The Western Hemisphere cannot be justly accused of lacking regional and multilateral mechanisms purportedly aimed at strengthening co-operation. Drawing up a full inventory of such mechanisms, and explaining their purpose and role, is in itself a considerable task.
The proliferation of regional groupings stems in part from a longstanding aspiration in Latin America and the Caribbean for greater unity and integration. In some ways, this is an old and familiar story. But in the age of globalization, that aspiration also derives from the determination of such countries as Brazil and Venezuela to assume more active regional leadership —along with the relative decline of U.S. influence in hemispheric affairs. As Latin American countries face a widening range of foreign policy options they also seek increased breathing space and distance from the hemisphere’s dominant power.
While it is preferable to have weak institutions than no institutions at all, it would be better still to have regional and sub-regional groupings that are able to effectively tackle common problems and challenges, from drugs, security and democracy and human rights to trade, the environment and migration. What is striking about the hemisphere’s current multilateral arrangements is the extent to which they have, on balance, underperformed. This is particularly so in light of the gravity of the shared agenda, and the expectations created in the early post-Cold War years about vigorous co-operation.
The obstacles have been fundamentally political, both within countries —the United States included— and among nations. The notion of collective action on key policy challenges that would gradually erode barriers of sovereignty has given way to the salience of nationalism, resulting in high degrees of tension, fragmentation and disarray.
On economic, technological, demographic and cultural fronts integration is moving forward, albeit by fits and starts, and absent the idea of an all-encompassing Free Trade Area of the Americas. But as bilateral strains mount, drug-fueled violence spreads, and democratic safeguards and the rule of law in some countries erode, the mobilization of the hemisphere’s political resources has been disappointing.
To be sure, there have been some successes that, in a hemisphere devoid of regional groupings, might not have otherwise been achieved. A Brazilian initiative launched in 2008, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was able to help defuse tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, and also assisted in brokering a political accord in Bolivia. But it is unclear whether UNASUR and the associated South American Defence Council (CDS) will become sufficiently institutionalized to deal, for example, with the fundamental threat of organized crime and the risk of an arms race in the region. Among UNASUR members, levels of mistrust are high and governments are generally reluctant to cede too much control on such sensitive questions.
The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the latest grouping that will be formally launched in Caracas in July 2011, is exclusively regional. The United States, Canada and Europe do not take part. Bolivian President Evo Morales has said that CELAC will supplant what he sees as the U.S.-dominated Organization of American States (OAS).
The OAS has had more than its share of difficulties and frustrations, particularly surrounding the 2009 crisis in Honduras. Member states have long expressed disappointment with the organization’s performance. Still, despite its shortcomings, the OAS has developed a remarkably advanced normative and juridical framework, and has had some real accomplishments in resolving conflicts throughout its history. The formation of CELAC might provide added impetus to the United States and Canada to revitalize and reform the OAS.
It will take some time before the incipient regional groupings acquire more definite shape and a clearer purpose. Some political posturing will be inevitable, and national governments may well turn inward to deal with many of their problems. It is unlikely, however, that such reactions will succeed in resolving the underlying problems that continue to deepen and that require meaningful co-operation.
In the post-financial crisis context, Latin America’s resilience and multiple strengths have been on display and deserve to be recognized. But the region’s vulnerabilities are serious, and cannot be adequately addressed without effective multilateralism.
This piece is the foreword to a compilation of articles published by the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), Latin American Multilateralism: New Directions.
The entire publication can be accessed below.
