A “triumph of diplomacy” was how Brazilian President Lula da Silva portrayed Brazil and Turkey’s recent nuclear accord with Iran. And that’s what it looked like at first. The two countries managed to clinch a deal similar to the agreement that the US and other world powers had unsuccessfully pursued last year. But, shortly thereafter, US Secretary of State Clinton announced that the US, Russia, Britain, France, and China (i.e., the permanent members of the UN Security Council) had agreed to tighten sanctions on Iran—precisely what the Brazil/Turkey initiative was supposed to prevent. Lula’s diplomacy had not prevailed. This confusing sequence of events raises several critical questions about Brazil’s global agenda and influence.
First, what motivated the Lula government to tackle the seemingly impossible task of stopping Iran’s development of nuclear weapons—which has eluded the US and everyone else? The answer starts from the consensus view of Brazil’s leadership that their country must have a lead role in world affairs—that it must actively participate in framing the global agenda, shaping international arrangements, and addressing the world’s common problems. This self-perception has led Brazil to an extremely ambitious foreign policy.
Brazil’s and Lula’s recent international successes (including the president’s selection this year as the globe’s most influential leader by Time magazine) have given Brazil the confidence and credibility needed to take on expansive, high-risk challenges such as Iran. And Brazilian diplomats, having forged a close, trusting relationship with Iran, believe their country now has the capacity to constructively influence Iran’s nuclear policy, through persuasion not force.
Economic interests and its own nuclear aspirations are also frequently cited to explain Brazil’s nuclear diplomacy in Iran. Neither, however, is likely to be playing much of a role. Brazil’s $1.2 billion per year in exports to Iran is just not all that significant for Brazil’s $1.8 trillion economy. While there are parallels between Brazil’s and Iran’s nuclear activities (and those parallels are worth serious discussion), no one today is concerned about Brazil manufacturing a bomb or transferring nuclear materials to terrorists. What happens with regard to Iran is unlikely to have much impact on Brazil’s nuclear program.
Second, what did Brazil and Turkey accomplish in Iran? Actually, not much. It was just not enough for the two countries to reach an agreement with Teheran. They also needed to find common ground with Washington and the other major powers, which they did not do. The inadequacy of the Brazil/Turkey deal became quickly apparent when Iranian President Ahmadenijad declared Iran would not stop enriching uranium—the central demand of the US and almost everyone else. A second critical demand, for intrusive UN inspection of Iran’s nuclear activities, was also missing.
Brazil and Turkey should have represented their initiative more modestly, perhaps as a test of Iran’s flexibility and willingness to negotiate seriously, or as an effort to build Iran’s confidence in negotiations (as Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim suggested at times)—and not as a solution to the dangers of a nuclear Iran or as a challenge to US policy favoring sanctions. Chances of success might have also been greater if Brazil had not so vehemently defended Iran’s nuclear activities—and been so dismissive of the evidence (like hidden enrichment facilities and a missile development program) that Iran intended to produce atomic weapons.
At the same time, the US—if it had not been so narrowly focused on preserving a big power consensus for stronger sanctions against Iran—could have taken better advantage of the deal negotiated by Brazil and Turkey. Washington could have praised what the two countries had achieved, criticized the agreement’s lapses (without suggesting it was fatally flawed), and encourage them to continue discussions with Iran. But the US chose simply to dismiss the Brazil-Turkey deal with Iran.
Finally, what does Brazil’s nuclear diplomacy reveal about its global reach and influence? The agreement with Iran (and the cooperation with Turkey to achieve it) powerfully demonstrated Brazil’s global presence and its capacity to shape debate and discussion, if not outcomes, on virtually any issue it chooses. Even if some critical assumptions and judgments were deficient, Brazil’s willingness to take on the Iran issue and its determination in the face of US opposition, has probably reinforced Brazil’s international stature.
On the other hand, Brazil has almost surely lost ground with the Washington. The Obama Administration has been particularly vexed by Brasilia’s steadfast defense of Iran’s right to enrich uranium and its seeming indifference to the threat of a nuclear armed Iran. In the coming period, Washington is likely to be more cautious about supporting or deferring to Brazil’s aspirations for international and regional leadership. But Brazil has demonstrated that it can act and affect events even when the US energetically resists. Although it did not accomplish much this time, Brazil has again showed it has to be taken seriously as a global force.
