On July 29, 2025, the Inter-American Dialogue hosted the virtual event, China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) in Latin America, which considered how the GSI aligns with Beijing’s broader foreign policy and what implications it may hold for hemispheric security and U.S. strategic interests.
Dialogue President & CEO Rebecca Bill Chavez opened the event, noting a significant shift from China’s historically low-profile regional security engagements toward a more assertive position on national sovereignty and non-interference articulated through the GSI and other initiatives. Chavez questioned whether the GSI represented rhetorical positioning or a strategic evolution capable of reshaping regional security and challenging United States–led frameworks. In the ensuing discussion, panelists largely agreed that the GSI represents an intentional, strategic effort by China to reshape global security norms and strengthen its geopolitical influence, particularly among nations of the Global South.
Carla Freeman, director of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Foreign Policy Institute considered the GSI as part of Xi Jinping’s broader vision for “holistic security,” noting a distinct shift from China’s traditional economics-first approach toward security-centric partnerships that integrate political, technological, economic, ecological, and cultural dimensions. Freeman noted the GSI was launched shortly after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and then codified into Chinese foreign relations law by 2023, underscoring its seriousness as an organizing principle.
Xiaoyu Pu, associate professor and director of Graduate Studies at the University of Nevada, Reno, echoed Freeman’s remarks by explaining the GSI as part of a broader Chinese strategy aimed at delegitimizing United States–led security alliances while positioning Beijing as a provider of international public goods. Pu expanded upon this point by characterizing the GSI as a global extension of China’s earlier regional security initiatives, which have also aimed to enhance China’s international status and build solidarity with countries in the Global South. However, he emphasized that while the GSI’s ambitions are considerable, China’s ability to replace or fully compete symmetrically with U.S. security alliances remains uncertain, leading to what he described as “asymmetric competition.”
Andrei Serbin Pont, director of Argentina’s Coordinador Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES) and Brian Fonseca, director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute at Florida International University, both considered how and whether China’s security engagement with Latin America is strategically nuanced and/or heavily tailored to local needs and gaps in U.S. assistance. Serbin Pont described China’s strategy of building relationships directly with subnational governments, bypassing central authorities, and creating dependencies through critical infrastructure investments, surveillance technologies, policing equipment, and training programs. He provided concrete examples from Argentina, such as the donation of Chinese armored vehicles, Chinese drone deployments along national borders, and local government adoption of Chinese surveillance technology. Serbin Pont also noted China’s tactical flexibility, exemplified by selective withdrawal from high-profile military deals (such as fighter jets), focusing instead on engagements that ensure sustained influence.
Fonseca underscored three main distinctions in China’s approach to security cooperation with the region. These included China’s emphasis on law enforcement rather than military cooperation, its willingness to engage at subnational levels, and blurred boundaries between military and policing functions. Fonseca argued that China’s model—less constrained by legal and normative considerations—allows it to operate where the United States does not. Fonseca noted that China’s provision of surveillance infrastructure, police training, and safe city systems often comes with fewer human rights safeguards and greater strategic entrenchment. Fonseca concluded by encouraging the United States to recognize demand for non-military assistance and to become more agile in delivering it—though without emulating China’s model.
During the Q&A session with audience members, panelists addressed regional perceptions of the GSI and other Chinese initiatives. Serbin Pont emphasized that perceptions remain mixed, with some actors viewing China as a non-coercive partner and others increasingly wary of dependencies. Freeman noted that countries in Southeast and Central Asia are also cautiously managing their security ties with China, especially given Beijing’s proximity and growing influence. Panelists recommended that U.S. policymakers pursue more flexible and responsive engagement strategies at subnational levels, prioritize empathy and alignment with local interests, and maintain core commitments to human rights and transparency to effectively compete with China’s expanding influence under the GSI.
In closing, Inter-American Dialogue Senior Advisor Margaret Myers, who moderated the event, reiterated a need to closely track the GSI’s evolution and its strategic implications for hemispheric security and U.S. interests, as well as the importance of nuanced U.S. and regional policy responses to China’s multifaceted security engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean.
