Tangible improvements in relations since President Barack Obama’s regional debut at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago have been elusive. Frustrations persist over stalled progress on longstanding disputes and the obstacles created by divergent foreign policy priorities and domestic political constraints.
ANALYSIS: The Summit of the Americas, held April 17-19, 2009, was President Barack Obama’s introduction to the main issues and personalities in Latin America and the Caribbean. In general, the region’s heads of states responded positively to the new US president. Obama committed to working with other countries in the Americas on “joint approaches to…common challenges” such as climate change and the global economic crisis. His notably measured handling of contentious issue like US relations with Cuba and Venezuela showed promise for more constructive ties.
Obama’s moderate tone and call for a “new beginning” helped improve the overall mood in hemispheric relations, increasingly tense by the end of President George W. Bush’s tenure. At the close of the Summit, the intentions of the Obama administration appeared relatively clear: to strengthen partnerships with regional powers like Mexico and Brazil, pursue a common regional agenda with other allies, and curry favor in Latin America by revamping unpopular US policies regarding Cuba and counternarcotics.
However, it soon became clear that US domestic political factors and bureaucratic inertia would make it difficult for Washington to deliver progress on issues such as reducing military involvement in Latin America or ending the Cuba embargo. Strains with key allies such as Brazil over policies on Honduras and Colombia posed difficulties for the implementation of Obama’s post-Summit agenda, while the sensitive matter of Iran’s involvement in Latin America (especially President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad’s welcome in Brasilia) further aggravated tensions.
Unexpected complications. Two unforeseen developments in the months following the Summit sidetracked US policy towards the region:
• Honduras. On June 28, Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was forced out of office in a coup universally condemned throughout the Americas. After months of stalled negotiations, Washington, which had taken a strong stand against the coup, ultimately helped broker a solution in which previously scheduled elections for a new president would be recognised. The prospect of Zelaya’s restoration was left up to the Honduran Congress. The compromise was expressly counter to the positions taken by other influential regional governments such as Brazil and Venezuela, which argued that elections could not go forward under a de facto government. This left Washington sharply at odds with some other Latin American governments on the first major Latin American crisis of Obama’s presidency. This created some disappointment in the region and raised some doubts about whether US policy had in fact changed.
•US-Colombia pact. Details of a forthcoming military cooperation pact between the United States and Colombia were leaked to the Colombian press in August 2009. The agreement, ultimately signed in October, revived suspicions in South America about US military motives in the region. Although the terms of the pact — a ten year accord granting the United States access to seven Colombian bases to combat drug trafficking and Colombia’s insurgency — essentially maintained the previous US policy laid out under Plan Colombia, the necessary diplomatic groundwork with Colombia’s South American neighbours was ineptly managed. While tensions eventually subsided, the episode struck many Latin Americans as incongruous with the spirit of the Obama administration’s stated regional approach.
Domestic politics, again. The complications posed by these situations were compounded by partisan wrangling in Washington over Honduras and Cuba policy that delayed the confirmation of two important Obama nominees for Latin America — Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela and Ambassador to Brazil Thomas Shannon — and stood in the way of implementing Obama administration policy goals towards the region.
Domestic politics in both the United States and Latin America remain a constant challenge to developing constructive partnerships. From the outset of his term, Obama’s agenda has been inundated, with other priorities taking precedence over issues of concern to Latin American governments such as immigration and trade. The November 2010 mid-term elections in the US render further progress unlikely for this year. At the same time, the February ruling of Colombia’s Constitutional Court against President Alvaro Uribe’s bid for another presidential term could make the US-Colombia agenda — including a pending free trade deal — somewhat easier to tackle.
Politics in Latin America similarly pose problems to pursuing a common agenda. While Obama’s personal appeal has helped improve the US image in the region, longstanding US policies on Cuba and anti-narcotics remain an effective rallying cry for many Latin American politicians. Modifications to these policies that are perceived as politically important in the United States (such as lifting restrictions on travel and remittances to the island by Cuban-Americans) strike many Latin Americans as inconsequential, and puzzling in light of Obama’s professed boldness.
New ‘new beginning’? In 2010, with key officials now in place, the Obama administration has pursued a number of high-profile opportunities to re-engage with Latin America and move forward on the agenda spelled out in the Trinidad and Tobago Summit:
•The administration responded forcefully and quickly to devastating earthquakes in Haiti and Chile. Obama promised “unwavering support” to Haiti and initiated an unprecedented US relief operation, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other high-ranking officials asked to coordinate the US response. Obama has pledged 2.8 billion dollars in aid, while emphasising that the United States has no desire for a long-term presence in the country. It was also noteworthy that on April 13, first lady Michelle Obama made her first solo overseas stop in Haiti.
•Clinton made a high-profile trip to the region in March to reassure key allies of Washington’s commitment to pursuing common hemispheric goals, visiting Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Costa Rica and Guatemala — countries selected to demonstrate the varied types of partnerships Washington was seeking to forge. Brazil’s rebuff of US support for tougher sanctions against Iran for its nuclear programme dominated media coverage of Clinton’s visit.
•On April 12, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates signed an agreement with Brazilian counterpart Nelson Jobim that involves joint training, military exchanges, and logistical collaboration on anti-drug efforts. Gates then travelled to the region to help reassure Andean allies Peru and Colombia. To reinforce that core message, in mid-April Valenzuela also made a trip to the Andes, with stops in Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. The US-Brazil pact is more limited and thus likely to prove far less controversial than the US-Colombia military cooperation agreement.
Outlook. The Obama administration is seeking to regain its footing in Latin America. The Clinton visit and security accord with Brazil reveal an interest in finding opportunities for collaboration, especially with key strategic allies. Given the continuing drug-fuelled violence in Mexico, and the ever-deepening ties between both countries, that bilateral relationship will get particular attention, as reflected by an array of US Cabinet-level and Congressional visits in recent months. Still, on issues that are regarded as politically sensitive in the United States, Obama is likely to move with considerable caution.
CONCLUSION: US-Latin America relations are at a crossroads. Although underlying frictions and misunderstandings continue to pose obstacles to forging stronger partnerships, in early 2010 the Obama administration has made some progress in repairing damage from past missteps and setting the stage for better relations.
