Margaret Myers, senior advisor to the Asia & Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 5, 2025.
TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS MADE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
Hemispheric developments and U.S. national interests are deeply intertwined. Shared borders, interpersonal ties, economic interests, and security alliances have bound the nations and people of our hemisphere for much of our recent history.
We derive tremendous economic and other benefit from these ties. At the same time, developments in the hemisphere present some challenges to U.S. interests. Political shifts, violence, natural disasters, and other difficulties have exacerbated irregular migration—an issue that has tested the United States across administrations and overshadowed much of our substantive engagement with the region.
Other critical issues for the United States include transnational crime, including the trafficking of illegal goods and substances, such as fentanyl, which has had a dramatic, wasting effect on the U.S. population.
As someone who has followed China’s engagement with the region for upwards of two decades, I am also concerned about the progress that China—and Russia, for that matter—has made toward dismantling U.S. ties in the region, whether through targeted messaging campaigns, political alliances, or because of its now-extensive economic footprint in the hemisphere.
Fortunately, there is much that the United States can do to maintain and grow its partnerships in the region, to address shared security and other challenges, and to compete effectively with China.
But doing so begins with a commitment to constructive engagement, carefully employing the widest possible range of economic and diplomatic tools and platforms, including new, innovative mechanisms to bolster American competitiveness.
Engagement, including through the many U.S. and multilateral organizations that provide economic and other forms of assistance to the region, should be an indispensable part of any effort to advance American interests in the Western Hemisphere. In this sense, today’s Supreme Court decision is heartening.
In fact, only by forging constructive partnerships within the region can we hope to address the full range of challenges and opportunities inherent in the U.S.–Latin America dynamic.
Forceful measures will generate immediate effects, but only for so long. Reliance on “sticks” alone is not sustainable, and will not yield desirable long-term outcomes, whether for the United States or our partners.
The United States is not the only viable economic or political partner for Latin American nations. Unless we recognize the strategic value of our hemispheric relations and demonstrate that we have something substantial to offer, including in the form of investment and development assistance, Latin American nations will increasingly turn toward China or other extra-hemispheric actors.
With this in mind, we must pursue our many national and economic security objectives in ways that support and reinforce our soft power and economic stability, not undermine them.
Our foreign assistance, security cooperation, and diversified economic engagement have historically distinguished us from China. If we hope to make the case that we are a more reliable, trustworthy, and steadfast partner, then we must demonstrate that to the region.
Equally, failing to invest meaningfully in our relationships with Latin America will exacerbate the challenges we face.
If we are serious about competing with China, this is a definitive moment. China continues to engage across the region, bringing wide-ranging diplomatic and economic tools to bear in support of its interests. Recently, it has aggressively entered the venture capital ecosystem in Latin America, focused on technology startups, including fintech and AI-enabled companies. If this sounds familiar, it’s because we have seen this same playbook in strategic infrastructure, critical minerals, and ICT (5G).
The good news is that there is considerable opportunity for the United States to be a significant player across many different sectors in Latin America, while also furthering regional integration, and challenging China in the process.
For instance, through the Development Finance Corporation, the U.S. government has the capabilities to leverage trusted and knowledgeable institutional partners like the Inter-American Development Bank to present solutions to U.S. national security challenges, with a relatively small investment.
That said, preserving our strengths—our partnerships, programming, and, relatedly, trust in our country, is also fundamental.
It is very likely that we will look back on this moment as a definitive one in our hemispheric relations—and a possible inflection point in China’s global affairs. This is not the time to sacrifice our hard-won gains and partnerships. It is a moment to think critically and carefully about what constitutes power, what we stand for, and how we can creatively and constructively achieve that.
