Considerably before presidents Dilma Rousseff and Barack Obama agreed to postpone the Brazilian leader’s travel to Washington, it had become clear that not much was going to get done on this highly anticipated visit, no matter how elaborately it was dressed in the trappings of a “state affair.” To be sure the Brazilian government welcomed the invitation, which had been extended to only six other countries during Obama’s tenure in the White House. For Brasilia, it was a strong and very visible expression of the global stature of their nation. In Washington, it was viewed as a serious effort to publicly acknowledge the importance of Brazil and make US’s awkward and troubled bilateral relationship with the South American giant more productive.
The discussion between the two leaders would certainly have addressed issues of significance and concern to both governments. But, like other summits between the presidents of Brazil and the US in the past two decades, there were no proposals or initiatives being prepared that would help to resolve the multiple disagreements between the two countries or increase their cooperation on critical regional and international matters. In the words of a highly regarded former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, the agenda for the visit was just “not presidential”
The story of the visit and its cancellation, as well as the continuing dispute over US spying on the Brazil, reveal a great deal about the substance and style of US-Brazil relations. Outwardly friendly, Brazilian and US leaders regularly assert that their bilateral relationship is as good or better than it has ever been, and claim that it is continuing to improve. It is not unusual for each of the two governments to refer to the other as a global or regional partner—and to suggest that the two nations are working toward a more robust, even strategic relationship.
Yet, despite the continuing rhetoric, neither government has been willing to invest much in advancing or upgrading the relationship. Formal agreements between Brazil and the United States have been insubstantial or largely peripheral to the two nations’ priority concerns. Those that have dealt with issues of priority concern have not been effectively implemented. Neither Washington nor Brasilia appears ready to do much to reshape a relationship that has been mostly amiable, though with limited cooperation, considerable discord, and a few unpleasant clashes. Not much has changed in the past 20 years.
Even when the two nations together have identified shared objectives that would advance the interests of both, they have rarely found ways to pursue them. US and Brazilian leaders speak frequently about their rich array of common economic interests. Yet, they have not signed a single major economic pact in more than two decades—a period when Washington has reached free trade accords with some 20 countries worldwide, 11 in Latin America alone, and is now negotiating with the 28 nations of the European Union and nearly a dozen prospective Asian partners. Brazil is now expressing more interest than ever before to reaching a free trade agreement with the EU, even if it means separating itself from its Mercosul partners. But free trade talks with US, which could be much more important for Brazil, are no longer even discussed.
As the world’s two largest agricultural exporters, Brazil and the US are both well aware of how much they would gain by diminishing the complex web of barriers to global trade in farm products. However, they have never been able to collaborate effectively to achieve that goal. In 2007, the two countries, which produce nearly 90 percent of the world’s ethanol, agreed to work together to establish world markets for the fuel and develop improved technologies for its production. But progress has been meager so far.
Cooperation has been equally elusive and disappointing in many other areas of interest to both governments including, for example, nuclear nonproliferation, transnational drug and crime challenges, and climate change. There is some encouraging news, however. Promising, though still modest accomplishments have been made toward establishing of sustained bilateral exchanges on science and technology, and the two countries are increasingly collaborating on overseas aid programs in Africa. They have been continuing and effective partners in Haiti since 2004 when Brazil took charge of the UN security mission to the beleaguered country. But these are subsidiary issues for both nations.
The opportunities for more productive cooperation are countless. The US is the world’s largest, richest, and most technologically advanced economy; it imports more goods and services and invests more overseas than any other nation. Although only about 15 percent the size of the US economy, Brazil boasts the sixth or seventh largest market worldwide and is projected to rise to fourth or fifth within a generation. Even though China has replaced the US as Brazil’s leading economic partner, US trade with Brazil has thrived in the past decade, more than doubling since 2002. The US is the largest buyer of Brazil’s manufactured exports and primary source of foreign capital and new technologies. The US market is critical to Brazil’s industrialization, which has been faltering in recent years. Brazil, year by year, has been absorbing increasing amounts of US investments and exports. Its offshore oil discoveries could turn Brazil into a major US energy supplier, potentially overtaking both Venezuela and Mexico. Brazil already serves as headquarters for the bulk of US firms doing business in South America and Brazilian corporations are investing more and more in the US.
Many formidable obstacles stand in the way of a more robust economic relationship between Brazil and the US. First, the two countries remain deeply at odds on crucial trade issues. Over the years, their disagreements have blocked progress toward bilateral trade, tax, and investment treaties. Disputes between the US and Brazil were also directly to blame for the failure of hemispheric trade negotiations, and have kept the two nations from joining forces in global trade talks.
US agriculture tariffs and subsidies, which limit Brazilian exports to the US and give US an edge in global markets, have been a source of tension for decades. So have restrictions on technologies imported from the US. The US, in turn, has long and unsuccessfully pressed Brazil to lower its import barriers to services and manufactured goods (which include tariffs, quotas, state subsidized loans, and local content requirements). Brazil has also regularly rebuffed Washington’s persistent calls to strengthen its safeguards on intellectual property.
No matter how complex and immovable they seem to be, the specific issues and policies may not be the main stumbling block to enhanced US-Brazilian economic relations. A bigger problem may be that neither the US nor Brazil are yet convinced of the value of a stronger partnership, or they simply believe it is not possible to attain one. In the early 1990’s, the US and Mexico were further apart on key commercial issues than the US and Brazil are today. But Washington and Mexico were fully committed to reaching agreement, and negotiated until they achieved the NAFTA accord. Neither Brazil nor the US has yet shown anything like that kind of commitment.
Washington views Brazil as unwilling to give up much, while demanding too many concessions, many of which are politically charged and seen as undercutting US negotiating positions with the EU and other trade partners. For its part, Brazil, like many other large developing countries, remains cautious about opening its economy to the US (or other major economic powers like Europe, China, and Japan). Despite Brazil’s recent successes and enormous potential, many policy officials and business leaders lack confidence in their country’s ability to compete head-to-head with world’s leading economies. They remain distrustful of the US and other economic giants, and fear their superior market power and technology (including surveillance and espionage capacity) leaves Brazil at a considerable disadvantage. The Snowden disclosures in recent months have only increased the mistrust and concern.
US-Brazilian disagreements and differences in perspective, of course, extend beyond economic and trade issues. The US views Brazil largely as a regional power, and most values its cooperation on Western Hemisphere issues. Differences with Brazil over policies toward Iran, other Middle Eastern countries, and nonproliferation have left the US with little confidence in Brazil as a reliable global actor. Washington today does not trust Brazil’s judgment on international affairs or its broader approach to foreign policy. Even at the regional level, the US is frustrated by Brazil’s reluctance to forcefully engage critical issues outside its own borders. Brazil, for example, has been largely unwilling to assist Colombia in its battle against guerrillas, vigilantes, and drug traffickers, and has consistently ignored violations of democratic practice and human rights abuses in Venezuela, Cuba and elsewhere. Where Brazil has taken action it has often clashed with the US—in Honduras and Paraguay, for instance.
Although the two governments have worked together from time to time, Brazil has demonstrated little interest in building sustained cooperation with the US in Latin America, especially in South America, where it considers itself the natural leader and wants to operate independently. For Brazil, regional collaboration mostly means working with other South American nations. In its view, cooperation with the US should focus mostly on bilateral or global issues. US political or security involvement in the region is usually unwelcome in Brazil, although collaboration still occurs on occasion. Last year, for instance, Brazil sought US support in curbing the flow of cocaine from Bolivia.
It will not be a simple task for either country to overcome the mistrust that has built up in recent years—or change its habitual ways of dealing with the other. Brazil has achieved its current stature and influence not through cooperation, but largely by acting on its own and by regularly saying no to Washington—while the United States has become wary of an increasingly powerful and energized Brazil. Even when the two countries’ interests and goals have been compatible, they have seldom sought to align their approaches or strategies.
Their different attitudes to the Snowden revelations powerfully illustrate the distance that Brazil and the US will have to travel to find common ground. The White House and State Department consider Brazil’s reaction to be overwrought and exaggerated. Their view is that Brazil needs to settle down, understand that US security requires expansive worldwide surveillance, and recognize that US intends no harm to Brazil. In a nutshell, Washington believes that, if Brazil wants a global role, it has to accept the responsibility and the bruises that come along with it.
On matters like this, Brazil views the US as something of a bully that doesn’t play fairly. For Brazil’s taste Washington’s massive surveillance is another instance of its willingness to use its economic and technological powers to gain improper advantage over Brazil and other nations (and, at time, even intimidate and humiliate them).
Their differences in perspective and disagreement on so many specific issues make collaboration between Brazil and US difficult—and from time to time, have seriously strained the relationship. But for most of the past two decades, the two counties have been remarkably successful in accommodating their differences and skillfully managing their disagreements, keeping their clashes within bounds, and consistently maintaining friendly relations. That ability may not persist indefinitely, however. Two serious clashes—over Iran in 2010 and now over US surveillance operations—have taken place in less than three years.
President Rousseff’s state visit to Washington may not have moved Brazil and the US any closer toward cooperation or partnership, but its symbolic value alone would helped to replenish their reserve of goodwill—and that would have been reason enough for visit. The opportunity, however, has been lost, and the reserve has ended up considerably smaller. And things could get worse.
The best course for both countries now is to avoid recriminations and do whatever they can to bring down the temperature. The US and Brazil need to take full advantage their remaining goodwill, first, to amicably resolve their dispute over surveillance, and then to find another date for the Rousseff visit to Washington.
