On May 19, 2025, the Inter-American Dialogue’s Asia and Latin America Program and Fundación Andrés Bello jointly hosted the public event “Views on the China–CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum.” Participants considered developments at the fourth ministerial gathering of the China–CELAC Forum, which was held in Beijing on May 13. The gathering commemorated the tenth anniversary of the forum’s establishment and included the participation of the presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and Chile.
According to Parsifal D’Sola, founder and executive director of Fundación Andrés Bello, the forum and meetings along the sidelines were an effort to both underscore China’s support of Global South solidarity and multilateralism (including implicit critique of U.S. policy) and deliver a handful of bilateral engagements, particularly with Brazil and Chile. D’Sola emphasized that although the China–CELAC Forum is a largely symbolic endeavor, significant developments resulted from parallel bilateral engagements.
Claudia Trevisan, executive director of the Brazil-China Business Council, focused on Brazil’s prominent role in the event. According to Trevisan, President Lula de Silva’s substantial delegation was indicative of Brazil’s strategic investment in deepening ties with China. Trevisan also highlighted some alignment in messaging by Lula and Chinese President Xi Jinping, emphasizing multilateral cooperation and opposition to trade protectionism.
Trevisan drew attention to emerging areas of Brazil–China cooperation, including on digital economy, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, and discussion of new financial integration mechanisms such as Panda Bonds, or renminbi(CNY)-denominated debt instruments intended to deepen economic ties between Latin America and China.
Ning Leng, assistant professor at Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy, compared the forum’s 2015 inaugural ministerial meeting and the 2025 session. Leng identified significant changes in the forum over time, including a reduced focus on Chinese financial assistance to the region and the introduction of Panda Bonds. These developments were reflective of China’s current economic constraints and changing financial strategies, she said. Leng also observed a growing Chinese emphasis on soft power, including through announcements of short-term training programs, cultural exchanges, and media cooperation.
Eric Olander, co-founder of the China Global South Project, also expressed surprise at the modest scale of China’s announced financial commitments, especially amid heightened geopolitical competition between China and the United States in Latin America. Olander suggested that this restraint was reflective of Chinese and/or Latin American caution amid growing U.S. scrutiny of the relationship, or else related to China’s domestic economic challenges. Olander also considered Colombia’s recent decision to sign onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative, noting the potential political risks of this decision for Colombian President Gustavo Petro in the country’s 2026 presidential elections.
Panelists suggested that looking ahead, amid an increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape, Chinese influence in the region is likely to increase—the result of diplomatic efforts, certainly, but mostly the product of China’s economic deliverables or Latin American perceptions thereof.
