacit approval from the Trump administration, be it for loans, infrastructure projects, joint ventures in oil production or Chinese imports of oil, gold or other commodities from Venezuela. At the same time, if foreign intervention in Venezuela is fair game, then China may be inclined to conduct similar operations in its own spheres of influence, perhaps in Taiwan, the South China Sea or any theater of conflict in Asia.”
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