On September 9, 2026, the Mexico Program at the Inter-American Dialogue hosted a virtual event titled “Mexico’s Judicial Reform at Two Years: Lessons Learned, Road Ahead”. The panel evaluated what the judicial reform meant for the different areas of governance, comparing initial predictions to the current situation. The discussion highlighted how Mexico has adopted new ways to process domestic politics, including the postponement of judicial elections from 2027 to 2028. The conversation also examined how the rule of law has been affected, and the impact on bilateral relations across the economy, security, trade, and democracy.
The panel featured Pedro Salazar Ugarte, researcher and director of the Institute for Legal Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, and Jaime Olaiz Gonzalez, professor in Constitutional Theory, International Law, and American Jurisprudence at the Panamerican University in Mexico City. The session was moderated by Veronica Ortiz Ortega, a Mexican Lawyer and political analyst, and former director general of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI).
Olaiz opened by stressing that the judicial reform must be understood fundamentally as a constitutional replacement rather than a simple amendment or a shift in legal interpretation. He noted how easily the governing coalition passed these amendments, replacing the statutory legislature and capturing the judiciary under the rhetorical pretext of executing the will of the people. Olaiz stated that clear evidence shows the judicial reform is no longer subject to independent checks and balances, creating a deep problem with institutional legitimacy. He warned that investors are uncertain about how new judges will perform and predicted that the Mexican government itself is highly likely to lose complex international litigation due to a lack of preparation and transparency.
Salazar added that individuals elected under this reform lack the technical capacity to perform judicial duties. He commented that the Mexican Supreme Court no longer operates in separate chambers. Official judicial statistics reveal a steep imbalance, with the government winning 85 percent of cases compared to just 15 percent for non-state actors. He stated that an important issue is transparency in judicial decisions, as this is the data that allows Mexicans to know how the judicial system is being held accountable in the country.
Ortiz addressed that no other country in the world has a popular election in its judicial system. There are other countries that have judicial elections, but not a popular vote for electing justices of the Supreme Court. Panelists underscored that candidate selection under the judicial reform is driven by political interest rather than technical merit. Critics, they highlighted, argue that replacing professional qualifications with political party nominations and popular votes severely undermines judicial independence.
Ortiz centered on how seat distribution following the 2024 elections enabled constitutional amendments under Article 135. Salazar stated that the Electoral Court validated an allocation under Article 54 that applied the 8 percent overrepresentation cap to individual parties rather than the coalition, granting the governing coalition the two-thirds congressional supermajority required to pass major judicial reforms regarding minority representation. To assist a public largely unfamiliar with the candidates or the complex electoral process, organizers distributed “cheat sheets” (acordeones) with explicit voting instructions, raising serious concerns regarding the transparency and overall legitimacy of the election itself.
On the economic front, the speakers highlighted Mexico’s vulnerability in international disputes, particularly due to the lack of technical expertise within the restructured judiciary. Panelists directly linked the judicial reform to decreasing foreign direct investment, noting that businesses may hesitate to deploy capital when the rule of law is compromised. Consequently, in the context of the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) and ongoing trade conflicts, the private sector may increasingly turn to international arbitration rather than relying on domestic courts.
The discussion also addressed whether the judicial reform responds to the structural problems that existed within Mexico’s justice system before its implementation. Olaiz and Salazar argued that the system that existed before the reform was flawed. Nevertheless, they highlighted that several of the system’s most persistent weaknesses, particularly underfunded prosecutors’ offices and public defenders, were left unattended. They maintained that if the government’s objective was to improve public safety and access to justice, greater resources should have been directed toward these institutions rather than focusing primarily on restructuring the judiciary. They also questioned whether changing the way judges are selected could effectively address longstanding problems such as institutional capacity and unequal access to justice. The panelists further warned that extending judicial elections to the state and local levels could create new vulnerabilities, particularly to political pressure and illicit financing from organized crime.
The speakers concluded that the capture of Mexico’s judiciary is simultaneously political, economic, and potentially criminal. They emphasized that judicial independence must be treated separately from political power, warning that without a strong public demand for checks and balances, neither citizens nor international business will have reason to believe in the country’s legal system.
