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Many commentators in Washington have pointed to the successful toppling of Muammar Qaddafi’s tyrannical regime as a model for future US interventions in the Arab world and elsewhere.
Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, in Libya the US played a supporting, not dominant, role within NATO, bore relatively modest economic costs, suffered no human casualties, and adhered to a UN Security Council resolution in backing a national rebel force.
These are positive features – few would argue with them. It is understandable why analysts seem so enthusiastic to have found what appears to be a low-cost formula for the US to support democracy movements in other countries.
The formula reflects two realities. First, the expanding influence of other countries means that the US today acts under greater constraints. It no longer has the international clout needed to serve as a global policeman. And second, related to the first, the US has severe economic limitations and needs to share the burden of interventions with other nations.
But while the Obama administration’s approach to the Libya challenge seems to have been vindicated, caution is warranted. Celebratory declarations and categorical, definitive judgments are premature.
There was no guarantee that the military operation would result in Qaddafi’s ouster. Other, more costly, scenarios were possible – and still are. Indeed, there are enormous questions and uncertainties about what comes next in Libya.
The transitional government’s democratic credentials and governing capacities are not clear. Some signs of human rights abuses against Qaddafi loyalists are troubling. As the US painfully learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, the hardest part of any intervention is assisting the construction of a new order in a society with few functioning institutions and profound tribal divisions.
The Libya story is just starting. What happens if there is a humanitarian crisis, or if the situation turns chaotic? Will the conditions that made possible the no-fly zone UN resolution be in place for the next, more challenging phase of international support?
Where else might this so-called “model” be applied? The Libyan case is sui generis. It is small country with a lot of oil. In the case of Syria – which has a stronger military apparatus and has the support of Iran and ties to Russia — mounting such an intervention would neither be possible nor desirable. It is unlikely that the governments of France, England and Italy would respond so forcefully to assist democratic movements in countries where they have less of an interest. Without such partners, the Obama administration would have to act on its own.
Though tempting to embrace a “model” that can be applied widely, each particular situation needs to be assessed on its own terms. The US contribution to Plan Colombia, for example, can be judged a success in helping to improve security conditions over the last decade. And there are of course important lessons that can be useful in dealing with situations like Mexico or even Afghanistan. But policy makers should be cautious in applying the “Colombia model” to countries that lack Colombia’s distinctive features, its institutional and political history.
President Obama deserves credit for pursuing a course in Libya that has – for now – yielded promising results. He did so at some political cost. He was criticized by Democrats and Republicans alike. Some urged him to stay out of Libya. Others pressed him to act earlier and more aggressively. But the outlook in Libya – and the Middle East broadly – is cloudy, and going from the end of Qaddafi’s despotic rule to a new template for future interventions is a huge leap.
