There are good reasons to be optimistic about the state of democracy in Latin America today. Recent public opinion surveys, reflected in Latinobarometro and Americas Barometer, point to higher levels of support for the democratic system of government. Policy and electoral choices have narrowed. More consensual, centrist politics has increasingly taken hold.
The move towards greater moderation and pragmatism can be seen in election results in Colombia, Chile and Brazil. Ideological differences were barely visible in the three contests. Instead, the outcomes can be explained by differing leadership styles and perceptions of the candidates. No viable candidate in any of these elections challenged the broad agreement on continued sound macroeconomic management, concern for the social agenda, and commitment to democratic politics. In Colombia, there was little distance among the candidates on security policy. Positions more or less converged.
The trend seems likely to continue in 2011. The Peruvian elections in April could well reveal greater certainty and stability in the country’s politics, especially compared to previous years. The anti-system candidate from the 2006 election – Ollanta Humala – has faded, and centrist figures, like former president Alejandro Toledo, have gained ground. Economic growth and pragmatism are beginning to move hand in hand in Peru.
In fact, the main explanation for Latin America’s gravitation to the center of the political spectrum has to do with the region’s expanding and deepening global connections. Broader engagement in global affairs – on such issues as energy, security, finance, technology, and trade – discourage any radical departures in key economic policies. The exceptions to this tendency – Venezuela stands out – tend to be left behind and are not able to address serious economic, social and security problems.
Widening global links have resulted in the growth of middle classes in such countries as Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Levels of inequality – long Latin America’s Achilles’s Heel – remain unacceptably high, but in a number of countries they have dropped, in part the result of more effective and targeted social programs. The political implications for such transformations are generally positive. Social inclusion and democratic strengthening are mutually reinforcing.
It is heartening that the obstacles for political participation for traditionally marginal groups have loosened in recent years. However one looks at democratic progress in Bolivia, it is hard not to be impressed by president Evo Morales’s own background and biography. Impressive, too, has been the majority indigenous population’s more vigorous participation in the country’s political and economic life. It is also striking that today of three Latin American countries – in Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica – are led by women, and three women are serious contenders for the presidency in upcoming elections in Haiti, Guatemala and Peru.
To be sure, there has also been some deterioration in democratic practice and institutions. With the exception of Cuba, elections are taking place throughout the region, but in a few countries there has been a troubling tendency towards the concentration of presidential power, erosion of checks and balances, and disdain for the rule of law. It is hard to speak about democracy in any meaningful sense when officials who are freely elected are then arbitrarily stripped of their authority, as has been the case in Venezuela.
The region has also seen some setbacks on a few critical issues, such as freedom of the press and expression. This is not a matter of left and right – but a general pattern towards increased intolerance, regardless of ideological orientation. Public officials, including some presidents, have engaged in fierce confrontations with independent media. Slander and defamation laws have been invoked, and some new, regressive laws have been adopted. The annual report of the special rapporteur of freedom of expression at the OAS is not encouraging.
Although Latin America has been making some progress in a number of areas – not only is the region growing economically, but poverty levels are dropping – there are few signs that organized and common crime are declining. On the contrary, especially in some countries, such as Venezuela, but also Central America’s “northern triangle” made up of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, violence is on the rise. According to the Economist, last year Honduras had the world’s highest homicide rate. The scale and brutality of what is happening in Mexico is particularly disturbing and dominates the media headlines.
Without question, the spreading criminality – much of it fueled by the unrelenting drug trade – constitutes the most significant risk and threat to democracy in Latin America. In Central America, the violence could trigger some of the authoritarian reflexes that prevailed during the period of the civil conflicts in the 1980s. Mexico’s bloody cartel battles put the country’s rule of law in serious jeopardy. The dark side of globalization in Latin America often counters its many benefits.
Colombia is one of the few Latin American countries where the security environment has improved. To be sure, important security challenges remain. The drug problem is far from resolved, and the armed conflict continues. Gains in curbing urban crime can be – indeed, have been – reversed and depend more than anything else on the efficacy of local governance.
But Colombia’s recent experience shows that it is possible to strengthen the capacity of state institutions to reverse deterioration and deal more effectively with security problems. In fact, Colombia illustrates the complexities and contradictions of democratic development. Problems of violence, human rights and corruption have coexisted with a Constitutional Court that has been seen as the model for the rest of the region. As an example of Colombia’s democratic habits and beliefs, there seemed to be little doubt that the Court’s decision nearly a year ago about the constitutionality of President Alvaro Uribe’s third term in office would be fully respected. Unfortunately, however, the Colombia example in this regard is more the exception than the norm in Latin America.
Of course, the move towards greater centrism is inextricably linked to the overall economic environment, which in recent years has been favorable for most of the region. Latin America’s capacity to weather the economic crisis – which originated in the US and whose effects are still being felt there – was impressive and reflected advances in policy-making and economic management (which Washington would be wise to learn from).
It is far from clear, however, how much longer such a benign global economic context will continue. Any significant worsening in China’s economic situation, for example, would have huge consequences for Latin America’s economies, which in turn would affect the political landscape. High food and fuel costs are putting enormous pressure on the very poor in a number of countries, and could increase discontent and social and political unrest in some Latin American countries.
The good news is that pragmatism and centrist politics characterize many important Latin American countries. But at the same time there is not much political will among governments to deal with the serious erosion in democratic safeguards in the more problematic situations. Compared with a decade ago, when hemispheric governments adopted the impressive Inter-American Democratic Charter, today there is little appetite to take effective, collective action. That is unfortunate, and poses a test for the OAS, UNASUR, and other multilateral bodies that claim to defend democratic principles.
Full article via El Timpo.
