I agreed with Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim when he stated last year that Cuba was a crucial test of President Obama’s commitment to a new approach in Latin America. But, it is not only a test for Washington. The U.S. needs the help of Brazil and other countries of the region in order to frame a new policy toward Cuba.
Cuba, in itself, is hardly a pressing concern for either Latin America or the U.S. But on no other issue is Washington more out of step with the rest of the region. While the U.S. continues its half-a-century old strategy of isolating and punishing Cuba, every other Western Hemisphere nation has established normal relations with the island. All of them vehemently oppose the U.S. trade embargo. Aside from its defiance of the White House, few countries find much to admire or respect about the Cuban regime; they almost all consider Cuba an economic and political throwback. But they reject the hypocrisy of Washington—where few officials believe their own rhetoric about U.S. policy promoting democracy in Cuba, and where trade and diplomacy is the favored approach to other repressive governments.
Interestingly, the remaking of U.S. relations with Cuba should be less politically challenging to the Obama Administration than confronting other longstanding stumbling blocks to improved U.S.-Latin American ties—including long overdue immigration reform, Washington’s erratic trade policies and practices, and its still inflexible anti-drug strategies. Sure, a skillful and deep-pocketed anti-Castro lobby remains fiercely opposed to any softening of U.S. -Cuba policies. The lobby’s strength in Florida, a critical swing state in U.S. presidential elections, has to be intimidating to any politician. Yet, increasing numbers of Americans favor normalization of relations with Cuba; demand is growing to allow greater trade with and travel to Cuba. Although most Cuban-Americans oppose lifting the embargo, opinion polls suggest a majority of them now favor dialogue and opening.
The Administration has already taken some steps to reduce Bush era restrictions—easing barriers to family travel and remittances to Cuba, allowing U.S. investment in telecommunications, facilitating food sales, restarting migration talks, and cooperating in limited ways to assist Haiti’s earthquake victims. Moreover, the U.S. recently joined every Latin American country in ending Cuba’s suspension from the Organization of American States. At a recent UN meeting, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Secretary Hillary Clinton’s chief of staff, Cheryl Mills—the highest level exchange between the two countries in more than 20 years.
What is most holding back more significant changes is not the politics of Miami, but rather the intransigence of the Cuban government, which refuses even the most modest concessions, the slightest gesture of good will. Demanding full reciprocity from Havana would be a mistake, because it would give the Cuba government control over the pace and content of U.S. policy initiatives. But no American president can move very fast or very far toward a normal relationship with a Cuban regime that is overtly hostile to the U.S., and callously abuses the rights of its own citizens. Already under intense fire from conservative lawmakers and commentators for accommodating U.S. adversaries and sacrificing U.S. principles abroad, the Obama Administration cannot simply open its arms to Cuba, when its leaders—in President Obama’s words—keep their fists clenched.
Bilateral negotiations between Cuba and the U.S. will probably not be enough to break the impasse. Brazil and other Latin American countries need to be more engaged. At a minimum, they should be working to encourage Cuba authorities to moderate their persistent, often brutal, violations of international human rights norms and to tone down their virulent anti-U.S. rhetoric. So far, however, Latin American leaders, even those most strongly committed to democracy and human rights at home, have been reluctant to become involved.
This is partly explained by domestic and international political considerations. But it is also true that many of region’s leaders were aided by Cuba when they were persecuted by military dictatorships in the past (many of whom had good relations with the U.S.). This is why South Africa’s Nelson Mandela traveled to Cuba and met with Fidel Castro. Still, Latin America’s democratic leaders have an obligation not to turn a blind eye when dictatorial Cuba treats its citizens with the same brutality and injustice as their nations’ military regimes once treated them. Given his experiences, it is hard to understand how President Lula could be indifferent to Cuba’s hunger strikers and compare them to common criminals—or how he could express confidence in Cuba’s justice system (a perfect oxymoron, incidentally).
If Minister Amorim wants the U.S. to revamp its policy toward Cuba, he should be advising his own and other Latin American governments also to change their approach to Cuba. They have every reason to seek Cuba’s full incorporation into hemispheric affairs, but that does not mean they should not overlook or disregard its repressive policies.
