Edmundo González, the presidential candidate of Venezuela’s opposition, fled the country on Sunday, days after a warrant was issued for his arrest. // File Photo: @EdmundoGU via X.

Venezuela’s opposition presidential candidate, Edmundo González, fled to Spain on Sunday. The European nation granted him asylum after a judge in Venezuela issued a warrant for his arrest days earlier. The warrant followed the government’s arrests of more than 2,400 people since Venezuela’s disputed July 28 election. What does González’s exile mean for the opposition? What options remain for the opposition as it continues to challenge the official results? What are the chances that the international community can help bring about a resolution?

Tamara Taraciuk Broner, director of the Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program at the Inter-American Dialogue: “The Maduro regime is buying time—to wear out the opposition, to scare people not to mobilize, to divert international attention and to limit dissidence by pushing people out of the country. González is now one of the 7.8 million Venezuelans who were forced to leave. He also represents a new wave of massive migration expected to occur if the crisis is not solved properly, this time of people fleeing persecution who could present legitimate asylum claims. The regime will try to use González’s departure to demoralize and divide the opposition, and it is up to the opposition to stay united and focus on an uncontested fact: the underlying reality has not changed. The regime failed to back up its alleged electoral victory and is scaling up repression. The opposition published evidence showing González won by a landslide. No democratic government in the region, including left-wing ones that in the past failed to distance themselves from Maduro, has supported the alleged official results. As Maduro loses international legitimacy, his chances of accessing markets and multilateral institutions decrease, which in turn increases his reliance on criminal networks to govern. If the international community does not act forcefully now, the possibility of a repressive narco-state expelling millions of people rises—and that outcome only benefits Maduro and his cronies. For any negotiation to exist, it is essential to step up international pressure, in coordination with the opposition leadership, to show those clinging on to power that their strategy has a very high cost. Possible measures include sanctioning top leadership and family members, stepping up threats of prosecution abroad for grave human rights violations, corruption, drug trafficking and money laundering and limiting access to markets. While for some implicated in crimes against humanity their best option will be to seek refuge in undemocratic countries, many other members of the government, security forces, judiciary and electoral authorities implicated should know they can obtain legal and sustainable benefits if they implement concrete actions to contribute to a transition to democracy. Given that power within the Maduro regime is not monolithic, this fragmentation and planting a seed of mistrust is key.”

Cynthia Arnson, distinguished fellow at the Wilson Center and adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies: “In light of the vicious post-election repression unleashed by the Maduro government, it is difficult to fault Edmundo González for leaving Venezuela: the trumped-up charges filed against him were undoubtedly designed to produce exactly that outcome. That said, his departure is a significant blow to the opposition, now deprived of the man who credibly beat Maduro by a two-to-one margin. After opting for an electoral strategy following years of abstention, the opposition will be hard-pressed to mobilize its supporters for the gubernatorial and legislative elections that take place next year. Opposition powerhouse María Corina Machado remains in hiding within Venezuela. However, she will be forced into an increasingly risky cat-and-mouse game with the regime, appearing often enough to lift the spirits of a frustrated, even embittered, electorate, while herself evading arrest. The international community, especially the United States, must play the long game. The legitimate desire to punish the regime for its massive electoral fraud must be balanced against the likely effects of further tightening economic sanctions—most importantly, the deepening of Venezuela’s dependency on Russia, China, Iran and other authoritarian regimes for its economic survival. Additional individual sanctions, which press reports indicate are in preparation, must target electoral, military and National Guard officials involved in fraud, human rights violations and corruption. More importantly, the United States and regional governments must do far more to crack down on illicit narcotics and gold trafficking from Venezuela that enrich the country’s corrupt leadership and destabilize Venezuela’s neighbors. Such moves could begin to create fissures within the military, without which a transition scenario is unlikely. In addition, the United States, regional democracies and international human rights bodies should continue to exert strong pressure on human rights issues, aimed especially at freeing political prisoners.”

Rebecca Hanson, assistant professor in the Department of Sociology, Criminology & Law and the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida: “González’s exile gives further credence to what many of us who study Venezuela have suspected since the election: the government feels it has little to lose by acting in an openly authoritarian fashion. Before the elections, we saw moves that suggested Maduro really wanted international recognition and legitimation. The blatant fraud that the government was forced to engage in when González swept the elections meant that recognition and legitimacy were off the table. The government now has fewer incentives to engage in performative shows of democracy and more incentives to engage in repression. While leaders in Colombia and Brazil probably have more sway than governments in North America or Europe, statements coming out of these countries haven’t accomplished much thus far. Maduro just has too much to lose to acquiesce to their demands. Since the elections, we have seen no real signal of fractures within Chavismo, and the government maintains control over all major institutions. Rather than prioritizing Maduro’s removal, the opposition could prioritize other strategies, such as coalition-building and advocating for the demands of those most affected by the economic and humanitarian crisis: the poor and working classes. The opposition has historically neglected these demands and needs to demonstrate that it cares about all Venezuelans. Removing Maduro for now is unlikely, but the opposition can build the groundwork to do so in a democratic way when conditions are more favorable. It could call for sanctions, but this will feed into Maduro’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and communicate to everyday Venezuelans that the opposition continues to be an elite group disconnected from them.”

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