Stagnation is the term that most frequently comes to mind in thinking about the current situation in Bolivia. The 2005 election of Evo Morales was symbolically important and raised high hopes in a country with a majority indigenous population that had long suffered considerable poverty and political instability.

But while Morales may have changed Bolivia in some positive ways, over the past year and a half he has encountered severe political difficulties that stand in the way of progress. The December 2010 gasolinazo was a turning point that caused a strong reaction among Morales’s previous supporters. Since then there have been continuing social unrest and governance problems, including the TIPNIS protests and the police mutiny for higher wages and better labor conditions. Political discontent seems widespread, as Morales’s approval level has declined sharply.

Fueling the public dissatisfaction is the government’s inability to effectively address Bolivians care about most –including security. Crime appears to be in on the rise, reflected in the presence and growth of gangs (though not nearly as serious as the “maras” in Central America). Drug trafficking is another fundamental, related problem that is far from being contained.

Based on most accounts of Bolivia today there seems to be little regard for the rule of law. The judiciary has become increasingly politicized and lacks independence. Checks on executive authority are weak. Charges of human rights abuses and censorship are common. Morales has a clear project of control — and he is taking advantage of available instruments to persecute political adversaries. There is a perception that corruption is rampant. Such concerns have affected the environment for foreign investment, particularly in natural-resource industries.

Morales does, however, have several key assets. First, the country’s public finances are in good shape and are often commended by international organizations. There is a sense that Bolivia will perform better than much of the rest of the region in the context of the global crisis. This gives the Morales some margin of maneuver in responding to demands and defusing discontent.

Second, Morales is still closely connected with the country’s social movements, which is the main arena of politics in Bolivia (he remains head of the coca growers union). Political parties are weak and fragmented. Most of the energy of the political opposition in Bolivia today seems to be coming from those who had been aligned with Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) but have now split. With the possible exception of former La Paz mayor Juan del Granado, there does not appear to be any political figure with a good chance to mount a serious challenge to Morales in the December 2014 elections.

Regionally, Bolivia is relatively off the radar. Although Morales in still regarded as an ally of Hugo Chavez – Bolivia continues to be an active member of ALBA – one hears fewer references today compared to several years ago about the influence of Chavez on the Bolivian situation. The OAS General Assembly meeting in Cochabama hosted by Morales did not appear to produce constructive results. There was a lot of noise and strong rhetoric aimed at the United States, but little was actually accomplished.

The Obama administration continues to try to find a way to resume ambassadorial presence in La Paz and Washington, but reaching an acceptable framework agreement has taken a long time and has not been easy. The level of concern about the drug question – which dominated US-Bolivian relations for many years – has gone down, as Washington is preoccupied with other challenges in the region. The US has lately worked with Brazil in fashioning a common strategy to deal with the drug challenge in Bolivia, which is of particular concern to Brazil.

Relations between Bolivia and Brazil are complicated and have become tense. The controversy surrounding the demands for the “safe conduct” document for Bolivian Senator Roger Pinto, who was granted asylum by Brazil, has been a particular source of strain. The problems associated with the Brazilian construction firm OAS building a highway in Central Bolivia with BNDES financing have also highlighted a difficult bilateral relationship. Bolivia’s use of the term “sub-imperialist” with respect to Brazil illustrates the growing level of irritation.

In the international community many previous enthusiasts of Evo Morales have become disenchanted with his administration. The revolutionary promise that generated excitement back in 2005 is gone. In the absence of any strong opposition figure and with a continued capacity for social spending and deep connections with social movements, Morales’s hold on political power does not appear to be threatened. But the society he said he would transform for the better – and the policy agenda he was committed to pursue — seems stuck.