Overshadowed by the unfolding crisis in Libya, Obama’s five-day visit was heavy on symbolism and public relations, and relatively light on substantive progress. That Obama resisted political pressure at home to postpone the trip and largely stuck to his original itinerary was the strongest and most positive indication that the administration wanted to re-engage with the region and pursue a shared agenda.

In his March 19-23 visit to Latin America (his first to Central and South America), President Barack Obama essentially picked up where he left off nearly two years ago, in his debut visit south for the Summit of the Americas meeting in Trinidad and Tobago. Since then, the Obama administration has been inundated and distracted by other urgent priorities, on both domestic and foreign policy fronts. The Libya situation only underlined how difficult it will be for Washington to sustain a focus on the region and follow through with its oft-repeated promise of “partnership” on a wide-ranging agenda.

Brazil, a new beginning? Obama’s trip to South and Central America took place against the backdrop of strained relations between Washington and Brasilia during the last several years — the result of policy differences on such regional issues as the Honduras crisis, the US-Colombia defence cooperation agreement, Cuba policy and, most seriously, Iran’s nuclear programme. Both Obama and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff were eager to put the bilateral relationship on a more productive footing. The personal chemistry between the two leaders was reportedly good, and Obama, the first US African-American president, connected with the Brazilian people, many of African descent. His speech in Rio de Janeiro and visit to the City of God shantytown aimed to introduce Obama to Brazilians and generate mutual goodwill. However, though the visit largely succeeded on that score, it was less productive in making progress on a shared policy agenda:

* In part for domestic consumption, Washington had billed and justified the trip — and the Brazil stop in particular — in economic terms, designed to increase trade and investment, which would result in more jobs to bolster the US economy. Yet, announcements made on this agenda constituted at best modest steps forward.

* There was no sign of any change on the trade issues that sharply divide both countries. In her opening statement Rousseff called attention to US protectionist practices and the lack of access for Brazilian products such as ethanol, cotton and orange juice.

* In light of the still pending US trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, Latin Americans were likely skeptical of Obama’s promises. (That Colombia, a longtime US ally in South America, was not included in Obama’s itinerary can be attributed to the uncertain fate of the free trade deal.)

On geopolitical matters there were no notable policy changes:

* Obama expressed “appreciation” for Brasilia’s aspiration for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. While this was further than any US president had previously gone on this question, it fell short of the pledge of support that Obama made in his India visit in 2009.

* There were also no announcements about controversial issues on the bilateral agenda, such as Iran’s nuclear programme, and non-proliferation questions generally.

* In a sharp reminder that — despite improved atmospherics — underlying policy differences persist, Brazil, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, had abstained on the Libya no-fly zone vote. Although there is sharp and widespread criticism of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, the use of US military force in the Middle East makes many Latin Americans uneasy.
In a private conversation Obama reportedly raised the possible sale of Boeing F-18 planes to Brazil, though Rousseff has not yet decided on the acquisition. Questions of technology transfer and possible joint production of the planes are part of the discussions.

Chilean example. As in Brazil, in Chile Obama highlighted a central theme of his visit: that Latin America has made enormous progress in recent years. A number of countries — best exemplified by Chile — combine sound macroeconomic performance with concern for the social agenda and a commitment to pragmatic, democratic politics. Obama recognized Brazil’s impressive ascent as an influential global player, as well as Chile’s successful transition from military rule over the past two decades, which could offer some lessons to Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries that are seeking to move to a new, democratic order.

Although Obama’s Santiago speech was supposed to have comparable significance for the region as his 2009 Cairo address had for the Middle East (some observers even expected a speech with the scope and boldness of John F. Kennedy’s announcement of the Alliance for Progress in 1961), it offered standard fare and did not reflect any shift in policy approach. Obama mentioned “partner” or “partnership” 24 times in the speech, but failed to flesh out what this means in concrete terms. Only two modest programmes, on educational exchanges and social media, were unveiled. A modest accord on nuclear energy that was signed by the US and Chilean governments just prior to Obama’s arrival proved to be awkward in light of the recent crisis in Japan.

Central American challenge. Obama’s El Salvador visit was also dominated by symbolism. The United States was keen to show its close ties with the country’s first leftist government, which includes many former guerrillas, and send a signal that Washington now views President Mauricio Funes as its most reliable and effective interlocutor in the troubled isthmus. As a measure of his administration’s growing concern with Central American’s unrelenting, mainly drug-fueled, criminality and overall deterioration in security conditions, Obama announced a “Citizens Security Partnership in Central America” programme, backed by a pledge of some 200 million dollars in support. The effort builds on the administration’s Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
The visit’s most powerful symbolic moment came when Obama visited the tomb of Archbishop Oscar Romero, who in 1980 had been murdered by death squads of the then US-supported Salvadoran government. Although Obama offered no apologies for its historic role in El Salvador, his gesture sent an important message to the region that the United States would now be on the side of human rights in its foreign policy. In addition, though Obama made no announcement on the immigration issue — of great concern particularly in Mexico and Central America — he used the El Salvador stop to highlight the profound social and cultural connections between the region and the United States (roughly one-third of Salvadorans live in the United States).

Conclusion. According to polls, Obama is widely liked in Latin America, which in turn has improved the image of the United States in the region, although his visit resulted in scant media coverage and offered little substantive progress on key inter-American issues like trade, drugs and immigration, which are complicated by US domestic politics. While expectations among Latin Americans have been tempered over the past two years, the visit succeeded in further exposing a popular US president to Latin America — and opened up possibilities for better follow through on common challenges from energy to security to science and technology.