Since Hugo Chavez first came to power in Venezuela in early 1999, there has been no shortage of speculation about how the regime would ultimately end and what scenarios would eventually follow. Yet few, if any, contemplated the possibility that Chavez would end up leaving the political scene he so thoroughly dominated for 14 years as a result of a severe illness, at the age of 58.
Charting the Course of the Chavista Movement
Chavez managed to construct his autocratic rule and self-described Bolivarian Revolution through a combination of sheer charisma, political astuteness, and lots of money to spend, thanks chiefly to the oil windfall he enjoyed (oil prices went from roughly $10 in 1999 to well over $100 during the period of his presidency). He went about systematically concentrating power, riding roughshod over institutions that had previously enjoyed a measure of independence such as the judiciary. Chavez ran the country in notably arbitrary fashion, with scant checks or constraints on his authority. He made all key decisions.
When Chavez announced that he had cancer in June 2011, the degree to which Venezuelan institutions had become hollowed out was sharply exposed. All of the main figures that had joined the Chavista movement – whether because of ideology, power, money or utter loyalty to the comandante – were strikingly ill-prepared to assume the reins of government. All of them had been eclipsed and overshadowed by Chavez. Chavez had skillfully played them off of each other to enhance his own position and power. He was in charge, and his followers played secondary roles at best.
In this context, opposition forces faced formidable obstacles to make any headway to effectively challenge the regime. True, after 14 years, there was fatigue with Chavez’s rule and the government’s performance was quite dismal by most measures (including vast shortages of basic goods and crumbling infrastructure). But Chavez had established a strong emotional connection with many Venezuelans – especially poor Venezuelans – and he had enough resources to sustain a patronage apparatus that promised better times ahead. In October 2012, in Chavez’s third re-election, the opposition showed greater unity and more effective leadership than it had in the past, but it still proved no match for the advantages that typically accompany a petro-authoritarian state.
Maintaining Continuity in the post-Chavez Era
In the immediate post-Chavez period, the government retains enormous advantages. For starters, the opposition not only lost by a wide margin in the October presidential elections, but was also resoundingly defeated by the Chavista PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) in the December 2012 regional elections. Moreover, Chavez’s illness – and the government’s peculiar handling of a very bizarre situation – threw the opposition off balance. In light of the compassion and sympathy for Chavez among Venezuelans, it made little political sense for the opposition to quibble over what must have struck much of the population as relatively trivial constitutional concerns. Yet, understandably frustrated by the government ignoring its own constitution, some opposition figures did precisely that, making it even more difficult to maintain morale and unity and regroup after two consecutive electoral defeats.
Within Chavismo, there are several factions that risk divisions and fierce infighting at some point, but for the immediate term there is every incentive to stay together, at least looking at another six-year presidential term. Chavismo, after all, is a particular mix that encompasses strands of socialism, militarism, and nationalism – and that only Chavez was able to hold together.
The two principal factions are led by Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela’s vice president, who Chavez designated as his successor on December 8 2012, and Diosdado Cabello, the head of the National Assembly. Maduro, a former union leader who was previously National Assembly president and had served for six years as foreign minister, is clearly ideologically on the left, and reportedly close to the Cuban government. While completely loyal to Chavez and the ultimate ‘yes man’, Maduro, at the same time, is regarded as someone with a pragmatic streak and willing to make deals.
Cabello, also a Chavez loyalist who served as governor and is vice president of the PSUV, is a former military official who played a key role in Chavez’s return to power following the April 2002 coup. Unlike Maduro, he has close ties to the military in a government whose military influence – both in the executive branch and at the regional level – has been quite considerable (and underreported). Cabello is also seen as a leader of a significant group widely known as the ‘boli-oligarchy,’ that has become rich during the Chavez years, reportedly as a result of rampant corruption. Cabello’s followers have a great deal invested in a system in which they have plainly prospered.
While neither Maduro nor Cabello can remotely match Chavez’s charisma and intense sentimental bond with Venezuelans, their political skills should not be underestimated. As Chavez loyalists, they have presumably learned a great deal over the past 14 years, and are likely to work out some power-sharing arrangement to manage and sustain the prevailing system.
To be sure, they will also have to contend with and placate other factions within the Chavez camp, as well as figures such as energy minister Rafael Ramirez, former vice president and current foreign minister Elias Jaua, and Chavez’s brother and governor of their home state of Barinas, Adan Chavez. Although it would be surprising if strains and tensions were entirely absent within Chavismo, it is also reasonable to expect that the government will find a way to handle them, and thereby, preserve continuity.
Challenges in the Long Term
In the short-term, there will probably be an election with Maduro as the government’s candidate and Chavez’s chosen successor, pitted against an opposition candidate – possibly Henrique Capriles, who lost to Chavez in the last presidential election, but was one of only three opposition figures who won the governor’s race in December’s regional elections. In such a contest, Maduro would have a decided edge, though a Capriles victory is not inconceivable. It would require serious missteps by Maduro and unusual organisational prowess and energy mounted by a dispirited opposition.
The critical question, however, is what is likely to happen in Venezuela in the medium-term under a re-elected Chavista government, probably headed by Maduro. In that circumstance, once power is secured through the ballot box, the differences within the government camp could well become more pronounced and more difficult to contain.
This would especially be the case if Venezuela’s economy continues to be in such dire straits and the government is forced – as many experts believe it will – to devalue the Bolivar. The current situation, marked by a huge fiscal deficit and debt, the region’s highest inflation level, and spreading shortages of basic goods, will be very hard to sustain. At the same time, however, there have been predictions in the past about the collapse of the Venezuelan economy that have not come to past. If oil prices remain high and Venezuela continues to get substantial loans from China and elsewhere, the government may well have sufficient margin for manoeuvre to weather the enormous economic pressures. In any case, the economy is likely to be the most critical variable that will severely test a re-elected Chavista government.
Without Chavez on the scene, Venezuela’s foreign policy ambitions are likely to be more restrained. Venezuela will remain a leftist government and continue to join with and support other, like-minded governments that are similarly intent on seeking to curtail the power and influence of the United States. But it is doubtful that Venezuela under Maduro or any other Chavista leader will have the resources – or Chavez’s uniquely Bolivarian vision of regional solidarity – to fully sustain the country’s role as chief benefactor for a number of countries and an ideological referent of the Latin American left.
Particularly, with Maduro in charge, the very close relationship with Cuba will surely not be broken, though economic constraints will be felt (Cuba now gets an annual subsidy of about $4 billion in discounted oil shipments) and other Chavista factions (including within the armed forces) may press to reduce Cuba’s heavy dependence on Venezuela. Other economic and political relationships that have been forged over the past decade or so are likely to be maintained, though there might be a change in emphasis or intensity (for example, one could expect the visible geopolitical alliance with Iran to lose a good deal of its stridency.) Although other leftist governments in the region such as Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia will take a hit because of reduced subsidies, for now, they are in a sufficiently strong economic position to weather the loss.
Over the longer-term, the key to Venezuela’s success will be moderate, incremental change that will take into account the risks of upsetting the country’s fragile social peace. The society is sharply polarised and there is enormous mistrust, so any abrupt move could be risky. Better decision-making on Venezuela’s economy will be the product of seeking to build consensus among diverse sectors.
That does not mean going back to pre-Chavez days; those days are over. It does, however, mean constructing a governance system that prizes the give-and-take of honest, democratic politics and that recognises the social injustices Chavez identified but, given his insatiable appetite for power, proved patently unable to redress.
